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INTRODUCTION
In many countries, market mechanisms are used to generate incentives for efficiency in 
health care markets. However, markets may suffer from market failures, resulting in an 
inefficient use of resources. Economists can help to design and tweak markets such that 
the public goals that have been set are reached. It is thus important to understand these 
market failures and to advance policy proposals that can help to avoid these failures.
In most OECD countries, markets play an important role in the delivery of health care. 
Additionally, in several OECD countries markets play an important role in the financing 
of health care, by means of health insurance markets, as well. This is for example the 
case in the United States, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Israel (OECD 2018). Such 
health care markets consist of a complex interaction between consumers, insurers and 
providers. Generally, in these health systems consumers buy health plans from compet-
ing health insurers. These health plans give consumers access to a network of providers 
when they seek treatment. An insurer and a provider negotiate over the inclusion of the 
provider into the insurer’s network. These negotiations result into contracts that include 
for example the reimbursement rates. Hospitals compete with each other to be included 
into an insurer’s network based on their contracts. Health insurers compete with each 
other based on their health plan premiums and the breadth and quality of their provider 
networks (Gaynor et al., 2015).
A potentially important source of market failure in health care is insufficient competi-
tion between health care providers. In that case, health insurers are not able to bargain 
effectively with providers. This results in high reimbursement rates and, most likely, high 
premiums. Another potential source of market failure is that health insurance markets 
can by affected by selection problems and information frictions. There is selection in the 
health insurance market when insurers cannot price all risk characteristics and riskier 
consumers choose more comprehensive health plans (Handel, 2013). Adverse selection 
can induce insurers to offer health plans with the goal to encourage self-selection by 
healthy individuals. Furthermore, information frictions may hamper optimal consumer 
choice in health insurance markets. A mismatch between people’s preferences and their 
health insurance choices is then created (Handel & Kolstad, 2015). This thesis examines 
these market failures in the context of the Dutch health care system. It focuses on (i) 
market power in the provider market and (ii) selection and inertia in the insurance 
market.
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1. DUTCH HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
In the Dutch health care system, market mechanisms were stepwise introduced with 
a major market-oriented reform in 2006 (Helderman, Schut, Van der Grinten, & Van de 
Ven, 2005). This reform was largely based on the Dekker plan (Dekker, 1987), which was 
drafted almost 20 years earlier. With the reform, ‘regulated competition’ was introduced 
in the Dutch health system: i.e. a regulated market with competing providers and com-
peting health insurers.
The current Dutch health care system is characterized by mandatory health insur-
ance with open enrollment. Since 1 January 2006 each person who lives or works in 
the Netherlands is obliged to buy health insurance. Private health insurer companies 
offer health plans based on a standardized benefits package, which is defined by the 
government. Health insurers have to accept all applicants for each health plan that they 
offer at a community-rated premium. Each year, individuals can switch health plans 
during the annual open enrollment period (December-January). Insurers compete with 
each other mainly on premium and service. The government expects that the insurers 
become prudent buyers of care on behalf of their insured populations (Van de Ven & 
Schut, 2008). Since health insurers cannot refuse applicants or charge a higher premium 
for individuals that are expected to have high health care costs, they have an incentive 
to select individuals that are expected to have low costs. To mitigate this selection incen-
tive, a risk-adjustment system is in place. This risk-adjustment system aims to eliminate 
as much as possible the predictable profits (losses) on low-risk profile (high-risk profile) 
individuals emanating from community rating.
Since 2005, health care providers gradually received more freedom to determine 
prices as well as the quantity and quality of production. For example, in the hospital 
market, which is largest market in terms of total expenditure, the percentage of revenue 
for which providers can freely set their prices increased from on average 10% in 2005 
to about 70% in 2012. The role of the insurers in this regulated market is twofold. First, 
they offer health plans to citizens. Second, they negotiate contracts with health care 
providers concerning the delivery of health care. An important bargaining instrument 
for health insurers is selective contracting. When offering health plans, insurers can limit 
the set of contracted providers for which the costs are fully reimbursed. Hence, they are 
allowed to contract selectively. This threat empowers insurers to negotiate lower prices 
or higher quality.
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2. HOSPITAL MARKET FAILURE
The first potential market failure discussed in this thesis is market power in the provider 
market. We focus on hospital markets, which accounts for the largest share (i.e. more 
than one third) of total healthcare expenditure in the Netherlands1. Since the 1980s, 
hospital sectors in many OECD countries have become increasingly concentrated as a 
result of mergers (Gaynor, Ho & Town, 2015). In hospital markets, where competition 
should create incentives for efficiency (Gaynor & Town, 2011), an increase in market 
concentration means that there may be less competitive pressure in the market. This 
may result in higher prices and/or lower quality.
An increasing number of empirical studies have investigated the price effects of hos-
pital mergers. Most of these studies have shown that although mergers may bring about 
meaningful reductions in marginal costs, mergers between rival hospitals are likely to 
raise prices in concentrated hospital markets (Gaynor & Town, 2011; Gaynor et al., 2015).
In many developed countries, an important policy instrument to prevent dominant 
positions (market power) is merger control. Competition authorities are entrusted 
with this instrument to prohibit anticompetitive mergers in order to keep markets 
competitive. However, the traditional approaches used to prospectively review mergers 
are especially problematic in hospital markets. Generally, these methods first define the 
relevant market for the industry being studied and then use market shares to infer how 
the merger could affect competition in that market (Shapiro, 2010). In order to delineate 
the relevant market, they typically rely on disputed methodologies and the conclusions 
drawn from the resulting analysis typically depends heavily on how that market is de-
fined. Given the critical role for merger control in keeping hospital markets competitive, 
it is important to develop reliable methods that competition authorities can implement 
to effectively review mergers. A recent development is the use of merger simulation 
models to assess the competitive effects of hospital mergers.
My first three research questions are about market concentration in the Dutch hospi-
tal industry and its (potential) implications for market outcomes. Due to a large number 
of hospital mergers, hospital market concentration in the Netherlands has substantially 
increased. From 2004 to (August) 2018, 30 hospital mergers were reviewed by the Dutch 
Competition Authority. From these 30 reviewed mergers, one merger was forbidden 
by the Competition Authority, one was accepted with remedies and three approved 
mergers were in the end not realized by the merging parties. Currently (August 2018) 
there are 68 hospital organizations in the Netherlands. Due to the above described 
1 In 2018 total hospital expenditure is projected at 24.9 billion euro, which is 36% of total projected 
expenditure on curative and long-term health care (69.2 billion euro). These figures are derived from 
the 2019 Budget Memorandum, available at http://www.rijksbegroting.nl/rijksbegroting2019.html).
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merger activities, 21 of the current 68 hospital organizations consists of hospitals that 
have merged between 2004 and (August) 20182.This indicates that the concentration 
in the Dutch hospital market has substantially increased during the last 14 years. In this 
thesis we will: (i) investigate the effect of a hospital merger on prices, (ii) evaluate the 
use of a merger simulation model to assess the price-effects of a hospital merger, and 
(iii) examine the relationship between hospital market concentration and quality of care.
To date, research on the causal effect of mergers on prices in the Dutch hospital mar-
ket is limited. By examining the effects of one specific hospital merger case on various 
hospital products in depth, we want to determine how mergers may affect prices in 
the Dutch hospital market. In most hospital merger studies, the unit of observation is 
the merged hospital. That is, hospital products are aggregated and prices are averaged 
across different payers. In practice, however, price effects of a hospital merger may vary 
between different hospital locations, different products and different insurers. There-
fore, my first research question is (discussed in Chapter 2): For a merger between two 
neighboring hospitals in the Netherlands, do the prices increase after a merger and 
do we observe differential price changes between different hospital locations, differ-
ent products and different insurers?
As discussed above, recently, economists have developed new methods for review-
ing mergers: merger simulation models. Specifically for hospital merger simulation, 
the Option Demand Method has been developed. This method uses a Nash-bargaining 
framework to model the hospital-insurer interactions, where the added value that a 
hospital brings to a health plan network is measured through a logit demand model. 
However, there is still not much empirical evidence that such simulation models are 
able to produce reliable predictions. An approach to evaluate the predictive power of a 
merger simulation model is to compare the predicted price effects from the simulation 
model with the actual price effect of a consummated hospital merger. Hence, my sec-
ond research question is (discussed in Chapter 3): What is the predictive power of the 
Option Demand Method for mergers in the Dutch hospital market? We examine this 
question by contrasting the prediction of the simulation model with the post-merger 
price effects examined in Chapter 2.
Next to prices, quality of care may also be affected by (changes in) the level of compe-
tition. Gaynor and Town (2011) argue that in hospital markets without regulated prices 
the impact of competition on quality is ambiguous. This is supported by empirical evi-
dence from the US and UK. To date empirical evidence about the relationship between 
competition and quality in the Netherlands is lacking. My third research question is 
2 Author’s own calculation based on data on hospital organizations from Volksgezondheidenzorg.info 
and a merger list from the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM). For a detailed historical 
description of merger activities in the Dutch hospital market, see chapter 2 in Roos (2018).
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(discussed in Chapter 4): What is the relationship between competition and quality in-
dicators in the Dutch non-price-regulated hospital market? We examine this question 
by analyzing three diagnosis groups (cataract, adenoid and tonsils, bladder tumor) de-
livered by Dutch hospitals in the period 2008-2011. For these three diagnoses the Health 
Inspectorate (current name: Dutch Health and Youth Care Inspectorate) published for 
each hospital outcome, process and structure indicators. Using these indicators, we 
evaluate the relationship between hospitals’ quality scores and market concentration.
3. MARKET FAILURES IN HEALTH INSURANCE
Health insurance markets play an important role in the financing of health care in vari-
ous countries, including the United States, Netherlands, Switzerland and Israel. In these 
countries, consumers buy health plans from insurers that give them access to health 
care in case they fall ill. Insurers bargain with providers to create provider networks for 
their enrollees. It is thus important to have an efficient health insurance market that give 
health insurers appropriate incentives to buy health care efficiently and to offer health 
plans that matches the preferences of the enrollees. As discussed above, the presence of 
adverse selection and inertia are impediments to an efficient health insurance market.
For many people, choosing the right health plan is a complex task. First, people have 
to search for relevant information and have to understand all the dimensions of the 
health plans (such as provider networks, reimbursement rates and deductible schemes). 
In addition, people have to predict their health care demand and expenses for the next 
year, since at the moment of choosing their health plan for the coming year, they do not 
exactly know what their health care needs will be. There is a growing number of studies 
finding that most consumers in health insurance markets are poorly informed and often 
do not actively and carefully evaluate their health plan choices (Ericson & Sydnor, 2017). 
Optimal consumer choice in health insurance markets is hampered by both frictions 
(inertia, search and switching cost) and a lack of knowledge (health insurance illiteracy); 
see for example Abaluck & Gruber, 2011, Bhargava, Loewenstein, & Sydnor, 2015, Handel, 
2013, and Handel & Kolstad, 2015. A mismatch between the theoretical optimal choices 
and the actual choices of the individuals can lower consumer welfare.
On the other hand, well-informed consumer choices can lead to adverse selection 
when high-risk consumers choose more comprehensive health plans and/or low-risk 
consumers choose less comprehensive health plans. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show 
that adverse selection can result in the underinsurance of low-risk individuals and even 
in a market without a stable equilibrium.
In this thesis, we identify and examine inertia and selection in the context of voluntary 
deductibles in the Dutch health insurance market. This analysis starts with the empirical 
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identification of the exact magnitude of selection, which is challenging, because of the 
interaction of selection with moral hazard (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). The mere fact 
that people who opt for a voluntary deductible have lower health care expenses does 
not, in itself, prove the presence of adverse selection, because the deductible may also 
induce more cost conscious behavior (i.e. less moral hazard). Importantly, in the Dutch 
health insurance market, which contains an comprehensive risk-adjustment system, it 
is a priori not clear if contracts with voluntary deductibles are profitable for insurers 
given the prevailing risk-adjustment system, since the goal of the system is to eliminate 
the predictable gains (losses) on low-risk profile (high-risk profile) individuals. My fourth 
research question is thus (discussed in Chapter 5): How large is the selection effect 
for individuals who chose voluntary deductibles in a health insurance market with 
risk-adjustment? By examining people’s deductible choice taking account of their prior 
health care expenses, we are able to identify the selection effect separately from moral 
hazard effect. In addition, we examine whether people opting for voluntary deductibles 
are over- or undercompensated by the risk adjustment scheme.
As shown by Handel (2013) and Handel et al. (2015), adverse selection may be coun-
teracted by consumer inertia. Hence, in case of consumer inertia the welfare loss due 
to suboptimal health plan choice may be compensated by a welfare gain due to less 
adverse selection. This interaction between adverse selection and consumer inertia is 
the subject of my fifth and final research question (discussed in Chapter 6): Is adverse 
selection effectively mitigated by consumer inertia in the Dutch health insurance 
market? By examining how previous as well as future health costs affect the choices 
individuals make regarding their voluntary deductible, we try to determine the extent 
of inertia and adverse selection regarding the uptake of voluntary deductible contracts. 
The Dutch market for mandatory basic health insurance has an interesting feature: i.e. 
people can annually adjust the voluntary deductible without changing health plans. 
This feature can be exploited for an empirical identification of the relationship between 
prior health care expenses and deductible choice, which can provide an indication of 
the extent of inertia and adverse selection in deductible choice.
15
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ABSTRACT
In most studies on hospital merger effects, the unit of observation is the merged 
hospital, whereas the observed price is the weighted average across hospital products 
and across payers. However, little is known about whether price effects vary between 
hospital locations, products and payers. We expand existing bargaining models to allow 
for heterogeneous price effects and use a difference-in-differences model in which price 
changes at the merging hospitals are compared to price changes at comparison hos-
pitals. We find evidence of heterogeneous price effects across health insurers, hospital 
products and hospital locations. These findings have implications for ex ante merger 
scrutiny.
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1. INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of empirical studies have been conducted concerning the price 
effects of hospital mergers. In general, the aim of these studies is to test the effectiveness 
of antitrust policy. In competitive markets, the aim of preventive merger control is to 
prohibit anticompetitive consolidation. To determine whether a merger between two or 
more firms will result in anticompetitive price increases and/or quality decreases, anti-
trust authorities need to carry out a prospective review of the merger. However, merger 
reviews in the healthcare sector encounter specific difficulties because there are unique 
factors that render the most commonly used tests for measuring geographic markets 
less reliable in healthcare than in other sectors (Elzinga & Swisher, 2011). Retrospective 
studies are aimed at providing a better understanding of the effects of mergers, which, 
in turn may improve future antitrust policy.
The majority of the studies on retrospective merger analyses indicate a positive 
correlation between hospital mergers and prices (see e.g. Gaynor & Town, 2012; Vogt 
& Town, 2006; Gaynor & Vogt, 2000 for reviews). In most of these studies, the unit of 
observation is the merged hospital, whereas the observed price is the weighted average 
across different hospital products and across different payers. However, little is known 
about whether price effects vary between different hospital locations, different products 
and different payers. Because merged hospitals often continue to operate at different 
locations, produce multiple products and negotiate prices with a range of payers, an in-
teresting question is whether these differences matter. If it turns out that they do matter, 
this may have important implications for ex ante merger scrutiny by antitrust authorities.
This article considers the question of whether the price effects of a hospital merger 
vary between locations, products and third-party payers (i.e. health insurers). By means 
of a hospital-insurer bargaining model, we show that the price effects of a hospital 
merger may vary and that the differences between locations, products and insurers 
may influence the outcome of hospital-insurer price setting differently. We show that 
the price effects differ between locations, products and insurers depending on: (i) the 
degree of substitution between the merging hospitals for different products, (ii) the 
relative bargaining ability of hospitals and insurers and (iii) the pre-merger price-cost 
margins. We then use a unique national dataset on hospital-insurer negotiated contract 
prices for each hospital product in the Netherlands to investigate whether the price 
effects of a merger between a general acute care hospital (henceforth hospital M1) 
and a neighboring general acute care hospital that also provides tertiary hospital care 
(henceforth hospital M2) vary between different hospital locations, different products 
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and different insurers. The merger that we study was consummated in the Netherlands 
in year t3.
Our article relates to two literatures. First, we build on the literature that structurally 
estimates multilateral bargaining models of healthcare competition. In general, these 
models contribute to our understanding of price setting mechanisms in the healthcare 
industry. This is relevant because standard oligopoly models are not applicable to the 
hospital industry (Gaynor et al., 2015). Because the current Dutch healthcare system 
bears evident similarities with the US healthcare system, we are able to build on the 
models that were developed for the US health market by Gaynor and Town (2012) (here-
after: GT) and Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) (hereafter: GNT). Following these models, we 
describe a bargaining model in which hospital-product prices are bilaterally negotiated 
between insurers and hospitals. We show how hospital-insurer negotiations translate 
into product prices, and by adapting the GT and GNT models for hospital mergers we 
show that the price effect of a merger between two hospitals may be heterogeneous de-
pending on the degree of substitution between hospitals, the relative bargaining ability 
of hospitals and insurers and the pre-merger price-cost margins of different products 
at both merging hospitals. The most important contribution of this article to hospital-
insurer bargaining models is that we, unlike GT and GNT, endogenize the product price 
ratio. That is, the models by GT and the GNT both assume that hospitals and health 
insurers bargain over a single base price per hospital, holding product-price ratios of 
each hospital fixed. This means that in both benchmark models each hospital entering a 
network always provides all treatments. Our model, in contrast, allows for the situation 
in which a hospital may be contracted only for a subset of treatments. In section 2, we 
explain that this assumption better matches current practice where contracts between 
hospitals and insurers can be concluded for a subset of treatments.
Second, we build on the literature on retrospective analyses of hospital mergers. Since 
the 1980s, hospital sectors in many OECD countries have become increasingly concen-
trated as a result of mergers (Gaynor and Town, 2012). Merger activity has fueled a public 
and scientific debate about the consequences of mergers and the desirability of further 
concentration of healthcare sectors. An increasing number of empirical studies have 
been conducted concerning the price effects of hospital mergers. Most of these studies 
have shown that although mergers may bring about meaningful reductions in marginal 
costs and therefore improve welfare overall, mergers between rival hospitals are likely 
to raise the price of inpatient care in concentrated markets (Gaynor and Town, 2012). We 
3 For reasons of confidentiality, we only report those results that are of direct interest to this article. We 
anonymize the names of the merged hospitals, rival hospitals and insurers. For the same reason, the 
merger year is reported as t (which was between 2005 and 2012), with the year preceding the merger 
as t-1 and the year following the merger as t+1.
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build on these studies, but disaggregate the merger price effect and show that the price 
effects of a merger between two hospitals may differ between locations, providers and 
products. With that, we contribute to a better understanding of the effects of mergers, 
which, in turn may also improve future antitrust policy.
This article is structured as follows. We start with the bargaining model. We then dis-
cuss the applicability of this model to the Dutch hospital market (section 3) and describe 
the merger that we study (section 4). The next sections concern the empirical model 
(section 5) and the data (section 6). In section 7 we present the results and section 8 
discusses the policy implications. Finally, our main findings are summarized in section 9.
2. THE MODEL
To explain the possibility of heterogeneous price effects of hospital mergers we consider 
a game-theoretical model of hospital-insurer bargaining, following the lines suggested 
by Gaynor and Town (2012) (GT) and Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) (GNT). These papers 
build on earlier literature analyzing hospital-insurer bargaining, notably Gal-Or (1997); 
Town and Vistnes (2001); Capps et al. (2003) and Gaynor and Vogt (2003).
To keep our model as simple as possible, we adopt a two-stage set-up following the 
base model of GNT. In the first stage of this model, health insurers4 bargain and contract 
with hospitals on behalf of their insured and in the second stage, each consumer receives 
a health draw and seeks treatment at the hospital that maximizes his utility. Because 
the consumer commits to a restricted network of hospitals when he buys health insur-
ance, he has the option of visiting any of the contracted hospitals when he is in need of 
specific care.
Like in the models by GT and GNT, we simplify some elements of the bargaining game: 
we condition on the network of the insurer5 and do not allow consumers to switch insur-
ers in response to a network change. Following GT and GNT, the bargaining solution 
used in this article is based on the framework that was developed by Horn and Wolinsky 
(1988). While not imposing a complete non-cooperative structure, this framework nests 
a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium within a cooperative game theoretical concept of a 
Nash bargaining solution.
4 GNT use the term managed care organization or MCO if they refer to insurers that use provider 
networks and negotiate prices with providers. We refer to similar organizations, but use the term 
‘health insurer’ instead as this is the more commonly used term in the Netherlands.
5 There is some work on network formation games, with Ho (2009) being the most notable. Ho (2009) 
estimates the parameters of managed care organization’s (MCO) choices of provider network focus-
ing on the role of different networks on downstream MCO competition (Gowrisankaran et al., 2015). 
Like GT and GNT, we treat the insurers’ network structure as given.
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To be able to explain heterogeneous price effects over products, we need to allow for 
flexibility in the price ratios between different products of the same hospital. Both the 
GT and the GNT models consider heterogeneous insurers, hospital locations and hospi-
tal products. However, they fix all the product-price ratios at the level of the respective 
disease-weight ratios. In their models, the hospitals are constrained to negotiate a single 
base price per hospital location and the prices for different products are computed as 
a product of the base price and the disease weight6. Our model deviates from this as-
sumption by freeing the product-price ratios. While in both benchmark models each 
hospital that enters a network always provides all treatments, our model allows for the 
situation in which a hospital may be contracted only for a subset of treatments. This 
also better matches practice where contracts between hospitals and insurers can be 
concluded for a subset of treatments. For example, in the US, we observe cases in which 
hospitals shifted resources and activities to central profitable services, while reducing or 
eliminating some loss making services (i.e. the so-called specialty service lines) (Beren-
son et al., 2006). This is in line with the anticipated strategy change towards integrated 
care delivery systems (Porter, 2009). Furthermore, there is an increase in the use of 
bundled payments, global payments or alternative quality contracts by health insurers 
(e.g. Chernew et al. 2011; Delbanco, 2014; Song et al. 2014). In these settings, a single 
payment covers the services that providers deliver to treat a given condition or provide 
a given treatment. Hence, in these cases, a price has to be determined for each bundle. 
Also in the Netherlands, which data we use when estimating the model parameters, 
hospitals may be contracted only for a subset of services. Interviews with health insurers 
and hospital representatives who were involved in contractual negotiations during our 
study period indicated that especially for high-revenue products insurers and hospitals 
bargain separate prices. In the Netherlands, it is usually the insurers that initiate selec-
tive contracting of procedures. Dutch health insurers have imposed rules on contracting 
certain types of operations. For example, one insurer selectively contracts providers of 
breast cancer surgeries (CZ, 2015), whereas another selectively contracts 15 hospital 
products (VGZ, 2014). As a result of selective contracting or hospitals’ choices, in prac-
tice, the full hospital or a subset of procedures in a hospital may be contracted.
Model set-up
Following GT and GNT, we analyze hospital-insurer bargaining in a model with multiple 
hospitals and health insurers. For ease of comparison, we follow the model notation by 
GNT. In this model, there is a set of hospitals that is indexed by j = 1, ..., J; and a set of 
6 Each year, the Center for Medicare Services publishes DRG weights. The DRG weights measure the 
mean resource usage by diagnosis. In the model, they reflect the resource intensity of treatment. 
Using the DRG weights with a base price does not allow for heterogeneous price effects of mergers.
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health insurance companies indexed by m = 1, ..., M. Each consumer buys insurance at a 
particular health insurer and hence the set of enrollees for a particular health insurer is 
indexed by i = 1, ..., I. With probability fid enrollees may be stricken by illness d  ∈ {0, 1, ..., 
D}, where d = 0 means no illness.
In our model, we associate each illness with a hospital product7. Let Dj denote the list 
of all products of hospital j. We assume that the range of products may differ between 
hospitals. The set of all hospitals (each of which delivers a certain range of products) is 
subdivided over S ≤ J systems. Here J denotes the number of hospitals, and S denotes 
the number of hospital systems. Ms will denote the respective set of all systems. Each 
system s  ∈ Ms is associated with a subset in the hospital-product space of all treatment 
options (jd) that can be provided by this system, where index j refers to hospitals and 
index d to products. Ls denotes the list of treatment options (jd) with which hospital j 
of system s enters the hospital-insurer bargaining game. For the sake of simplicity, we 
consider the situation in which each system is initially represented by one hospital (i.e. 
S = J).
For any consumer i, we denote his health insurer by m(i). Following the base model 
version of GNT, we assume that m(i) is chosen via long-run employer/health insurer 
contracts and hence, we assume that m(i) is fixed. This implies that we do not allow con-
sumers to switch insurers in response to a network change8. We also treat the network 
of each health insurer as given. That is, we assume that each health insurer enters the 
negotiations with some set of hospital systems and bargains with each of these systems 
over the prices of products. The network of insurer m denoted by Nm defines all hospital-
product pairs available to the enrollees of insurer m. By introducing the notation Nmd for 
the subset of hospitals that provide product d in network Nm, we obtain the expression: 
N m =  ∪ d∈ {1,…,D} ,j∈ N md  ( jd ) .
Value functions of a health insurer and a hospital system
When falling ill with illness d, the patient seeks treatment at a hospital that gives him 
the highest utility level. The utility function from the treatment of illness d at hospitals 
j is given by
7 Please note that d can also be a cluster of products.
8 GNT also present a modification of their base model to include the possibility that an enrollee may 
choose between different health insurers. In their posted premium model extension, the framework 
is as follows: (i) the health insurers set their network, (ii) the health insurers post their premiums 
simultaneously and (iii) the enrollees choose their health insurers. The bargaining process of the 
posted premium model is similar to the base model, except that the threat points are different. Since 
the results of the base model broadly align with the extended posted premium model, we follow the 
relatively simpler base model.
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 u ijd = β  x ijd +  e ij  (1)
where  x ijd is a vector of hospital and patient characteristics such as travel time, hospital 
quality, or other characteristics, β is the associated vector of parameters and  e ij is an i.i.d. 
error term that is distributed type 1 extreme value. We assume that getting treated at a 
hospital does not require an out-of-pocket payment from the patient (see below). The 
patient with illness d may visit any of the contracted hospitals that provide this treat-
ment in the insurer’s network or an outside option. Following GNT, we assume that the 
outside option is treatment at a hospital located outside the market. The outside option 
is denoted by j = 0, so that the associated characteristics are normalized:  x i0d = 0 .
Health insurer m provides its enrollees a set of treatment options at hospitals in its 
network Nm, where each option (jd)   ∈ Nm listed in the insurance policy allows patients 
access to hospital j for treatment of disease d. Therefore, the utility function of enrollees 
introduced above results in the following expression for the probability that patient i 
with disease d chooses hospital j:
 s ijd ( N m (i)  ) =   δ ijd  _  ∑  k∈ { 0,N m (i) ,d }   δ ikd  (2)
where  δ ijd = β  x ijd , j ∈  { 0,  N m (i) ,d } . The notation  N m (i) ,d denotes the subset of treatment 
options available to individual i enrolled at insurer m for treatment of illness d. Since the 
right hand side of equation (2) does not depend on prices and only includes product vd, 
s ijd ( N m (i)  ) =  s ijd (  N m (i) ,d ) .
It is important to note that GT and GNT differ in their position towards copayments. 
GT assumes that enrollees pay a premium to their insurer, which gets them access to 
the provider network without any additional payments, whereas GNT considers an 
extension in which they also model out-of-pocket payments (i.e. the negotiated base 
price multiplied by the coinsurance rate and the resource intensity of the illness). The 
GT model without copayments is in this respect similar to the GNT model with zero 
coinsurance rates. Because our empirical analysis focuses on the Netherlands and in the 
Netherlands, coinsurance as defined by GNT in the hospital sector is nonexistent9, we 
follow the approach of GT or, put differently, the approach of GNT with zero coinsur-
ance rates. For our model this means that the utility from treatment does not depend 
on hospital prices and hence the resulting choice probabilities are also independent of 
product prices.
9 Also copayments are very limited. There is a yearly mandatory deductible that the patient pays when 
he starts using healthcare. However, the deductible is limited to a fixed amount. Since most hospital 
prices are higher than this amount, each patient receiving treatment at any hospital would generally 
pay the same deductible. Hence, deductibles are expected to hardly affect patient hospital choice.
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The ex ante expected utility to patient i from network  N m ( i )  is then:
 w i ( N m (i)  ) =  ∑ d=1 D  f id ln ( ∑ j∈ { 0, N m (i) ,d }  exp (  δ ijd ) )  (3)
Aggregating over the enrollees of insurer m, we obtain:
 W m ( N m ) =  ∑ 
i=1
 
I
 1 { m (i) = m }  w i (  N m ) 
Denoting the prices that insurer m pays to hospital j for treatment d by  p mjd , we obtain 
the insurer’s total cost as follows:
 TC m ( N m ,  p m ) =  ∑ i=1 I ∑ d=1 D 1 { m (i) = m }  f id  ∑ j∈ { 0, N md }  p mjd  s ijd (  N m )  (4)
Following GNT, we assume that the health insurer is seeking to maximize the sum of 
the enrollee surplus (equal to  w i -  premium m for each consumer) and the insurer’s profit 
(equal to  premium m - expected   cost m ( i ) for each consumer) over all enrollees. Under this 
assumption, the value function of the health insurer is the difference between the ex 
ante expected utility of all the enrollees and the total payment to the hospitals treating 
these enrollees:
 V m ( N m ,  p m ) =  W m ( N m ) -  TC m (  N m ,  p m )  (5)
Note that in GNT the health insurer acts as an agent for the employer and, thus, cares 
equally about both enrollee welfare and insurer profit10. With that, it is assumed that the 
incentives of health insurers and enrollees are perfectly aligned which implies that both 
terms in equation (5) will have equal weights11.
Substituting into this expression equations (3) and (4), and rearranging the terms, 
we derive the same expression in terms of prices and choice probabilities. Since both 
expected utility and the payment to the hospital are separable in products d, the total 
value function of a health insurer has an additive structure over the products. This can 
be seen as follows:
10 This is also a reasonable assumption in the Netherlands, where the provision of basic insurance is 
subject to strict rules so that Dutch health insurers too not only care about profit maximization, but 
also enrollee welfare. Having originated from social insurance funds, some insurers even explicitly 
state that they continue to carry out social mission. See section 3 for more details.
11 If we assume stronger power on the enrollee or the health insurer side, we would have to impose a 
higher weight to the respective term (as discussed in Gowrisankaran et al., 2015 and Gaynor et al., 
2015).
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 V m ( N m ,  p m ) =  W m ( N m ) -  TC m ( N m ,  p m ) 
=  ∑ 
i
 1 {m (i) 
= m} ∑ 
d
  f id (ln [ ∑ j∈ {0, N md }  exp (  δ ijd ) ] -  ∑ j∈ {0, N md }   p mjd  s ijd ( N m ) ) 
=  ∑ 
d
  ∑ 
i
 1 {m (i) = m}  f id (ln [ ∑ j∈ {0, N md }  exp (  δ ijd ) ] 
-  ∑ 
j∈ {0, N md } 
  p mjd  s ijd ( N m ) ) 
=  ∑ 
d
  W md ( N md ) -  TC md ( N md ,  p md ) =  ∑ 
d
 V md (  N md ,  p md ) 
where  p m   is the price vector of all product prices negotiated by insurer m,  p md denotes 
the subvector of product d’s prices,  N md is the subset of options for product d,  W md ( N md ) = 
∑ i 1 { m (i) = m }  f id ln [ ∑ j∈ { 0, N md }   exp (  δ ijd ) ] and  TC md ( N md ,  p md )     =     ∑ d  ∑ i 1 {m (i) = m}  f id  ∑ j∈ { 0, N md }  
p mjd  s ijd (  N m ) . Since the choice probabilities do not depend on product prices, the enrollee 
surplus from each product also does not depend on prices of other products.
Following GT and GNT, we assume profit maximizing hospitals, which is typical in the 
health economics literature, especially because numerous studies found that the behav-
ior of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals is similar12. The marginal cost of providing 
product d in hospital j for health insurer m can then be denoted by  mc mjd :
 mc mjd = γ  ν mjd +  ∈ mjd  (6)
where  ν mjd denotes a fixed effect,  γ is the associated parameter and ​  ∈ mjd is an error 
term. Because we assume that hospitals are maximizing their profits, we let each hospi-
tal system s maximize the total profits earned from the contracts with health insurers:
 π ( M s ,  N m ,  p m ) =  ∑ m∈ M s   ∑  ( jd ) ∈ L s  (  p mjd -  mc mjd )  q mjd (  N m )  (7)
where  q mjd denotes the production volumes of the hospitals under hospital-product 
system s and  mc mjd is the marginal cost of treatment d at hospital j for enrollees of insurer 
12 In this article, we assume that hospitals are profit maximizers, but Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006) 
and Gaynor et al. (2015) have shown that output maximization can be incorporated in the standard 
hospital utility function in addition to profit maximization by using perceived marginal costs instead 
of actual marginal costs.
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m. 13 Because of our assumption on the consumer utility function, the volume delivered 
by the hospital system only depends on the set of treatment options included in the 
network and not on the prices of these options. The production quantities of hospital j 
are then expressed by:
 q mjd ( N m ) =  ∑ i 1 { m (i) = m }  f id  s ijd (  N m )  (8)
Bargaining problem
There are  M  ×  S potential contracts. However, in our model, each contract specifies the 
prices of treatment options that are contracted by the insurer and the hospital system, 
and not the base prices of the hospitals that enter the system, as in the models by GT 
and GNT. Following GT and GNT, we assume that bargaining occurs under complete 
information about the characteristics of enrollees and hospitals and we consider the 
Nash Bargaining solution price vector that results from the maximization of the product 
of the exponentiated value functions of both parties from agreement, conditional on 
all other prices. Based on the theoretical contributions by Binmore et al. (1986), Horn 
and Wolinsky (1988) and Collard-Wexler et al. (2014), it is assumed that the prices of 
each contract are negotiated conditional on the prices of all other contracts and that the 
agents do not change their strategies when they observe the outcome of the contracts 
that have already been concluded. That is, if one negotiating pair fails, the other pairs 
will continue the negotiation process conditional on their initial assumptions regarding 
the pricing outcomes of the other pairs (‘passive beliefs’). The introduction of these as-
sumptions corresponds with the models that were developed in the recent literature on 
hospital-insurer negotiations (in particular, GT and GNT). Here, we additionally assume 
that both insurers and hospitals appoint their negotiating teams per product. Therefore, 
bargaining on one product occurs separately from other products.
Under these assumptions, the objective of the Nash bargaining problem of health 
insurer m and system s is as follows:
 NB m,s ( p m,s | p m,-s ) 
=  ( ∑ d [ ∑  ( jd ) ∈ L s  q mjd (  N m ) (  p mjd -  mc mjd ) ] ) 
 b s ( m )  
 
×  ( ∑ d [  V m ( N m ,  p m ) -  V m ( N m \ L s ) ,  p m ) ] )  b m ( s )   
13 Marginal costs may differ between insurers, for example because of differences in administrative 
costs. If we assume, however, that marginal costs are the same over insurers, we could drop index m 
from the notation of marginal costs.
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where  b s ( m )  and  b m ( s )  are the bargaining weights of system s and health insurer m re-
spectively. The weights characterize the bargaining abilities of both negotiating parties. 
They are normalized to sum up to one.  p m,s and  p m,-s denote the insurer’s prices of the 
treatment options at hospitals that participate in hospital system s and those that do not 
participate in the system, respectively.
The Nash equilibrium is a vector of prices that maximizes the Nash bargaining value 
specified above. Each price vector maximizes the value for the negotiating pair, condi-
tional on the other prices:
 p mjd * =  argmax 
 p mjd 
 NB m,s (  p mjd ,  p m,- ( jd )  * |  p m,-s * )  (9)
The new notation  p m,- ( jd )  
* denotes the equilibrium price vector consisting of all negoti-
ated prices between insurer m and system s except for  p mjd .
Although each team negotiates separately, different negotiating teams of the same 
agent would generally take into account the effect of their decisions on patient flows 
for other products of the same agent. However, as according to equation (2) patient 
flows are fully determined by the network structure (i.e., the set of treatment options) 
and not by prices, the decisions of different product teams of the same agent will not be 
dependent on each other. This can be seen as follows. Consider that hospital j negotiates 
with insurer m over the price of product d, conditional on the other prices. We partition 
the set of all diseases into  { D ‘ , d,  D ‘’ } =  {  d 1 , … , d D } , where  {  D ‘ , d } covers the subset of 
products with which hospital j enters the network of insurer m and D’’ covers the rest. 
Because m(i) is fixed, a hospital system that fails to reach agreement with a particular 
insurer regarding treatment option (jd) cannot capture any profit on this treatment op-
tion from the enrollees of this health insurer. Therefore, the disagreement outcome of 
the hospital system in negotiation over this treatment option will be zero. The payoff 
structure in bargaining between insurer m and hospital j over (jd) will then be:
 j agree d =  π jd ( N md ,  p md ) +  π j, D ‘  (  N m D ‘  ,  p m D ‘  ) 
 j disagree d =  π j D ‘  (  N m D ‘  ,  p m D ‘  ) 
 m agree d =  V md ( N md ,  p md ) +  V m D ‘  ( N m D ‘  ,  p m D ‘  ) +  V m D ‘’  (  N m D ‘’  ,  p m D ‘’  ) 
 m disagree d =  V md ( N md \j,  p md ) +  V m D ‘  ( N m D ‘  ,  p m D ‘  ) +  V m D ‘’  (  N m D ‘’  ,  p m D ‘’  ) 
This payoff structure implies that the difference between the agreement and disagree-
ment payoffs in negotiations on any product d only depends on the part related to that 
particular product. In particular,  j agree d -  j disagree d =  π jd (  N md ,  p md ) and  m agree d -  m disagree d =  V md ( 
N md ,  p md ) -  V md (  N md \j,  p md ) . Hence, only these terms will be relevant for the derivation of 
the price  p mjd . Note that bargaining over this price only occurs if the sum of the payoffs 
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is positive:  j agree d -  j disagree d +  m agree d -  m disagree d > 0 , therefore each ‘link’ (jd) included in the 
network must satisfy:
 π jd  ( N md ,  p md ) +  V md  ( N md ,  p md ) -  V md  ( N md \j,  p md ) =  W md  ( N md ) -  W md  ( N md \j) -  mc mjd 
q mjd ( N md ) -  ∑ 
l≠j,l∈ {0, N md } 
  p mjd ( N md ) ( q mld ( N md \j) -  q mld ( N md ) ) > 0 
Hence, hospital j will produce product d only if this condition is satisfied. The payoff 
structure outlined above leads to the following Nash bargaining problem with respect 
to  p mjd :
 max 
 p mjd | N md , p m,-j,d 
 (  j agree d -  j disagree d )  b s ( m )    ( m agree d -  m disagree d )  b m ( s )   
where  p m,-j,d corresponds to the price vector of contract prices of hospitals other than j 
in the subset of treatments options  N md . The same type of Nash bargaining problem as 
described above is considered in GNT and GT, with the difference that their problem is 
formulated for a hospital’s base price, keeping a product weight fixed in accordance to 
the disease weights of different diagnoses.
From the first order condition (FOC) of this problem, we derive the expression for 
product prices:
 p mjd =  b s ( m )   
 W md ( N md ) -  W md (  N md \j )   _______________ q mjd  +  b m ( s )   mc mjd +  b s ( m )   ∑ k≠j [  p mkd  d md 
jk ] 
where  d md jk =  
 q mkd ( N md \j) -  q mkd (  N md )  ___________ q mjd  . The numerator of this ratio shows how many patients of 
insurer m with illness d will flow to hospital k if hospital j no longer treats this illness, and 
therefore  d md jk defines the disease-specific diversion share of patients with illness d from 
hospital j to hospital k. A higher value of the diversion share suggests a higher degree of 
substitution between two hospitals in treating this illness.
The expression for  p mjd suggests that a product price of a hospital is increasing in the 
hospital’s marginal costs of this product, the product prices of other hospitals, and net 
value that the inclusion of treatment option (jd) brings to the insurer’s network. In addi-
tion to these factors, negotiated prices also depend on the bargaining abilities/weights 
of the hospital and the insurer. Differences in these parameters can explain the presence 
of price differences between health insurers, hospital locations and hospital products.
Merger analysis
The merger analysis considered in our article adopts a method proposed by GT. The 
method by GT allows us to derive the expressions of product price changes in a closed 
form, which simplifies the price comparison across products and players.
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GT consider two alternative approaches to model a hospital merger of hospitals j and 
k. In the first approach, it is assumed that after the merger, these hospitals still negotiate 
prices per hospital, but take into account the impact of disagreement on the flow of 
patients to each other. In the second approach it is assumed that hospitals negotiate 
jointly and will charge the same price after the merger. Because our empirical applica-
tion deals with the situation in which hospitals continue to charge different prices after 
they merged, we follow the first approach. Please note that because in our model the 
patient flows of different products are independent of each other, the problem can be 
split and analyzed separately for each product.
Drawing from GT, we analyze the situation in which two hospitals that enter the same 
network are merging and consider the bargaining problem for product d after their 
merger has taken place (assuming that the network covers treatment options of d at both 
hospitals). If each of the merged hospitals negotiates its own price of the product, but 
accounts for the effect on the other’s patient flow, we obtain the following expressions for 
the agreement and disagreement payoffs in the bargaining problem of hospital j:
 ( j + k ) agree d =  [ p mjd -  mc mjd ]  q mjd ( N md ) +  [ p mkd -  mc mkd ]  q mkd ( N md ) 
 ( j + k ) disagree d =  [  p mkd -  mc mkd ]  q mkd (  N md \j ) 
 m agree d =  W md ( N md ) -  p mjd  q mjd ( N md ) -  ∑ 
l≠j
p mld  q mld (  N md ) 
 m disagree d =  W md ( N md \j) -  ∑ 
l≠j
p mld  q mld (  N md \j ) 
Writing down the Nash bargaining solution for this game and transforming the FOC 
of this problem, we derive the price of hospital j’s product d after the merger,  p mjd  ( j+k )  , as 
follows:
 p mjd  ( j+k )  =  b s ( m )   
 W md ( N md ) -  W md (  N md \j )   _______________ q mjd  +  b m ( s )   mc mjd +  
 p mkd  d md jk  _ q mjd  +  b s ( m )   ∑ l≠j[  p mld  d md 
jl ] 
If we then take the difference between this price and the initial price level of hospital j, 
we obtain the expression for price change due to merger (given that the marginal costs 
are not affected by the merger):
 p mjd  ( j+k )  -  p mjd =  b m (s)  (  p mkd -  mc mkd )  d md jk  (10)
The same type of derivations can be done for hospital k, with indices k and j changing 
places.
Heterogeneous price effects of hospital mergers
There are a few important conclusions that can be drawn from equation (10) with re-
spect to the price effect of a hospital merger. The first important finding is that product 
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d’s price change after the merger in each hospital is increasing in the diversion share 
between these hospitals. Since the diversion share reflects the degree of substitution 
between the hospitals, this result tells us that a merger will increase the product’s price 
more if the hospitals that partner in the merger are close substitutes with respect to that 
product. Therefore, if substitution between hospitals is stronger for one product than for 
another product14, the price increase after the merger will be higher for the first product 
and hence hospital mergers may lead to heterogeneous price effects across different 
products and different locations.
The second most important conclusion that follows from our model is that, according 
to equation (10), the price change caused by merger is proportional to the difference 
between the price and the marginal cost of the other hospital (i.e. the merger partner). 
Therefore, these differences also contribute to explaining the heterogeneity of price 
changes after the merger for different products and locations. Merging with a hospital 
whose price of product d is higher, whereas the marginal cost are lower, would result in 
a greater price increase (other things being equal).
Finally, we observe, perhaps at first sight somewhat contra-intuitively, that a price 
increase caused by merger is proportional to the bargaining ability  b m ( s )  of the insurer. 
Thus, a health insurer with greater bargaining ability against hospital system s is con-
fronted with a higher price increase after the merger. This result suggests that, although 
a greater relative bargaining ability of the insurer in comparison to hospitals provides 
the insurer with more leverage against these hospitals, this leverage advantage is re-
duced after the merger of the hospitals.
3. THE DUTCH HOSPITAL MARKET
In this article, we estimate the price changes of a merger between two Dutch hospitals. 
From the viewpoint of the bilateral bargaining model, the current Dutch healthcare 
system bears important similarities with the US healthcare system. In recent decades, 
the Netherlands, like several other OECD countries, has embraced a market-oriented 
approach to healthcare. After decades of strict governmental supply-side regulation, 
the Dutch healthcare system is currently undergoing a transition towards regulated (or 
‘managed’) competition (Van de Ven & Schut, 2009; 2008; Schut & Van de Ven, 2005). The 
main goal of the market-oriented healthcare reforms is to increase the efficiency of the 
14 The substitution rates may differ across products, for example, because for some hospital products 
patients’ willingness to travel might be higher, there is more intense competition with nearby hospi-
tals over those products or the transparency of different product markets differs.
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system and its responsiveness to patients’ needs, whereas maintaining universal access 
to care (Schut & Van de Ven, 2005).
Of particular importance to this article are the introduction of the Health Insurance 
Act (HIA) in 2006 and the introduction of hospital-insurer bargaining in 2005. Under the 
HIA, all Dutch citizens are obliged to buy standardized individual basic health insurance 
from a private insurer. The standardized basic benefits package specified in the HIA is 
fairly comprehensive and includes hospital care, GP services, prescription drugs and 
maternity care. Having bought an insurance policy, the enrollee gets access to all hos-
pitals of the contracted network without co-payments. As described in section 2, there 
is an annual deductible per adult individual, although most hospital product prices are 
higher than the fixed amount that is set by the deductible15 and hence the deductible 
does not play a role in patients’ hospital choices. Dutch health insurers are furthermore 
required to offer all applicants standardized coverage at a community-rated premium, 
the insurers have to offer all basic health insurance policies to all applicants (i.e. a guar-
anteed issue requirement) and consumers are free to choose their health insurer during 
an annual enrolment period. Risk equalization across insurers takes place to ensure a 
level playing field for health insurers and to prevent risk selection. The insurers’ market 
shares are relatively stable16.
In 2005, a product classification system for hospital and medical specialist care was 
introduced. Each activity and/or service provided by a hospital, including outpatient 
care, which is associated with a patient’s demand for care, is referred to as a Diagnosis 
and Treatment Combination (DTC)17. Following the introduction of the DTC system, the 
scope for free negotiations of prices between hospitals and health insurance companies 
has gradually increased from 10% of hospital revenue in 2005, to 20% in 2008, to 34% 
in 2009 and to 70% in 2012. For the remaining part, hospital prices are still regulated. 
For products and services included in the free-pricing segment, each hospital typically 
renegotiates the terms of its contracts with health insurers on an annual basis. Dutch 
health insurers are allowed to engage in selective contracting with healthcare providers. 
As explained in section 2, there are several cases in which the insurer contracts only a 
subset of treatments in hospitals.
15 Just 11% of all patients received treatments that cost less than 165 euro in 2011. The prices of the 
products that we consider in our article all exceed the deductible during the study period.
16 For example, the switching rate between health insurance companies in the Netherlands was 6% in 
2012.
17 The DTC system is based on the concept of Diagnosis-Related Groups but constitutes a newly de-
veloped classification system. The Dutch system originally contained 29,000 DTCs. In 2007, a project 
was initiated to decrease the number of DTCs to about 3,000. This was known as the ‘DOT revision’ 
and was implemented in January 2012.
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The two-stage model that underlies the bargaining theory developed above reflects 
how Dutch health insurers and hospitals negotiate over the products in the free-pricing 
segment: consumers buy health insurance from health insurers and health insurers 
bargain and contract with hospitals on behalf of those that they insure. In the early years 
of the reform selective contracting was limitedly used, but over the years, the number 
of health insurers offering contracts with restricted provider networks has increased. 
Furthermore, the available evidence on the nature of hospital-insurer negotiations in 
the Netherlands suggests that until 2012, hospital-insurer bargaining focused on price, 
rather than on quality of volume of care (Ruwaard et al., 2014; Meijer et al., 2010; NZa, 
2009). The introduction of the HIA has led to strong price competition between health 
insurers and health insurers have put increasing pressure on hospitals to charge lower 
prices (Schut & Van de Ven, 2011). It seems as if the threat of selective contracting, rather 
than its actual use, may already have had an impact on hospital-insurer bargaining.
4. THE MERGER
Dutch local and regional hospital markets are highly concentrated18 and mergers rep-
resent the largest change in the Dutch hospital industry nowadays as no hospitals have 
entered or exited the market since 2005. Between 2005 and 2012, 17 mergers involving 
34 hospitals were cleared by the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM)19 (www.
acm.nl), among which the merger that we study in this article. All mergers took place 
between neighboring hospitals.
The merger that we study was consummated in year t (which was between 2005 
and 2012). The merger was notified to the ACM prior to taking place20. Following the 
notification, the ACM carried out a general review of the proposed merger in which 
they made prospective inferences regarding the expected anticompetitive effects of the 
18 In 2006, the average HHI of Dutch hospitals equaled 2.350 (Halbersma et al., 2010) and since then 
no hospitals entered or exited the hospital market. Only mergers have decreased the number of 
hospitals.
19 The Authority for Consumers and Markets is the Dutch antitrust agency. The legal predecessor of the 
Authority for Consumers and Markets, the Netherlands Competition Authority, has carried out the 
review of some of these mergers. For reasons of clarity, however, we ascribe the decisions made by 
the Netherlands Competition Authority to its legal successor, which has been in charge since April 1, 
2013: the Authority for Consumers and Markets.
20 According to most antitrust laws, mergers must be reported to an antitrust authority prior to 
consummation (see 15 USC §18A for the US and the competition laws of the EU Member States or 
EC: 2004 for the European Union’s rules on prior merger notification). The Dutch antitrust law is no 
exception (Mededingingswet, section 37.2).
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merger on the market. In the Netherlands, a merger requires a license when there is 
reason to assume that ‘a dominant position that appreciably restricts competition on 
the Dutch market or a part thereof could arise or be strengthened as a result of the 
said concentration’ (Mededingingswet, Section 37.2). The merger that we study did not 
require a license and was cleared after the first general review. The decision to clear the 
merger evoked critical appraisal by health economists, however, who argued that the 
prospective merger analysis by the antitrust authority had been lacking and that it was 
likely that the merger had created a dominant position for the two hospitals involved 
(Varkevisser & Schut, 2008). Hence, this merger seems to be on the enforcement margin, 
making it an interesting case for further retrospective studies.
The locations
The merger involved a general acute care hospital (hospital M1) and a neighboring 
general acute care hospital that also provides tertiary hospital care (hospital M2). 
Hospital M1 is located in an isolated geographical area, whereas hospital M2 is located 
in a more densely populated region with several other hospitals nearby. The distance 
between hospitals M1 and M2 is about 50 kilometers21. According to the ACM, the merg-
ing hospitals were subject to competition from five other hospitals before the merger 
took place. Prior to the merger, hospital M2 was the largest competitor to hospital M1 
and therefore posed a major constraint on hospital M1’s prices, whereas hospital M2 
had multiple competitors. After the merger, hospital M1 was expected to experience 
competitive pressure from only one rival hospital, whereas hospital M2 was expected 
to experience notable competitive pressure from five other hospitals22. The differences 
in competitive pressure in the markets of hospitals M1 and M2 may result in hetero-
geneous price effects of the merger (see section 2). To find out whether the merging 
hospitals exploited this opportunity, we disaggregated the merger effect for each of the 
two merging hospital locations.
The products
In this article, we estimated the impact of the merger in three separate product markets 
that jointly make up 47.5 percent of the merged hospital’s turnover in the segment for 
which Dutch insurers and hospitals were allowed to freely negotiate prices at the time 
of the merger. We looked at hip replacements, knee replacements and cataract surgery. 
Most hospitals provide these services. In year t, 95% of all Dutch hospitals (n=97) and 
21 1 kilometer is approximately 0.621 miles
22 None of these rivals provides tertiary hospital care.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Hip replacements Knee replacements Cataract surgery
t - 1 t + 1 t - 1 t + 1 t - 1 t + 1
Panel A. Hospital M1
Volume 174 175 223 293 387 361
Gender (% male) 0.28 0.38 0.34 0.43 0.38 0.35
Patients’ average age 68 68 64 56 72 73
Patients’ average SES score 0.05 -0.14 0.15 0 0.09 -0.06
Panel B. Hospital M2
Volume 390 511 271 299 2144 2113
Gender (% male) 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.41 0.40
Patients’ average age 68 70 69 69 72 73
Patients’ average SES score 0.31 0.42 0.39 0.48 0.35 0.42
Panel C. Rival 1
Volume 165 154 164 135 1026 1045
Gender (% male) 0.27 0.36 0.27 0.29 0.41 0.37
Patients’ average age 70 71 71 69 75 75
Patients’ average SES score -0.22 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.02
Panel D. Rival 2
Volume 237 195 162 162 881 1088
Gender (% male) 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.38 0.43 0.41
Patients’ average age 70 68 68 68 73 72
Patients’ average SES score 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.28 0.22 0.26
Panel E. Rival 3
Volume 136 114 146 118 650 972
Gender (% male) 0.34 0.28 0.40 0.29 0.38 0.42
Patients’ average age 70 62 70 70 75 74
Patients’ average SES score -0.83 -0.88 -0.76 -0.69 -1.01 -0.96
Panel F. Rival 4
Volume 169 155 101 151 855 763
Gender (% male) 0.34 0.26 0.38 0.35 0.43 0.44
Patients’ average age 69 73 70 71 75 75
Patients’ average SES score 0.24 0.46 0.09 0.36 0.17 0.4
Panel G. Other hospitals
Volume 231 (14) 234 (15) 196 (12) 199 (12) 1590 (146) 1545 (137)
Gender (% male) 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.39 0.41
Patients’ average age 69 (0.37) 69 (0.25) 69 (0.27) 69 (0.26) 73 (0.32) 73 (0.29)
Patients’ average SES score -0.04 (0.05) -0.18 (0.08) 0 (0.05) -0.11 (0.07) 0.01 (0.05) -0.09 (0.07)
Notes: The standard errors are in parentheses. We excluded all hospitals that had more than 15% missing 
prices for either hip or knee replacements or cataract surgeries in the period t-2 to t+2. The fifth rival hos-
pital was therefore excluded from this analysis. Panel G displays the descriptive statistics of the hospitals 
other than hospitals M1, M2 and the rival hospitals. Within panel G, 51 hospitals performed hip replace-
ments, 56 hospitals performed knee replacements and 57 hospitals performed cataract surgeries. The rows 
on volume only report cases which have a valid gender, age and SES-score.
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2.7% of all Dutch Independent Treatment Centers (ITCs)23 (n=73) provided hip replace-
ments, 95% (hospitals) and 7% (ITCs) provided knee replacements and 96% (hospitals) 
and 15% (ITCs) provided cataract surgery. These products were also provided by hospi-
tals M1 and M2 and all five rivals in year t. At time of the merger, there were no ITCs in the 
regional market that offered any of the hospital products considered. Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics on the patients for each product in hospitals M1 and M2 and four 
rivals24 before and after the merger.
After merger, the hospitals had an opportunity to concentrate care in one of the two 
hospital locations. This does not seem to have occurred, however. Even though it follows 
from table 1 that hospital M2 provided many more hip replacements in year t+1 than 
in t-1, the provision of hip replacements in hospital M1 did not change significantly. 
The hospitals therefore do not seem to have concentrated care in hospital M2 after the 
merger. Rather, it seems that hospital M2 is, post-merger, better able to attract patients 
in need of hip replacements because the number of hip replacements performed in rival 
hospitals decreased slightly whereas the total number of patients in the market did not 
change significantly.
In hospital M1, the average age of patients undergoing knee replacements dropped 
between t-1 and t+1. Again, this does not seem to be an attempt to change patient flows 
in the merged hospitals, as the mean age of patients undergoing knee replacement 
surgery in hospital M2 did not change. However, according to hospital M1’s website, the 
hospital has been testing out an innovative procedure for knee replacements since year 
t for which only patients under 60 years old are eligible. This is likely unrelated to the 
merger, but could potentially explain the decrease in the patients’ average age observed 
in the data.
23 ITCs are comparable to freestanding Ambulatory Surgery Centers (ASCs) that operate in the US and 
UK healthcare markets (see e.g. Gaynor & Town, 2012; Carey et al., 2011). Independent Treatment 
Centers (ITCs) are typically much smaller than general hospitals and only compete on a narrow range 
of specialties. Their market share is relatively small, but their influence has increased because they 
usually offer elective care treatments, focus on the free-pricing segment and have rapidly grown 
in number and size (NZa, 2012; 2009). The joint market share of all ITCs increased from 1.5 percent 
(2005) to 4 percent (2007) of the free-pricing segment’s total returns (NZa, 2009) and from 1 percent 
(2007) to 2.3 per cent (2010) of total medical specialist care (NZa, 2012).
24 We excluded all hospitals that had more than 15% missing prices for either hip or knee replacements 
or cataract surgeries in the period t-2 to t+2. The fifth rival hospital was therefore excluded from the 
analysis. See section 5 for more information on the exclusion criteria.
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The health insurers
At the time of the merger, at least five health insurers were active in the region25. Four of 
these were independent health insurers, whereas the fifth was in fact a joint purchasing 
organization representing the majority of smaller health insurers. For reasons of clarity, 
we will henceforth treat this purchasing entity as a health insurer. All five health insurers 
are active on the national insurance market. According to table 1, the volume of patients 
has not changed significantly across hospitals, indicating that health insurers did not 
shift enrollees away from the merged hospitals to rival hospitals in t+1.
Table 2 shows the insurers’ market share for each product and for each hospital in years 
t-1 and t+1. The market shares have not changed significantly over the years. Although 
insurer 1 has the largest market share per product per hospital (its market share ranges 
from 61% to 84%) it is not the largest health insurer nationally26. Regional market shares 
reflect the continuing effect of the former regional legal monopoly positions of local 
health insurers (a policy that was abolished in 1992) (Halbersma et al., 2010).
25 In fact, there are six health insurers active in the region. However, for the sixth health insurer, we did 
not have valid prices in the post-merger year (t+1) for the merging hospitals M1 and M2. This health 
insurer was therefore not included in the difference-in-differences estimates or in any other analysis. 
The effect of excluding this health insurer for hospital M1 and hospital M2 is most likely negligible, 
however, because the health insurer only accounts for less than 2% of all hip, knee and cataract 
patients in hospitals M1 and M2.
26 For reasons of confidentiality, we cannot report the national market shares of the health insurers.
Table 2. Health insurers’ market share per product per hospital in t-1 and t+1
Market share 
insurer 1
Market share 
insurer 2
Market share 
insurer 3
Market share 
insurer 4
Market share 
insurer 5
t -1 t +1 t -1 t +1 t -1 t +1 t -1 t +1 t -1 t +1
Panel A. Hospital M1
Hip replacements 0.76 0.74 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.07
Knee replacements 0.69 0.61 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.06
Cataract surgery 0.84 0.77 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.06
Panel B. Hospital M2
Hip replacements 0.62 0.62 0.08 0.06 0.19 0.17 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08
Knee replacements 0.69 0.62 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.20 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.08
Cataract surgery 0.70 0.71 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.08
Notes: The health insurers’ market shares are based on the number of cases per hospital-insurer-product 
combination.
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5. EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION
We use data on hospital-insurer negotiated contract prices in the Netherlands for each 
of the three hospital products considered, to investigate whether the merger between 
hospitals M1 and M2 has led to price changes and if so, whether this effect varies be-
tween locations, payers and products. There are several ways to calculate price changes 
post-merger. The first method is to calculate the post-merger price change for each 
hospital product indexed on, for example, the average price change over all hospitals. 
However, these price changes would only give us a crude indication of the effect of the 
merger as it does not take account of changes in prices that would also have occurred if 
the merger had not taken place.
Although our model focuses on the price effects that follow from the interaction 
between health insurers and hospitals, large post-merger price increases for merged 
hospitals in comparison to prices among a control group could be consistent with at 
least four hypotheses according to the empirical literature (Haas-Wilson & Garmon, 
2011; Adams & Noether, 2011): (i) the merger created or enhanced the hospital’s power 
to raise its prices for general acute inpatient services; (ii) between the years t-1 and t+1 
there was an increase in the product complexity of inpatient cases or an increase in the 
severity of patients’ illness in the merging hospitals relative to non-merging hospitals; 
(iii) between the years t-1 and t+1, the quality of care associated with the products 
improved at the merging hospitals relative to non-merging hospitals, which increased 
value and (perhaps) cost and (iv) pre-merger prices at the merging hospitals were 
lower than the competitive equilibrium prices. In other words, the post-merger price 
increases at the merged hospital could be an adjustment towards equilibrium (Garmon 
& Haas-Wilson, 2011). We call this latter phenomenon ‘catching up’. When interpreting 
our results in section 8, we will also reflect on these alternative explanations, arguing 
that the first explanation is the most likely in our case.
Because we wanted to control for price changes that would have occurred even if the 
merger had not taken place, we used a difference-in-differences (DID) model in which 
price changes at the merging hospitals are compared to price changes among a group 
of comparison hospitals which were unaffected by the merger (i.e. the control group). 
The identifying assumption of a difference-in-differences estimation is that trends (price 
trends) would be the same in both groups in the absence of the event (merger). This 
assumption is referred to as the ‘common trend assumption’. We visually investigated 
whether the common trend assumption applies by using data on multiple periods.
To examine the effect of aggregating the merger price effect, we estimated difference-
in-differences models at various aggregation levels. As a benchmark, we started with 
the most aggregated model. In other words, we first estimated the price effect for the 
merged hospital fully aggregated over hospital locations, products and insurers. We 
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then disaggregated this effect stepwise to ultimately arrive at the most differentiated 
model in which we fully differentiated the merger price effect across hospital locations, 
products and insurers. Table 3 provides a summary of the different models.
We first estimated the most aggregated model:
(11)  ln p jt = α + λ ∙  POST t + δ ∙  POST t ∙  MERGED j +  ϑ j +  ε jt 
where  p jt was the weighted average hospital negotiated price. POSTt is one in year t+1 
(the post-merger year) and zero in year t-1 (the pre-merger year), MERGEDj is one for 
the merger hospitals and zero for the control group hospitals,  λ ∙  POST t    denotes the 
change in the average price in year t+1 compared to year t-1, δ is the DID estimator (i.e. 
the average treatment effect on the treated; see Blundell & Costa Dias, 2009) and  ϑ j is 
a hospital fixed effect. To account for potential endogeneity of the merging policy, we 
matched a control group to the event group (i.e. hospitals M1 and M2). In this control 
group, we included all Dutch hospitals that provided the three products and excluded 
any other hospitals that also merged between years t-2 and t+2 and Independent Treat-
ment Centers.
To estimate the most aggregated difference-in-differences model we aggregated the 
patient-level hospital data to an average price per hospital. It is important to note that 
in the Netherlands, negotiated prices differ between health insurers but not between 
patients with the same health insurer who are treated in the same hospital. Therefore, 
we can aggregate the data to hospital-insurer level without a loss of information. 
Furthermore, due to aggregation, we do not have to consider the correlation between 
prices within each hospital-insurer combination, which would otherwise lead to biased 
standard errors (see for example Thompson, 2011; Donald & Lang, 2007 and Bertrand 
et al., 2004). First, we calculated an average price per product for each hospital-insurer 
pair. Second, we aggregated these prices over the insurers to an average price for each 
hospital-product combination, whereby we weighted the prices with the insurer’s spe-
Table 3. Continuum of aggregated and disaggregated models
Models Merger price effect
Baseline model Fully aggregated over hospital locations, products and insurers
First disaggregated model Aggregated over hospital products and insurers; disaggregated across locations
Second disaggregated model Aggregated over hospital locations and insurers; disaggregated across products
Third disaggregated model Aggregated over insurers; disaggregated across products and locations
Fourth disaggregated model Aggregated over hospital locations and products; disaggregated across insurers
Fifth disaggregated model Aggregated over hospital products; disaggregated across insurers and locations
Disaggregated model Fully disaggregated across hospital locations, products and insurers
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cific volume shares in year t-1. Third, we aggregated over the products to an average 
price per hospital, whereby we weighted the hospital-product prices with the market-
wide revenue shares for each product in t-127. We calculated an average price for the 
merged entity M1 + M2, by weighting the prices for hospitals M1 and M2 with their 
corresponding revenue shares in year t-1. We then removed the aggregations stepwise 
to show the effect of aggregating over products, locations and insurers until, finally, our 
results were disaggregated over all three sources of heterogeneity.
We investigated whether our results from the disaggregated model were robust 
to changes in the control groups by using six different control groups28: (1) all Dutch 
hospitals that provide the product, excluding hospitals that also merged between years 
t-2 and t+2 and Independent Treatment Centers; (2) control group 1, excluding all uni-
versity hospitals; (3) control group 2, excluding rivals of the merged hospitals; (4) control 
group 3, excluding the hospitals with low market power; (5) control group 3, excluding 
all hospitals with low health insurers concentration; and (6) control group 3, excluding 
hospitals of a different size to hospitals M1 and M2. We thus had twelve control groups: 
six for each hospital. Table 4 summarizes the number of hospitals in the control group.
The reasons behind the various exclusion criteria for the control groups were as fol-
lows. Control group 2 excludes all university hospitals because these generally spend 
more time on research and education and they usually treat patients with more complex 
problems than general acute care hospitals. This could result in different price trends. 
Control group 3 excludes the merged hospital’s rivals, which were identified as such 
in the ex ante merger review by both the merged hospitals and the ACM. If the merger 
hospitals exercise their newly acquired market power by raising prices, their rivals may 
respond by also raising their prices (see e.g. Dafny, 2009; Gaynor & Vogt, 2003). Because 
of this rival-effect, rivals are excluded from control group 3. Hospitals with limited 
market power are excluded from control group 4. It is generally assumed that hospitals 
with a 55 percent market share or higher have significant market power (NZa, 2008; EC, 
2004). Both hospital M1 and hospital M2 have a weighted average market share29 of 55 
27 We also estimated the models using the per hospital-product revenue in t-1 as a weighting factor for 
the aggregation over products. The results of these models do not differ from the main model and 
are therefore not included in this article. The results are available from the authors upon request.
28 We also wanted to know whether our disaggregated model was robust to hospital-specific covari-
ates. As a sensitivity check, we therefore also included hospitals-specific covariates in an additional 
difference-in-differences model (i.e. the number of patients, the percentage of males, the average 
(standardized) socio-economic status score, the average age of the patients and the weighted 
market share per hospital). The results using this model did not differ from the other disaggregated 
model effects and are therefore not included in this article. The results are available from the authors 
upon request.
29 Measured by the inverse LOgit Competition Index – see section 6 for more information
41
Price effects of a hospital merger
or higher for all three products. In control group 4, we therefore only take into account 
those hospitals that also have significant market power. We ranked the hospitals from 
control group 3 according to their weighted average market share and excluded the 
hospitals in the bottom quintile. Furthermore, to control for the effect of health insurers’ 
concentration in each hospital in control group 5, we ranked the hospitals according 
to health insurers’ HHI and excluded the hospitals in which the insurers’ HHI was in the 
bottom quintile. Finally, in control group 6, we matched the hospitals that were in con-
trol group 3 with the volume of the merged hospitals. Hospital M2 had a much higher 
volume than hospital M1 and this difference in volume may have reflected different 
costs per unit product. We therefore matched two groups of equally sized hospitals with 
hospitals M1 and M2. For hospital M2, we ranked the hospitals by volume per product 
Table 4. Number of hospitals in control groups for hospitals M1 and M2
Hospital M1 Hospital M2
Panel A. Hip replacements
Control group 1 55 55
Control group 2 50 50
Control group 3 46 46
Control group 4 38 38
Control group 5 41 41
Control group 6 36 40
Panel B. Knee replacements
Control group 1 60 60
Control group 2 56 56
Control group 3 52 52
Control group 4 46 46
Control group 5 44 44
Control group 6 44 44
Panel C. Cataract surgery
Control group 1 61 61
Control group 2 55 55
Control group 3 51 51
Control group 4 49 49
Control group 5 42 42
Control group 6 36 45
Notes: Control group 1 includes all Dutch hospitals that provide the product, excluding hospitals that also 
merged between years t-2 and t+2 and Independent Treatment Centers; control group 2 is control group 
1 excluding all university hospitals; control group 3 is control group 2 excluding rivals of the merged hos-
pitals; control group 4 is control group 3 excluding the hospitals with low market power; control group 5 is 
control group 3 excluding all hospitals with low health insurers concentration and control group 6 is control 
group 3 excluding hospitals of a different size to hospitals M1 and M2.
Chapter 2
42
and excluded the bottom quintile. For hospital M1, we ranked the hospitals by volume 
for each product and excluded the top quintile (for hip replacements and cataract sur-
geries) or the bottom quintile (for knee replacements).
6. DATA
We used a comprehensive nationwide patient-level dataset containing all inpatient 
and outpatient visits at all hospitals in the Netherlands. For each visit, the patient’s 
zip code, age (year of birth), gender, health insurer, and DTC were observed, as well as 
the price negotiated for each hospital-insurer-product combination between years t-2 
and t+2. Access to all patient-level data including negotiated prices from all insurers 
makes our dataset unique. The patient-level data that we used came from the insurers’ 
claims administration and hospital registries, and was provided by the Dutch Healthcare 
Authority.
We focused on three products for which prices are freely negotiable: hip replace-
ments30, knee replacements31 (both orthopedics) and cataract surgery32 (ophthalmol-
ogy). In year t-1, these product markets jointly accounted for 47.5 percent of turnover in 
the free-pricing segment at the merging hospitals33. We checked for obvious outliers in 
the negotiated price data by studying the following for each outlier: the average price 
of the hospital-product combination; the average price of the health insurer-product 
combination; the price change in the hospital-product combination; the price change 
in the health insurer-product combination; and the price change in the hospital-insurer-
product combination over the years. Only if the price deviated markedly from all the 
averages excluded the observation from the analysis34. In all other cases, we could not 
30 The definition used in the Dutch hospital product classification system is ‘joint degeneration of 
pelvic/hip/upper leg; surgery with clinical admission and joint prosthesis’.
31 The definition used in the Dutch hospital product classification system is ‘joint degeneration of knee; 
surgery with clinical admission and joint prosthesis’.
32 The definition used in the Dutch hospital product classification system is ‘cataract; outpatient treat-
ment with intervention’.
33 In hospital M1, hip replacements represented 18 percent, knee replacements represented 27 per-
cent, and cataract surgeries represented 6 percent of the turnover in the competitive segment in 
year t-1. In hospital M2, hip replacements represented 16 percent, knee replacements represented 
14 percent, and cataract surgeries represented 14 percent of the turnover in the competitive seg-
ment in year t-1. By way of comparison: in control group 1, hip replacements represented 15 percent, 
knee replacements represented 14 percent, and cataract surgeries represented 14 percent of the 
turnover in the competitive segment in year t-1.
34 In total, 73 hip replacements (n=66,437 before cleaning), 57 knee replacements (n=61,404 before 
cleaning) and 281 cataract surgeries (n=47,6205 before cleaning) were excluded from the dataset.
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detect measurement error with certainty and we kept the prices in the dataset. All hos-
pitals where more than 15% of prices were missing for one or more years between t-2 
and t+2 were excluded from the dataset35.
The pre-merger price was based on data from the year preceding the merger (t-1) 
and the post-merger price was based on data from the year after the merger (t+1). Table 
5 presents summary statistics on the volume and mean prices of the products within 
hospital M1, hospital M2 and control group 1.
Hospitals with limited market power are excluded from control group 4. The weighted 
average market share that was used to determine the hospitals’ market power was 
based on the LOgit Competition Index (LOCI), developed by Akosa Antwi et al. (2006; 
35 For hip replacements, 31 out of 90 hospitals had more than 15% missing prices in one or more years 
in the period t-2 and t+2 and were therefore excluded. For knee replacements, 25 out of 89 hospitals 
had more than 15% missing prices in one or more years in the period t-2 to t+2 and were therefore 
excluded. For cataract operations, 25 out of 89 hospitals had more than 15% missing prices in one or 
more years in the period t-2 to t+2 and were therefore excluded. The threshold of 15% was arbitrary. 
As a sensitivity check, we therefore also used other thresholds for the disaggregated model. This had 
no effect on the overall results or the conclusions of the article. The results are available upon request 
by the authors.
Table 5. Volume and mean prices for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery in hospitals M1, M2 
and control group 1
Hip replacements Knee replacements Cataract surgeries
t-1 t+1 t-1 t+1 t-1 t+1
Panel A. Hospital M1
Volume 172 173 222 282 381 355
Mean price (in €) 9189.58
(348.00)
10188.05
(559.08)
11022.98
(494.94)
11291.41
(651.32)
1405.00
(40.78)
1421.27
(45.08)
Panel B. Hospital M2
Volume 389 503 271 295 2140 2077
Mean price (in €) 9181.96
(144.25)
8991.34
(109.09)
10959.49
(185.30)
10321.76
(245.90)
1400.10
(20.34)
1313.40
(29.83)
Panel C. Control group 1
Volume 224 227 189 194 1520 1498
Mean price (in €) 9045.00
(338.64)
9160.96
(620.08)
10592.34
(473.51)
10608.52
(786.32)
1340,94
(72.83)
1349.43
(104.12)
Notes: The hospitals’ volume per product in this table slightly deviates from the hospitals’ volume per prod-
uct reported in table 1. In this table we only report the records with a valid price, whereas in table 1 only 
records with a valid gender, age and SES-score per product per hospital are reported. The mean prices for 
each hospital are the averaged over all patients. The mean price for control group 1 is the average over the 
mean prices of the hospitals within control group 1. The standard errors are in parentheses.
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2009). The application of the method is explained in Gaynor and Town (2012) and NZa 
(2014). First, we calculated the hospitals’ market share for each product in each zip code. 
The market share of hospital j for product d in zip code z is defined as  s jd,z =  
 q jd,z  _  ∑ j=1 J  q jd,z , where 
q jd,z   is the total number of patients at hospital j (j=1,..,J) for product d (d=1,2,3) in zip code 
z (z=1,...,Z). Second, for each hospital and product, we calculated a weighted average 
market share  s - jd =  ∑ z=1 Z  w jd,z  s jd,z  , where we weighted each market share with its share in 
hospital j, i.e.  w jd,z = 
 q jd,z  _  ∑ z=1 Z  q jd,z .
The insurer’s HHI that was used to construct control group 5 is based on the insurer’s 
market shares for each product and ranged from zero to one36. The insurer’s HHI for 
hospital j and product d: insurer’s HHIjd =  ∑ m=1 M  (  q mjd  _  ∑ m=1 M  q mjd ) 2 , where  q mjd is the total number of 
patients of insurer m (m=1, …,M) in hospital j for product d.
7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To gain a picture of the change in the market structure as a result of the merger, we 
calculated the market share of the combined entity M1 + M2 for each product and 
compared it to the weighted average of the separate market shares of hospitals M1 and 
M2. Both calculations were based on the pre-merger market shares (i.e. from year t-1)37. 
As expected, the weighted average market shares of the hospitals’ products increased 
as a result of the merger. The increase is from 76.7% to 82.5% for hip replacements, from 
78.2% to 85.7% for knee replacements, and from 83.5% to 86.6% for cataract surgeries. 
In table 6, we present the diversion shares of hospitals M1 and M2 that follow from the 
bargaining model presented in section 2. Diversion shares reflect the degree of substitu-
tion between hospitals. As indicated in section 2, a higher value of the diversion share 
suggests a higher degree of substitution between two hospitals in treating the same 
disease.
From table 6 it follows that the diversion shares of hospital M1 to hospital M2 are 
much higher. Hospital M1 is located in a more isolated region with hospital M2 being its 
strongest competitor pre-merger. As expected, a large share of patients is diverted to 
hospital M2 once hospital M1 is not available. If the more centrally located hospital M2 
would not be available, however, only few patients are expected to be diverted to hospi-
tal M1. When comparing the diversion shares over products, we find that the variation in 
36 Although it is also possible to calculate the hospitals’ HHI, we opted for the weighted average market 
share that was based on the LOgit Competition Index (LOCI) because market delineation is necessary 
for the hospitals’ HHI (in contrast to the insurers’ HHI), but the use of market delineation methods in 
healthcare markets is the subject of increasing criticism (e.g. Elzinga & Swisher, 2011).
37 Measured by the inverse LOgit Competition Index – see section 6 for more information.
45
Price effects of a hospital merger
diversion shares across products within each hospital is much smaller than the variation 
in diversion shares across hospital M1 and M2 for each product. Table 7 shows the aver-
age price increases for hip replacements, knee replacements and cataract surgeries for 
control group 1 and the merged hospitals M1 and M2, indexed on the average price in 
control group 1 in year t-1.
The table suggests that following the merger, both hospital locations charged differ-
ent prices. As argued in section 4, the differences in competition intensity between the 
markets of hospitals M1 and M2, may induce the merged hospital to charge different 
prices. The prices for hip replacements did not change substantially between years t-2 
and t+2 in control group 1. In comparison to the average control group prices in year t-1, 
the prices for hip replacements in hospital M1 increased by 13 percent after the merger 
(year t). This was the most substantial deviation from the average prices of control group 
1 for year t-1.
Table 6. Diversion shares TO/FROM hospitals M1 and M2 (in t-1)
Hip replacements Knee replacements Cataract surgery
To \ From M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
M1 - 0.105 - 0.158 - 0.034
M2 0.735 - 0.663 - 0.850 -
Notes: The diversion shares are calculated using a conditional logit model of hospital choice, following 
Capps et al. (2003). We used patient-level data from t-1 to estimate the model, which included the travel 
time between the patient’s zip code and hospital location, a dummy indicating whether the patient is older 
or younger than 65, a dummy for the patient’s gender and the socio-economic status score for the patient’s 
zip code.
Table 7. Price changes of hospitals M1, M2 and the control group pre- and post-merger (indexed on the 
average price in control group 1 in year t-1)
Hospital Control group 1
t - 2 t -1 t t +1 t +2 t -2 t - 1 t t+1 t+2
Panel A. Hospital M1
Hip replacements 99 102 110 113 111 99 100 101 101 100
Knee replacements 101 104 105 107 105 99 100 100 99 101
Cataract surgery 101 103 102 104 100 98 100 99 99 95
Panel B. Hospital M2
Hip replacements 99 102 97 99 99 99 100 101 101 100
Knee replacements 100 103 95 97 97 99 100 100 99 101
Cataract surgery 99 103 94 96 94 98 100 99 99 95
Notes: Indexed on the average price in control group 1 in year t-1; that is, the average price in control group 
1 in t-1 is 100. The price for the control group is averaged over the mean prices of the hospitals in control 
group 1.
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As explained in section 5, however, price changes only give us a crude indication of 
the effect of the merger because they do not control for changes in prices that would 
have occurred anyway. We therefore estimate a model in which price changes at the 
merging hospitals are compared to price changes at a group of comparison hospitals 
which were unaffected by the merger (i.e. a difference-in-differences model). We visually 
investigate the common trend assumption on which the DID model is based. Figures 
1-3 suggest that the pre-merger price change in the merged hospital did not deviate 
substantially from the pre-merger price changes in control group 1.
Table 8 presents the results of the difference-in-differences model aggregated over 
locations, insurers and products. Table 8 shows that no significant merger effect was 
observed when the result was aggregated over locations, insurers and products.
In table 9, we again show the price effect, aggregated over insurers, products and 
locations (panel A, column 1) but we then disaggregated the effect by location (panel A, 
column 2 and 3), by product (panels B to D, column 1), by location and product (panels B 
to D, columns 2 and 3), by insurer (panel E, column 1), and, finally, by insurer and location 
(panel E, columns 2 and 3).
If we only disaggregate by location, product or insurer, no significant merger effect 
is found. However, if we disaggregate by both product and location, we find that the 
merger led to significantly increased prices for hip replacements in hospital M1, by a 
total of 9 percentage points. This was the overall price effect of the merger for hip re-
placements in hospital M1. When the price effect was estimated over hospital locations 
Figure 1. Average price development hip replacements in Hospitals M1, M2 and control group 1
The prices plotted for control group 1 are averaged over all hospitals in control group 1. Control group 1 
includes all Dutch hospitals that provide the product, excluding hospitals that also merged between years 
t-2 and t+2 and Independent Treatment Centers.
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and products, the effect disappeared. Also, if we disaggregated by insurer and location, 
we found that the merger only resulted in price changes for specific health insurers and 
only at hospital M1. In table 10, we disaggregate the merger effect by location, product 
and insurer.
Figure 3. Average price development cataract surgery in Hospitals M1, M2 and control group 1
The prices plotted for control group 1 are averaged over all hospitals in control group 1. Control group 1 
includes all Dutch hospitals that provide the product, excluding hospitals that also merged between years 
t-2 and t+2 and Independent Treatment Centers.
Figure 2. Average price development knee replacements in Hospitals M1, M2 and control group 1
The prices plotted for control group 1 are averaged over all hospitals in control group 1. Control group 1 
includes all Dutch hospitals that provide the product, excluding hospitals that also merged between years 
t-2 and t+2 and Independent Treatment Centers.
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In section 4 we explained that we disaggregated the post-merger price change for 
each hospital location to see whether the merging hospital differentiated a potential 
price increase after merger across locations. Table 7 suggested that the hospitals had 
done so and when we use the difference-in-differences approach we also found that the 
post-merger increase in prices for hip replacements in hospital M1 varied significantly 
from the control group, whereas the prices for hip replacements in hospital M2 were 
unaffected by the merger. Apparently, the merged hospital differentiated its prices 
across locations.
We also disaggregated the effect of the merger for each product. We found that the 
price effects of the merger varied significantly between hospital products. Specifically, 
the merger resulted in higher prices for hip replacements in hospital M1, whereas the 
prices for knee replacements and cataract care in hospitals M1 and M2 remained unaf-
fected.
Finally, we disaggregated the post-merger price changes for each hospital-insurer 
combination. For four out of five health insurers that negotiated prices with hospital 
M1, the post-merger price increases for hip replacements were on average 13 percent-
age points higher than for the control groups. The merger’s price effect varied between 
health insurers from -12 to 16 percentage points relative to the control groups. Also, the 
Table 8. Merger effect aggregated over all three products, health insurers and hospital locationsA.
Hospitals M1 & M2
(intercept) 8.869*** (0.029)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ) 0.009 (0.009)
Post-merger price change -0.017 (0.057)
Observations 54
R-Squared 0.719
Adjusted R-Squared 0.422
Notes: Models estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with standard errors in parentheses under co-
efficients. In this model, hospitals M1 and M2 together are compared to control group 1. Control group 
1 includes all Dutch hospitals that provide the product, excluding hospitals that also merged between 
years t-2 and t+2 and Independent Treatment Centers. We aggregated the patient-level hospital data to a 
mean price per hospital. Firstly, we calculated an average price per product for each hospital-insurer pair. 
Secondly, we aggregated these prices over the insurers to an average price for each hospital-product com-
bination, whereby we weighted the prices with the insurer’s specific volume shares in year t-1. Thirdly, we 
aggregated over the products to an average price per hospital, whereby we weighted the hospital-product 
prices with the market-wide revenue shares for each product in t-1. We calculated an average price for the 
merged entity M1 + M2, by weighting the prices for hospitals M1 and M2 with their corresponding revenue 
shares in year t-1.
A For clarity reasons, we do not report the hospital dummies here.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 9. Merger effect for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery stepwise disaggregationA
Hospitals M1 & M2 Hospital M1 Hospital M2
Panel A. Aggregated over insurers & products
(intercept) 8.869*** (0.029) 8.869*** (0.029) 8.869*** (0.029)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ) 0.009 (0.009) 0.008 (0.008) 0.008 (0.008)
Post-merger price change -0.017 (0.057) 0.053 (0.057) -0.053 (0.057)
Observations 54 54 54
R-Squared 0.719 0.725 0.720
Adjusted R-Squared 0.422 0.434 0.423
Panel B. Hip replacements: aggregated over insurers
(intercept) 9.130*** (0.027) 9.130*** (0.026) 9.130*** (0.026)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ) 0.014* (0.007) 0.014* (0.007) 0.014* (0.007)
Post-merger price change 0.005 (0.053) 0.090* (0.053) -0.035 (0.053)
Observations 57 57 57
R-Squared 0.733 0.745 0.734
Adjusted R-Squared 0.452 0.476 0.453
Panel C. Knee replacements: aggregated over insurers
(intercept) 9.311*** (0.031) 9.311*** (0.031) 9.311*** (0.031)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ) 0.003 (0.008) 0.004 (0.008) 0.004 (0.008)
Post-merger price change -0.021 (0.063) 0.021 (0.062) -0.064 (0.062)
Observations 57 62 62
R-Squared 0.708 0.709 0.707
Adjusted R-Squared 0.401 0.403 0.399
Panel D Cataract surgery: aggregated over insurers
(intercept) 7.249*** (0.029) 7.249*** (0.028) 7.249*** (0.028)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ) -0.015** (0.007) -0.015** (0.007) -0.015** (0.007)
Post-merger price change -0.038 (0.057 0.027 (0.057) -0.049 (0.057)
Observations 57 63 63
R-Squared 0.693 0.697 0.697
Adjusted R-Squared 0.371 0.378 0.378
Panel E. Per insurer: aggregated over products
(intercept) 8.869*** (0.029) 8.869*** (0.029) 8.869*** (0.029)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ) 0.008 (0.008) 0.008 (0.008) 0.008 (0.008)
Post-merger price change insurer 1 -0.008 (0.057) 0.074 (0.057) -0.052 (0.057)
Post-merger price change insurer 2 -0.008 (0.057) 0.049 (0.057) -0.032 (0.057)
Post-merger price change insurer 3 -0.088 (0.057) -0.137** (0.057) -0.070 (0.057)
Post-merger price change insurer 4 0.054 (0.057) 0.115 (0.057) -0.019 (0.057)
Post-merger price change insurer 5 -0.011 (0.057) 0.106* (0.057) -0.046 (0.057)
Observations 54 53 53
R-Squared 0.742 0.796 0.728
Adjusted R-Squared 0.430 0.549 0.398
Chapter 2
50
largest health insurer – insurer 1, which represented 76 percent of hospital M1’s patients 
– was unable to negotiate lower prices: the prices it paid for hip replacements rose by 
11 percentage points as a result of the merger. In contrast, one of the four other much 
smaller health insurers – insurer 3, which represented only 11 percent of hospital M1’s 
patients – was able to negotiate prices that were much lower than the control groups. 
These results were robust between the control groups. It is therefore less likely that the 
merger effect estimated was driven by unobserved characteristics in the control group38.
Hence, what we can deduct from these tables is that aggregating the merger effect 
over locations, products and insurers masked considerable variations between loca-
tions, products and insurers. In other words, failing to disaggregate would prevent us 
from detecting the price effects of a hospital merger.
8. DISCUSSION
The main finding of our study is that a merger between two hospitals in overlapping 
geographical markets generated heterogeneous prices effects at the two different 
hospital locations, for different hospital products and for different health insurers. The 
theoretical model that was presented in section 2 explains why this might be the case.
38 These findings are not reported in the article, but are available upon request by the authors.
Table 9 Notes: Models estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with standard errors in parentheses under 
coefficients. In this model, hospitals M1, M2 and M1 and M2 together are compared to control group 1. 
Control group 1 includes all Dutch hospitals that provide the product, excluding hospitals that also merged 
between years t-2 and t+2 and Independent Treatment Centers. The data for the model in Panel A, columns 
2 & 3 is aggregated over health insurers and products: (i) we calculated an average price per product for 
each hospital-insurer pair, (ii) we aggregated these prices over the insurers to an average price for each 
hospital-product combination, whereby we weighted the prices with the insurer’s specific volume shares 
in year t-1 and (iii) we aggregated over the products to an average price per hospital, whereby we weighted 
the hospital-product prices with the market-wide revenue shares for each product in t-1. The data for the 
model in Panels B, C & D, columns 2 & 3 is aggregated over health insurers: (i) we calculated an average price 
per product for each hospital-insurer pair, and (ii) we aggregated these prices over the insurers to an aver-
age price for each hospital-product combination, whereby we weighted the prices with the insurer’s spe-
cific volume shares in year t-1. The data for the model in Panel E, column 2 & 3 is aggregated for the control 
group as in Panel A. For the merged hospital entity M1+M2 (column 1) the data is aggregated: (i) we calcu-
lated an average price per product for each hospital-insurer pair, (ii) we aggregated these prices over the 
insurers to an average price for each hospital-product combination, whereby we weighted the prices with 
the insurer’s specific volume shares in year t-1. We calculated an average price for the merged entity M1 + 
M2, by weighting the prices for hospitals M1 and M2 with their corresponding revenue shares in year t-1.
A For clarity reasons, we do not report the hospital dummies here.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Different price effects for different products
First, when we compare the price effects of a hospital merger on hip replacements, knee 
replacements and cataract surgery, we find a significant increase in the post-merger 
price of hip replacements but not of the other two products. This result was robust 
across all control groups and model specifications. In section 5, we explained that large 
Table 10. Merger effect for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery per health insurer in hospitals 
M1 & M2A
Hip replacements Knee replacements Cataract surgeries
Panel A. Hospital M1
(intercept) 9.130*** (0.026) 9.311*** (0.031) 7.249*** (0.028)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ) 0.014* (0.007) 0.004 (0.008) -0.015** (0.007)
Post-merger price change insurer 1 0.113** (0.053) 0.049 (0.062) 0.037 (0.057)
Post-merger price change insurer 2 0.099* (0.053) 0.024 (0.062) -0.053 (0.057)
Post-merger price change insurer 3 -0.118** (0.053) -0.153** (0.062) -0.114** (0.057)
Post-merger price change insurer 4 0.157*** (0.053) 0.089 (0.062) 0.067 (0.057)
Post-merger price change insurer 5 0.147*** (0.053) 0.080 (0.062) 0.059 (0.057)
Observations 57 62 63
R-Squared 0.828 0.767 0.740
Adjusted R-Squared 0.617 0.487 0.429
Panel B. Hospital M2
(intercept) 9.130*** (0.026) 9.311*** (0.031) 7.249*** (0.028)
Post-merger price change in the common trend (λ) 0.014* (0.007) 0.004 (0.008) -0.015** (0.007)
Post-merger price change insurer 1 -0.032 (0.053) -0.066 (0.062) -0.051 (0.057)
Post-merger price change insurer 2 -0.029 (0.053) -0.035 (0.062) -0.016 (0.057)
Post-merger price change insurer 3 -0.049 (0.053) -0.084 (0.062) -0.074 (0.057)
Post-merger price change insurer 4 -0.021 (0.053) -0.016 (0.062) -0.010 (0.057)
Post-merger price change insurer 5 -0.044 (0.053) -0.049 (0.062) -0.022 (0.057)
Observations 57 62 63
R-Squared 0.738 0.716 0.706
Adjusted R-Squared 0.417 0.375 0.354
Notes: Models estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with standard errors in parentheses under coef-
ficients. In this model, hospital M1 and M2 are compared to control group 1 which includes all hospitals 
excluding other merging hospitals and Independent Treatment Centers. The data for this model is aggre-
gated for the control group as follows: (i) we calculated an average price per product for each hospital-
insurer pair, (ii) we aggregated these prices over the insurers to an average price for each hospital-product 
combination, whereby we weighted the prices with the insurer’s specific volume shares in year t-1. For the 
merging hospitals the data is aggregated as follows: an average price per product for each hospital-insurer 
pair.
A For clarity reasons, we do not report the hospital dummies here.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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post-merger price increases for the merged hospitals in comparison to prices among 
a control group could be consistent with at least four hypotheses. By a close consid-
eration of the market under study, we can rule out the possibility that the increase in 
the post-merger price of hip replacements can be explained by a catching-up effect, 
or by an increase in quality or case mix severity. This because the pre-merger prices 
of hip replacements in hospital M1 were no lower than the prices at the comparison 
hospitals, as table 5 shows. Also, the pre-merger price for hip replacements at hospital 
M1 corresponds to the pre-merger price for hip replacements at hospital M2. According 
to the ‘learning about demand’ explanation, following a merger, a hospital is able to 
observe the prices paid to one of its former competitors, revealing potentially important 
information about the willingness of health insurers to pay for hospital services (see Ad-
ams & Noether, 2011). This explanation, however, cannot apply here as the pre-merger 
prices are similar. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the quality of care for hip replacements 
increased in hospital M1 following the merger. Although the hospital advertised quality 
increases in other procedures during the study period, this did not include the quality of 
its hip replacements. Furthermore, if it were the case that hospital M1 increased its qual-
ity because it learned from hospital M2 following the merger, we would expect prices 
to converge between the locations, but this did not happen. Also, an increase in quality 
that would justify such a large price increase (9 percentage points on average) would 
most likely also have an effect on patient volume at the expense of patient numbers at 
hospital M2 or rival hospitals, but this did not occur either. Therefore, we find it unlikely 
that an increase in quality between t-1 and t+1 can account for the price increase for hip 
replacements in hospital M1. From table 1 it also follows that the demographic charac-
teristics of the patients at hospital M1 did not change much following the merger. The 
number of males increased slightly, but as the number of males increased in almost all 
hospitals, this cannot explain the increase in the prices for hip replacements at hospital 
M1. Also, it is more likely that if the patients’ case mix had increased post-merger, more 
complex cases would have gone to hospital M2 rather than to hospital M1 because 
hospital M2 is a larger general hospital that also provides tertiary care. In view of this, 
the most plausible explanation out of the four possible explanations that follow from 
the empirical literature is that the merger enhanced the market power of the hospitals.
However, this raises the question of why the price rise only occurred for hip replace-
ments and not for knee replacements and cataract surgery. It is possible that this was 
due to a different level of competition intensity for these products. Indeed it followed 
from the theoretical framework that product d’s price change after the merger in each 
hospital is increasing in the diversion share between these hospitals, as well as the price-
cost margin of the partnering hospital. We found that the diversion shares in hospital M1 
of hip replacements were no higher than the diversion shares of other products. In fact, 
the diversion share of cataract surgeries is higher, whereas the price change for cataract 
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surgeries in hospital M1 after merger is not significant. Hence, based on the conclusions 
from the theoretical model, the difference in product-price effects after merger must 
be explained by other factors, i.e. the pre-merger price-cost margins of hospital M2. 
Unfortunately, we have no information on the product’s price-cost margins of hospitals 
in this market. However, because the pre-merger prices for hip replacements in hospitals 
M1 and M2 were remarkably similar according to table 5, the theory suggests that the 
pre-merger cost of hip replacements at hospital M2 were lower than the pre-merger 
cost of hip replacements at hospital M1.
Nevertheless, the finding that price effects are heterogeneous across hospitals’ top-
revenue products highlights the importance of using a more disaggregated approach 
rather than the more aggregated approach, when defining product markets. In practice, 
it is often assumed that the merger price effect will be the same for all hospital products 
because acute care, inpatient services can be considered as a single and thus homoge-
neous hospital product in cases of hospital mergers. Typically, antitrust agencies use a 
cluster approach to define hospital product markets and most empirical studies follow 
this approach and look at the aggregated price effects of hospital mergers. Also, the 
bargaining models that were developed to reflect hospital-insurer bargaining assume 
that a hospital system and an insurer bargain over a single base price per hospital loca-
tion. In section 2, we already noted that freeing the product price ratios would more 
closely correspond to hospital-insurer bargaining in practice. The hospital market is 
highly complex due to the multiplicity of services offered and the heterogeneity of con-
sumers and therefore many different hospital products exist. Sacher and Silvia (1998) 
show that using the standard inpatient cluster may mask considerable variability in the 
concentration statistics across the inpatient categories that make up an overall cluster. 
They argue that disaggregation can provide a better understanding of the potential 
competition effects of a merger in a range of market configurations. A similar point is 
made by Hentschker et al. (2014).
Also, from the theoretical model it followed that price effects after merger may differ 
between hospital products. For that reason, when we estimated the model parameters, 
we also disaggregated the effects of the merger by product markets. Like Sacher and 
Silvia (1998), we find that disaggregation can provide a fuller understanding of the 
potential competitive effects of the merger. However, if potential competitive effects 
are not homogeneous over product markets this may have important implications for 
future antitrust scrutiny. If the rules for market definition that are formulated in the EC 
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merger guidelines (EC, 1997)39, as well as in the US merger guidelines (FTC, 2010)40, were 
applied strictly, hundreds or maybe thousands of separate hospital product markets 
would have to be distinguished because many hospital products and services are not 
demand or supply substitutes as prescribed by these rules. Clearly this would not be a 
feasible strategy in cases of hospital mergers. Hence, only a certain level of disaggrega-
tion would be warranted. Although our theoretical model defines each product d as 
a treatment of one illness, d may also be understood as a product cluster combining 
several illnesses based on revenue or volume or specialism or otherwise. Hence, the 
model conclusions also hold for the situation in which some clustering (aggregation) is 
applied in order to reduce the number of product dimensions in the analysis or because 
this more closely corresponds with practice. Sacher and Silvia (1998) show that even a 
very limited disaggregation of the standard inpatient cluster can lead to a more accurate 
merger analysis. Zwanziger et al. (1994), too, propose a manageable disaggregation of 
the standard clusters. Because it is unclear how often antitrust outcomes would be af-
fected by using a different level of aggregation (Sacher & Silvia, 1998), we suggest using 
both the clustered approach as well as a limited disaggregated approach when defin-
ing product markets in the case of hospital mergers. One feasible approach may then 
be similar to our approach in which at least the top 3 or top 5 of the highest revenue 
products affected by the merger are analyzed separately. If the initial disaggregated 
approach gives rise to suspicions, the analysis can be further disaggregated41.
If antitrust authorities indeed decide to conduct disaggregated analyses, it is an inter-
esting question how an antitrust authority should deal with differences in merger out-
comes between products. It is unlikely that the antitrust authority will block a merger if 
the prospective analysis indicates that the prices for one product will increase, whereas 
the prices of other products will not be affected. Rather, finding different effects across 
products may lead to interventions that are specifically addressed only to the product 
that is found to be affected by the merger. For example, antitrust authorities may im-
39 According to the EC (1997) Commission Notice, ‘A relevant product market comprises all those 
products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, 
by reason of the products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended use’.
40 According to the FTC (2010) Merger Guidelines: ‘Market definition focuses solely on demand sub-
stitution factors, i.e. on consumers’ ability and willingness to substitute away from one product to 
another in response to a price increase or a corresponding non-price change such as a reduction in 
product quality or service’.
41 In practice, antitrust authorities occasionally take potential differences between products into ac-
count. For example, in one case the UK Competition Commission performed a detailed analysis of 
the appropriate product markets (CC, 2013) and in the FTC v. ProMedica Health System case, the US 
antitrust authority paid special attention to the inpatient obstetrical services in addition to general 
acute-care inpatient services (FTC, 2012).
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pose remedies requiring the divestiture of a specific product, imposing the obligation 
to support new entrants (like ITCs) or introducing a price ceiling on particular products 
at one or more hospital locations.
Different price effects at different locations
Second, the merged hospital raised its price for hip replacements significantly at one 
location (hospital M1), but not at the other (hospital M2). To establish whether the merg-
ing hospitals experienced different price changes after merger, we aggregated the post-
merger price change according to hospital location. It followed from the theoretical 
model that price changes caused by merger are proportional to the merging hospitals’ 
diversion shares and the initial price-cost margins of the merger partner. To date, how-
ever, most studies have not controlled for this potential source of heterogeneity. Only 
Tenn (2011) examines and finds evidence of differential pricing strategies after merger.
In our case study, the merging hospitals’ diversion shares were different due to their 
geographic location. Hospital M1 is located in a more geographically isolated area. 
Hospital M2 was the strongest competitor to hospital M1 and therefore posed a major 
constraint on hospital M1’s prices prior to the merger. Hospital M2, however, faced 
additional competition from other hospitals. This difference manifests itself in higher 
diversion shares for hospital M1 than for hospital M2 before merger (table 6). After 
the merger, the two hospitals were likely able to internalize this constraint, leading to 
higher prices at hospital M1. They were able to do this without being penalized by rivals 
because hospital M1 experienced competitive pressure from only one rival hospital after 
the merger. By contrast, hospital M2 still experienced significant competitive pressure 
from five other hospitals after the merger. In this setting, differentiating prices according 
to the location may be a profitable strategy for the merged hospital: hospital M1 was in 
a position to raise its prices whereas maintaining a steady flow of patients, whereas hos-
pital M2 maintained its prices at the pre-merger level in order to prevent losing patients 
to a rival hospital. Our results are consistent with this line of reasoning: the price change 
after merger was higher for hospital M1 whose diversion shares to hospital M2 were 
much higher than the diversions shares from hospital M2 to hospital M1.
By means of our empirical analysis we showed that it needs to be recognized that 
a merger between a rather isolated hospital location and its closest substitute creates 
opportunities for post-merger price increases that may be overlooked when not taking 
the disaggregate approach. Our findings suggests that the competition intensity that 
merging locations experience before and after merger may differ considerably between 
locations even if the merger entails two neighboring hospitals. Because this difference 
may result in a heterogeneous merger effects across locations, antitrust agencies 
should take the difference between locations into account. Given that these hospitals 
initially function as separate entities, the data that would be needed for the analysis at 
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the location level should be available. However, then the question remains how antitrust 
authorities should deal with differences in merger outcomes between locations. We dis-
cussed product-specific remedies in the previous paragraph. Likewise, antitrust authori-
ties may think about location-specific remedies in case they predict the merger effect 
to be differentiated across locations. Like product-specific remedies, location-specific 
remedies might entail structural remedies or behavioral remedies that are only aimed at 
the location(s) that is (are) affected by merger42.
Different price effects for different insurers
The theoretical model that we presented in this article showed that the price change 
caused by merger may differ between health insurers. In our empirical analysis we 
disaggregated the overall results for each hospital-insurer combination which revealed 
that there is considerable heterogeneity across health insurers in the change in the 
post-merger negotiated prices. For four out of five health insurers that negotiated prices 
with hospital M1, the post-merger price increases for hip replacements were on average 
13 percentage points higher than the control group. The merger’s price effect varied 
between health insurers from -12 to 16 percentage points relative to the control group. 
This finding corresponds to the results from an earlier retrospective study from the US 
(Thompson, 2011), which indicated that two health insurers experienced price increases 
due to the hospital merger under study, whereas a third insurer experienced a price 
decrease and a fourth experienced no price effect from the merger.
The theoretical model suggests that the insurer-specific price differences may arise 
due to differences in the insurers’ bargaining abilities. In particular, a health insurer with 
more bargaining weight or ability is confronted with a higher price increase after the 
merger.
The source of bargaining ability of health insurers is the topic of many studies. The evi-
dence suggests that idiosyncratic effects such as bargaining skills of the individuals at 
the negotiating table might have a sizeable impact on the market outcomes (Sorensen, 
2003; Halbersma et al., 2010; Grennan, 2014). Thompson (2012) furthermore suggests 
that the differences between insurers may be attributed to variations in the types of 
plans that the insurers offer and the services that they provide. Hence, although the bar-
gaining model gives us some ideas on the source of heterogeneity in the post-merger 
42 Occasionally, antitrust authorities have opted for imposing remedies at the entire location level. 
Divestitures of hospital locations were, for example, ordered by the US antitrust authority in the FTC 
v. ProMedica Health System case (FTC, 2012) and by the German antitrust authority in the Asklepios/
LBK Hamburg case (Bundeskartellamt, 2005), whereas in the Evanston Northwestern/Highland Park 
Hospital case the US antitrust authority imposed a firewall so that the two firms had to negotiate 
separately with insurers after merger (FTC, 2008). See Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) for a critical review 
of the latter remedy.
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price effects across health insurers, it remains largely unclear why such large differences 
exist across insurers within markets and why some health insurers experience price in-
creases whereas others experience price decreases after merger. Because this is an issue 
that has been indicated a few times in research on hospital mergers (Thompson, 2012; 
Gaynor & Town, 2012), we suggest that further research on hospital-insurer bargaining 
should aim to establish the source of bargaining ability of health insurers in relation to 
hospital mergers.
From a policy perspective, the fact that post-merger price effects are not homoge-
neous across insurers within markets is an interesting finding, however. It is furthermore 
interesting to note that the heterogeneities are large. In ex ante merger reviews in the 
Netherlands, the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) asks representatives of 
large health insurers in the region about their expectations regarding competitive ef-
fects of the merger. In fact, in the guidelines for assessing mergers and collaborations in 
healthcare, issued in 2013, the ACM says: ‘When assessing a concentration’s implications, 
the arguments put forward by insurers and patient organizations will be central.’ (ACM, 
2013). Like in most prospective merger cases, the representatives of the two largest 
health insurers in the region indicated that they did not anticipate negative competitive 
effects from the consolidation that we studied; and partly because of that reason the 
merger was cleared. However, the retrospective analysis indicates that the health insur-
ers that believed to be able to counteract post-merger price increases were not both 
able to do that. We therefore suggest that a more critical assessment of health insurers’ 
bargaining ability in merger cases is warranted.
9. CONCLUSION
In this study, we expanded existing bargaining models to allow for heterogeneous 
product-price effects and used a difference-in-differences model in which price changes 
at the merging hospitals are compared to price changes at a group of comparison hospi-
tals. The main finding of our study is that the merger led to heterogeneous prices effects 
for different health insurers, hospital products and hospital locations and that these 
differences depend on (i) the degree of substitution between hospitals, which may also 
vary over products, (ii) the relative bargaining ability of hospitals and insurers and (iii) 
the pre-merger price-cost margins of different products delivered by these hospitals.
The theoretical model provided us with valuable insights on the sources of heteroge-
neity, whereas our detailed empirical analysis of a hospital merger improved our under-
standing of the magnitude of differences. The analysis, however, also gives rise to three 
areas for future research. First, it would be interesting to replicate this study for different 
hospital mergers to find out which of our findings persist. Second, more insight into the 
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sources of insurers’ bargaining ability would be valuable. Third, analysis of pre-merger 
price-cost margins will improve our understanding of heterogeneous post-merger price 
effects across products.
Nevertheless, the fact that price effects of a merger are heterogeneous across prod-
ucts, locations and insurers signals important conclusions for ex ante merger scrutiny. 
First, it highlights the importance of using a disaggregated approach rather than the 
current cluster approach when defining product markets. Second, it suggests that future 
prospective merger analyses should take potential differences across hospital locations 
into account. Finally, it asks for a critical assessment of health insurers’ bargaining ability 
in merger cases.
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ABSTRACT
Antitrust authorities need new approaches to predict the effects of healthcare mergers. 
Merger simulation models are promising alternatives to highly debated traditional ap-
proaches, but they have only been validated to a limited extent. This paper evaluates the 
predictive power of the Option Demand method, a merger simulation model developed 
specifically for the US hospital market. We contrast the predictions of the merger simula-
tion model to the estimated price effects of a consummated merger between two Dutch 
hospitals. We find that the Option Demand method could be a valuable addition to the 
antitrust agencies’ toolkit, but that more research is necessary.
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INTRODUCTION
In competitive markets, the aim of preventive merger control is to prohibit anticom-
petitive consolidation. To determine whether a merger between two (or more) firms will 
result in anticompetitive price increases (and/or quality decreases), antitrust authorities 
need to carry out an ex ante (prospective) review. Unfortunately, the approaches that 
are commonly used to prospectively review mergers are problematic. Generally, these 
methods first define the relevant market for the industry being studied and then use 
market shares to infer how the merger could affect competition in that market (Shapiro 
2010; Werden and Froeb 2006). However, in order to delineate the relevant market, they 
typically rely on disputed methodologies and the conclusions drawn from the resulting 
analysis will depend heavily on how that market is defined. Moreover, these measure-
ments are imperfect indicators of market power and so they do not necessarily reveal the 
actual exercise of market power. Merger reviews in the healthcare sector are subject to 
an additional difficulty because there are unique factors that render the most commonly 
used tests for measuring geographic markets less reliable in healthcare than in other 
sectors (Elzinga and Swisher 2011). Antitrust authorities therefore struggle to delineate 
the healthcare market effectively (Gaynor and Town 2012; Varkevisser and Schut 2012; 
Capps et al. 2002).
The most promising alternatives to these traditional approaches to review mergers 
are Merger Simulation Models (MSMs). The use of MSMs has clear advantages over the 
traditional approaches. MSMs use structural models to represent specific industries. By 
calibrating these models to the specifics of the market being studied, they can be used 
to predict the price effects of a merger directly (Werden 2005). Merger simulations take 
into account more than just market shares and concentration levels; they provide direct 
evidence and do not require or depend upon arbitrary market definitions (Argue and 
Shin 2009). For all these reasons, interest in MSMs is growing, both in the US and the 
EU (see e.g. Budzinski and Ruhmer 2009; Argue and Shin 2009; Walker 2005; Kalbfleisch 
2005). However, the important question of whether MSMs are able to predict anticom-
petitive price increases accurately has not yet been answered conclusively. So far, MSMs 
have only been validated to a limited extent; they are always used in combination with 
traditional approaches and have rarely been subject to public scrutiny (Budzinski and 
Ruhmer 2009). Only merger simulation models that can produce reliable predictions are 
useful for merger policies, and the key issue with any merger simulation is its predictive 
capacity.
This paper contributes to the small, but growing, body of literature relating to the 
evaluation of merger simulation methods by evaluating the predictive powers of a 
reduced‐form MSM that was developed specifically for hospital markets. The reduced‐
form MSM that we tested is referred to by its developers as the Option Demand method 
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(OD method). In the literature, this model is also referred to as the Capps, Dranove and 
Satterthwaite (CDS) or Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) model. The OD method is designed 
specifically to model markets in which managed care organizations or health insurers 
(selectively) contract with hospitals (Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite 2003; Town and 
Vistnes 2001). Recently, this model has been generalized by Gowrisankaran, Nevo and 
Town (2015)43.
In this paper, we use the OD method to predict the price effects of a hospital merger 
between a general acute care hospital (hospital M1) and a neighboring general acute 
care hospital that also provides tertiary hospital care (hospital M2) that took place in the 
Dutch hospital market44. From the viewpoint of the Option Demand method, the current 
Dutch healthcare system bears evident similarities with the US healthcare system. We 
explicitly take the multiproduct nature of hospitals into account by examining the price 
effects of the hospital merger for different hospital products. We also allow for potential 
differences in bargaining outcomes between neighboring locations by predicting the 
merger effects for each location. We use an instrumental variable approach to control 
for potential endogeneity issues. The actual price effects of the merger that we study 
are determined through a difference-in-difference (DiD) technique (Roos et al. 2017). By 
contrasting the simulated price effects with the actual price effects of the merger, we 
are able to evaluate the predictive power of the Option Demand method for hospital 
mergers in the Dutch context.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 1, we discuss how to identify unilateral 
effects after a horizontal merger and we consider the small number of available studies 
that evaluate the accuracy of merger simulation models. Section 2 describes the Op-
tion Demand model and discusses the applicability of the Option Demand method to 
the Dutch healthcare industry. Section 3 focuses on the modeling details of the Option 
Demand method and in section 4 we focus on the details of the estimation that we car-
ried out. Section 5 describes the data that were used and section 4 presents the results. 
In section 7 we briefly discuss the findings of the retrospective study and compare the 
simulation results with the effects of the actual merger. In section 8 we present our 
conclusions on the predictive power of the reduced-form merger simulation model that 
we have applied.
43 For an extensive review of the literature on modeling hospital competition, see Gaynor, Ho and Town 
(2015).
44 For reasons of confidentiality, we anonymize the merged hospitals’ and health insurers’ names. For 
the same reason, the merger year is reported as t (t lies in the period 2005 – 2012).
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1. MERGER SIMULATION MODELS
A. Identifying unilateral effects after a horizontal merger
According to most national and supranational antitrust laws, mergers must be reported 
to an antitrust authority prior to being consummated45. After notification, the antitrust 
authorities carry out a review of the proposed merger, in which they make inferences 
regarding the expected anticompetitive effects of a merger in the relevant market. In 
general, horizontal mergers may give rise to two types of anticompetitive effects: (i) 
unilateral and (ii) coordinated effects. Both unilateral and coordinated effects may lead 
to higher post-merger prices, but prospective merger analyses focus predominantly on 
predicting the unilateral effects that a merger may cause (Baker 2003). In this paper, we 
also focus on the potential for unilateral effects.
Two methods are available to determine unilateral effects quantitatively: (i) a market 
definition approach and (ii) methods to predict unilateral effects directly. The market 
definition approach first defines the market and then hypothesizes on the merger-effect 
in that market. However, the market definition approach has several shortcomings, 
particularly when applied to the hospital industry (Dranove and Ody 2016; Elzinga and 
Swisher 2011; Gaynor, Kleiner, and Vogt 2011; Kaplow 2011; Shapiro 2010; Varkevisser, 
Capps, and Schut 2008; Capps et al. 2002). For example, the approach assumes that a 
product is either inside or outside the market. The products in the market are assumed 
to be subject to equal competitive pressure, while the products outside the market are 
not taken into account. However, in a market with differentiated products - which is typi-
cally the case for hospital markets - the degree of competition between two products 
depends on their substitutability and it is often difficult to draw meaningful boundaries 
between markets (Werden and Froeb 2006). Furthermore, it is only when very specific 
assumptions are made (e.g. homogeneous goods) that market shares can be translated 
into unilateral price effects (Kaplow 2011). The Elzinga-Hogarty test, in particular, has 
also been criticized because of its limited applicability to the hospital industry, mainly 
because of what has become known as the silent majority fallacy (e.g. Elzinga and 
Swisher 2011; Capps et al. 2001).
Given the drawbacks of the market definition approach, alternatives such as MSM 
that screen or predict anticompetitive effects directly and that circumvent the need for 
market delineation are promising alternatives.
45 See 15 USC §18A for the US and the competition laws of the EU Member States or EC:2004 for the 
European Union’s rules on prior merger notification.
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B. Merger Simulation Models
An MSM builds a structural model of the industry being studied. Typically, a structural 
model consists of (i) a demand model, which models the consumers’ decision-making 
process and (ii) a model of competition, which models the supply-side of the market on 
the basis of the firm’s behavior, the actions of its rivals and the consumer demand model. 
Having defined the competition model that best fits the industry being studied, the de-
mand model can be estimated and the model of competition should be calibrated with 
pre-merger data. Next, a merger can be simulated by changing the ownership structure, 
for example by modeling that the number of competitors in a market decreases from 4 
to 3 after merger (Budzinski and Ruhmer 2009).
A major issue with merger simulations is their predictive power and, thus, their cred-
ibility as a technique in the prospective merger review process (Budzinski and Ruhmer 
2009). Only MSMs that are able to predict the actual effects of mergers accurately are 
useful for merger policy. Weinberg and Hosken (2013) stipulate that there are two 
methods for testing structural models: (i) the marginal costs approach, in which the 
actual (observed) marginal costs are contrasted with the marginal costs calculated by 
the calibrated simulation model; and (ii) the market structure approach, in which actual 
(observed) changes in price and/or quality following a merger are contrasted with the 
changes in price and/or quality simulated by the structural model. Budzinski and Ruh-
mer (2009), Werden and Froeb (2006) and Davis and Garcés (2010; chapter 8) describe 
both these methods in detail. Our study employs the second approach. Hence, we use 
past changes in market structure and the resulting price effects to test the accuracy of a 
(reduced-form) merger simulation model.
There are a handful of studies that have used the market structure approach to test 
merger simulation models. In addition to the three studies reviewed by Budzinski and 
Ruhmer (2009) (i.e. Pinkse and Slade 2004; Peters 2006 and Weinberg and Hosken 
201346), Weinberg (2011), Friberg and Romahn (2015), Greenfield, Kreisle and Williams 
(2015) and Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016) also apply this approach. The studies differ 
in their efficacy (i.e. whether they are able to accurately predict price effects). In terms of 
methodology, they most often use a Bertrand model to model market competition. The 
studies use different demand functions to reflect the differences in industries and data 
and they also differ in the methodology that they employ to compare the simulated 
price changes to the actual price changes induced by the merger. Also, none of the 
previous studies have focused on hospital merger cases, although the problems that 
arise from using the more traditional market definition approaches are particularly strik-
46 Budzinski and Ruhmer (2009) review an earlier version (working paper: Weinberg. Matthew C. and 
Daniel Hosken. 2008. ‘Using Mergers to Test a Model of Oligopoly’. Working paper. University of 
Georgia) of Weinberg and Hosken (2013).
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ing in this sector (e.g. Elzinga and Swisher 2011). A notable exception is a recent FTC 
working paper (Garmon 2016) that reflects on the accuracy of hospital merger screening 
methods. The study concludes that the market definition approach is less accurate at 
predicting post-merger price effects than more recently developed models, including 
the Option Demand method (Garmon 2016). In contrast to Garmon (2016), we do not 
focus on contrasting the results of traditional approaches versus MSMs but rather on 
the predictive powers of one reduced-form MSM that is tailor-made for the healthcare 
industry: the Option Demand model.
2.  THE OPTION DEMAND METHOD AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO THE DUTCH 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
A. What are Option Demand markets?
The Option Demand model that we evaluate in this paper was developed by Town and 
Vistnes (2001) and further refined by Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) and 
Gowrisankaran et al. (2015). The papers developed a framework for analyzing bargain-
ing relationships between hospitals and insurers under selective contracting. Under 
such a healthcare system, consumers buy health insurance from health insurers. The 
consumers decide on a specific health insurance policy on the basis of the network of 
hospitals that the insurance contract offers and the premium. Each hospital renegoti-
ates the terms of its contracts with health insurers on a regular basis. The idea is that 
the (threat of ) selective contracting of hospitals may enable insurers to negotiate lower 
prices and/or higher quality, which may lower premiums (Ho 2009).
The OD method builds on this two-layer model of the hospital industry; that is, it 
models that (i) consumers buy health insurance from health insurers before fully know-
ing their medical needs and (ii) health insurers bargain and contract with healthcare 
providers (here: hospitals) on behalf of their insured. Following Dranove and White 
(1996), Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) refer to markets that exhibit these two 
layers as ‘Option Demand’ markets (or OD markets), since the consumer commits to a 
possibly restricted network of hospitals when he buys health insurance prior to knowing 
his future healthcare needs and when he is in need of specific care, he has the option of 
visiting any of the contracted hospitals. The value that a consumer then places on health 
insurance depends on his expected demand for healthcare and the expected utility that 
a particular hospital from this network will provide him. This value can be expressed as 
Willingness-To-Pay (WTP). The notion of WTP gives an estimate of how much consumers 
are willing to pay ex ante to retain access to this hospital in the network. The WTP is 
therefore a proxy of the hospital’s market power: a hospital with a high WTP score will 
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be better able to secure higher prices from the health insurer than a hospital with a low 
WTP score (Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite 2003:738).
B.  The applicability of the Option Demand method to the Dutch healthcare 
sector
To date, the OD method has been applied by Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003), 
by Dranove and Sfekas (2009) and by Dranove and Ody (2016) who find a positive rela-
tionship between hospital profits and WTP. Garmon (2016) finds an imprecise relation-
ship between prices and WTP. The OD method has also been applied by the US Federal 
Trade Commission (Dranove and Ody 2016; Garmon 2016).
From the viewpoint of the Option Demand method, the current Dutch healthcare 
system bears similarities with the US healthcare system. In recent decades, the Dutch 
healthcare system has moved away from strict governmental supply-side regulation and 
towards regulated (or ‘managed’) competition (Van de Ven and Schut 2008; Schut and 
Van de Ven 2005). Of particular importance to this paper is the gradual introduction of 
hospital-insurer bargaining since 2005. In 2005, a product classification system for hos-
pital and medical specialist care was introduced. Each activity and/or hospital service 
associated with a patient’s demand for care, including outpatient care, is referred to as a 
Diagnosis and Treatment Combination (or DTC)47. Following the introduction of the DTC 
system, the room for free negotiations between hospitals and health insurers on prices, 
volume and quality was gradually increased from 10% of hospitals’ revenue in 2005, 
to 20% in 2008, to 34% in 2009 and to 70% in 2012. The remainder of hospital prices is 
regulated by the Dutch Healthcare Authority. For those services in the free-pricing seg-
ment, each hospital typically renegotiates the terms of its contracts with health insurers 
on an annual basis. Health insurers are allowed to contract selectively with healthcare 
providers.
The two-layer model that underlies the OD method seems to reflect the Dutch health-
care system accurately; consumers buy health insurance from health insurers and health 
insurers bargain and contract with hospitals on behalf of their enrollees. In the early 
years of the reform selective contracting was limitedly used. However, over the years, 
the number of health insurers offering contracts with restricted provider networks has 
increased. Furthermore, the introduction of a new Health Insurance Act has led to strong 
price competition between health insurers, and health insurers have put increasing 
pressure on hospitals to charge lower prices (Schut and Van de Ven 2011). The threat 
of selective contracting, rather than its actual use, may already have had an impact on 
47 The DTC system is based on the concept of DRGs (Diagnosis-Related Groups) but constitutes a newly 
developed classification system.
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hospital-insurer bargaining. We therefore consider the OD method applicable to the 
free-pricing segment of the Dutch hospital industry.
3. THE OPTION DEMAND METHOD: THE MODELING DETAILS
In this section, we describe how to estimate the demand model and Willingness-To-Pay 
(WTP) (section 3A), how to estimate the supply side and the competition model (section 
3B) and how to simulate a merger with the WTP (section 3C). Our paper makes two 
modifications to the model by Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003).
First, we explicitly take into account the multiproduct nature of hospitals by examin-
ing the price effects of the hospital merger for different hospital products. Typically, 
antitrust agencies use a cluster approach to define hospital product markets, assuming 
that ‘acute care, in-patient services’ can be considered as a single and thus homog-
enous hospital product. Most empirical studies follow this approach and examine the 
aggregated price effects of hospital mergers. However, the hospital market is highly 
complex due to the multiplicity of services provided and the heterogeneity of consum-
ers, which is in turn caused by differences in medical treatment needs and third-party 
payer coverage. Sacher and Silvia (1998) show that using the standard in-patient cluster 
may mask considerable variability in the concentration statistics across the in-patient 
categories that make up a whole cluster. They show that disaggregation can provide a 
fuller understanding of the potential competitive effects of a merger in a variety of mar-
ket configurations. Roos et al. (2017) also find evidence of heterogeneous price effects 
across products in their retrospective case study. They studied the same merger case as 
the one simulated in this paper. We therefore also disaggregate the effect of the merger 
by product markets. We estimate the impact of the merger in three separate product 
markets that jointly represent 47.5 per cent of the merged hospital’s turnover in the seg-
ment for which Dutch insurers and hospitals at the time of the merger were allowed to 
freely negotiate prices. The products included in this study are hip replacements, knee 
replacements and cataract surgery.
Second, our study allows for potential differences in bargaining outcomes between 
neighboring locations of merged hospitals by predicting the merger effects for each 
location. Hitherto, most studies have aggregated the merger effect, thereby disregard-
ing the fact that post-merger differences in market power for each location may lead to 
opportunities to differentiate pricing strategies. In the case of multiple locations, price 
differentiation across locations may be a profitable strategy for the merged hospital. In 
retrospectives studies, Roos et al. (2017) and Tenn (2011) find evidence of differential 
pricing strategies in hospital mergers. However, most previous studies on mergers have 
not controlled for this potential source of heterogeneity. We disaggregate the predicted 
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price change for each hospital location. In sections 2C and 4, we will explain in more 
detail how we handled the modification of the model by Capps, Dranove, and Satterth-
waite (2003) in our paper. We also discuss the relationship with the extension of the OD 
model by Gowrisankaran et al. (2015).
A. Step 1: demand model and Willingness-To-Pay (WTP)
Under the OD method, a consumer’s demand for hospital treatment is modeled using 
a conditional logit demand function (see McFadden 1974). Under this model, patient i 
seeks treatment after falling ill. His health insurance gives him access to network G of 
hospitals (all the available hospitals in the market). The expected utility of patient i for 
receiving treatment at hospital j is given by:  U ij = U ( H j ,  X i ,  λ i ) +  ε ij where Hj is a vector of 
hospital j characteristics.  X i is a vector which combines the characteristics and clinical 
attributes of patient i. The patient’s travel time ( λ i ) is determined by the distance be-
tween the patient’s location (e.g. zip code) and the hospital j. Under the conditional logit 
demand function, we assume that the residuals ( ε ) are i.i.d. with the double standard 
exponential distribution (see McFadden 1974)48.
Using a logit demand model, the probability that patient i chooses hospital j is given 
by:  s j ( H j ,  X i ,  λ i ) =    exp [U (  H j ,  X i ,  λ i ) ]  ___________  ∑ g∈G exp [U (  H g ,  X i ,  λ i ) ]  .
Denote the utility of patient i for access to network G as  V UI ( G,  X i ,  λ i ) . The WTP of patient 
i for hospital j, denoted by  Δ  V ij UI (G,  X i ,  λ i ) , is the reduction in  V UI due to the exclusion of 
hospital j from network G. Hence,  Δ  V ij UI (G,  X i ,  λ i ) =  V ij UI (G,  X i ,  λ i ) -  V ij UI ( G / j,    X i ,  λ i ) , where G/j is 
the network of hospitals G excluding hospital j. Capps et al. (2003) show that it follows 
from the logit demand that for the WTP of patient i for hospital j that:
 Δ  V ij UI (G,  X i ,  λ i ) =  ln [ 1 ___________ 1 -  s j (  H j ,    X i ,  λ i )  ] . 
The ex ante WTP for the entire population (with N ill consumers) of hospital j is the 
weighted sum of the patients’ WTPs (Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite 2003:743):
 W j = N ∫ 
X,λ
 
 
 1 _γ ln [ 1 _ 1 -  s j ( H j ,  X i ,  λ i )  ] f ( X i ,  λ i ) d  X i d  λ i ,
48 To avoid the IIA property that underlies the conditional logit functions, some studies use the mixed 
logit model to analyze patient hospital choice (see e.g. Pope 2009; Varkevisser, van der Geest, and 
Schut 2012). Farrell et al. (2011) find that there is almost no difference in the estimated hospital-level 
diversions in the patient-level mixed logit compared to the standard patient-level conditional logit 
model. Recent studies on hospital choice use the conditional logit model (e.g. Chandra et al. 2016; 
Gaynor, Propper, and Seiler 2016; Gutacker et al. 2016; Frank et al. 2015; Chou et al. 2014; Ho, and 
Pakes 2014).
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where the population density distribution of all ill consumers is given by  f (  X i ,  λ i ) and 
constant  γ convert utils into monetary terms. Since we do not observe constant γ, we use 
WTP up to the unidentified scale factor. For our application this is sufficient, since we are 
not interested in the exact value of the WTP.
We apply the discrete equivalent of the above equation to calculate the WTP of each 
hospital (see also Garmon 2016; Balan and Brand 2015; Farrell et al. 2011). Further, 
following Farrell et al. (2011), we rescale the WTP according to the hospital’s expected 
number of patients. The rescaled discrete WTP equation for hospital j is49:
 w j =  
 ∑ i=1 N ln [ 1 _ 1 -  s j ( H j ,  X i ,  λ i )  ]  ___________
 ∑ i=1 N  s j ( H j ,  X i ,  λ i ) 
  .
B. Step 2: supply side and competition model
Under the OD method, the idea is that if a hospital adds a high value to the health insur-
ance network, it will be able to extract more profits from its negotiations and vice versa. 
Hospitals and insurers thus bargain according to the total value that hospital j adds 
to the health insurance network, i.e.  w j . Following Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite 
(2003), we model this negotiation with a reduced-form bargaining model:
(2)  p j -  c j = α ∙  w j ,
where pj is the revenue per patient and cj is the variable cost per patient. This equation 
thus gives the relationship between the margin of hospital j, i.e. the per-patient revenue 
minus the variable cost per patient, and the WTP per patient for hospital j. The per-patient 
gain of including hospital j in the network is split between the hospital and the insurer. 
Parameter  α is the proportion that each hospital captures ( 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 ) . Parameter  α is 
fixed and depends on the parties’ relative bargaining abilities (Farrell et al. 2011).
Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) present a structural bargaining model that is more general 
than the Capps et al. (2003) model that we present here. Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) show 
that the Capps et al. (2003) model is a special case of their structural bargaining model. 
An important extension in the model of Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) is that patients face 
coinsurances. The Capps et al. (2003) model assumes that there is no coinsurance, which 
simplifies the bargaining model. In the Dutch market, there is no coinsurance. There is 
a yearly mandatory deductible that the patient pays when he starts using healthcare. 
However, the deductible is limited to a relatively small fixed amount (220 euro per year 
49 The unscaled WTP employed by Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) also increases with the 
number of patients that a hospital treats. This is undesirable. The rescaled WTP is high only if a 
hospital does not have close substitutes.
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in 2012). Since most hospital prices are higher than this amount, each patient receiving 
treatment at any hospital would generally pay the same deductible. Hence, deductibles 
are expected to hardly affect patient hospital choice, which implies that the no out-of-
pocket payment assumption is also justifiable in our application of the model. Another 
extension of Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) is that they take health insurers’ costs into 
account in the bargaining model. However, following Capps et al. (2003) and as is often 
done in practice (Gaynor, Ho and Town 2015), we regress WTP measures on price, and 
add marginal cost controls to the regression in our reduced-form merger simulation50.
C. Step 3: merger simulation with WTP
In a merger review, antitrust authorities need to make an ex ante review to find out 
whether the merger between two (or more) hospitals will result in anticompetitive price 
increases. In our model, this means that we are interested in the increase in the post-
merger prices of entity j+k compared to the pre-merger prices of hospitals j and k. If we 
know the demand, WTP and bargaining model, we can calculate the post-merger WTP 
of the new entity and the post-merger price increase of the merged entity by estimating 
α (Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite 2003).
This works as follows. Let us assume that we want to predict the increase in prices 
due to a merger between hospitals j and k. With equation (1), we can calculate the pre-
merger WTP of hospitals j and k, which we will denote with  w j pre and  w k pre . Post-merger, 
hospitals j and k form one entity. The weighted joint pre-merger WTP of hospitals j and 
m is:  w j+m pre ≔  S j  w j pre +  S k  w k pre where  S j is the post-merger revenue share of hospital j in 
the merged hospital and  S k is the post-merger share of hospital k in the merged hospital. 
We assume that the merged firm will bargain on an all-or-nothing basis (i.e. the merged 
hospitals are either in or out of the insurer’s network and reimbursement for patients 
visiting that hospital is therefore either 100% or 0%51). Thus, post-merger, the WTP of 
entity j+k is:
 w j+k post =  
 ∑ i=1 N ln [ 1 ________________ 1 -  s j ( H j ,  Y i ,  Z i ,  λ i ) -  s k ( H k ,  Y i ,  Z i ,  λ i )  ]   ________________________   
 ∑ i=1 N  ( s j ( H j ,  Y i ,  Z i ,  λ i ) +  s k ( H k ,  Y i ,  Z i ,  λ i ) )  . 
The increase in WTP due to the merger for the combined entity is then  w j+k post -  w j+k pre. 
Given bargaining model (2), we can calculate the increase in the j+k entities’ margin 
with:  ( p j+k post -  c j+k post ) -  ( p j+k pre -  c j+k pre) = α ∙  ( w j+k post -  w j+k pre) . Using equation (2) the  α can be estimat-
50 In a Monte Carlo setting, Balan and Brand (2015) compared the true price effects of more general 
bargaining models with WTP-based merger simulation methods. They conclude that generally the 
WTP-based merger simulation methods perform well.
51 In practice, this is the most common negotiating strategy of hospitals. The assumption can, however, 
be relaxed by adapting WTP to separate bargaining scenarios (Brand and Garmon 2014).
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ed and post-merger prices can be predicted. Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) 
estimate  α with an OLS regression of total hospital profits on the unscaled WTP and use 
the above equation to predict the increase in total profits due to the merger. However, 
we are interested in the predicted price changes due to the merger. As is common in the 
MSM literature, we assume that the variable costs per patient do not change due to the 
merger (i.e.  c j+k post =  c j+k pre) and we can therefore rewrite the latter equation as:
(3)  ( p j+k post -  p j+k pre) = α ∙  (  w j+k post -  w j+k pre) 
Following Balan and Brand (2013), we divide the merged entity’s increase in WTP into a 
per-hospital WTP increase. To this end, we have to determine the post-merger WTP of 
hospital j and k:  w j post and  w k post . We do this by using two assumptions. The first assump-
tion stipulates that the increase in the joint WTP is divided between the two hospitals 
according to their revenue share in the merged entity:    w j+k post -  w j+k pre =  S j  ( w j post -  w j pre ) +  S k  ( 
w k post -  w k pre ) . But this equation does not yet identify a unique pair ( w j post ,  w k post ), since there 
is an infinite number of combinations that satisfies this assumption. The second assump-
tion therefore stipulates that the increase in the hospitals’ WTP is divided in proportion 
to their diversion ratios:
 ( w j post -  w j pre ) =   D jk  _ D kj ( w k post -  w k pre ) ,
where diversion ratio  D jk is the share of patients from hospital j that would go to hospital 
k if hospital j were no longer accessible to them52. From the IIA property of the condi-
tional logit model it follows that if patient i can no longer visit hospital j, the diversion 
of hospital j to hospital k for patient i is equal to   s k ( H k ,  X i ,  λ i )  _ 1 -  s j ( H j ,  X i ,  λ i )  (see for example Conlon and 
Mortimer 2013). We calculated the weighted average diversion of hospital j to hospital k 
( D jk ) by summing over all patients and weighting each patient with their predicted share 
in hospital j:
  D jk =  ∑ 
i
 
N
  (  s j ( H j ,  X i ,  λ i )  _  ∑ i N  s j ( H j ,  X i ,  λ i )      s k ( H k ,  X i ,  λ i )  _ 1 -  s j ( H j ,  X i ,  λ i )  ) . 
Similarly, diversion ratio   D kj is the share of patients from hospital k that would go to 
hospital j if hospital k were no longer accessible to them. Together, the above assump-
tions can identify the unique pair ( w j post ,  w k post ) of hospital specific post-merger WTPs. The 
hospital-specific increase in WTP for hospitals j and k are  ( w j post -  w j pre ) and  ( w k post -  w k pre ) 
respectively.
52 The intuition behind this assumption is that the hospital for which the diversion ratio is relatively 
high, can profit more from the merger.
Chapter 3
78
Following equation (3), the hospital-specific price increase for hospital j is then given 
by:
(4)  ( p j post -  p j pre ) = α ∙  ( w j post -  w j pre ) .
Similarly, the hospital-specific price increase for hospital k is given by:
(5)  ( p k post -  p k pre ) = α ∙  (  w k post -  w k ,pre ) .
In the following, we will use equations (4) and (5) to predict the price increases resulting 
from the merger that we examined in this paper.
4. ESTIMATION
A. Specification of our choice model
Following Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003), we first estimated a conditional 
logit model (see section 3A). Unlike Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003), however, 
we ran the model for each of the products separately (rather than aggregating all the 
products for each hospital). We used the following specification for patient utility:
(6)  U ij =  ∑ j J-1   α j ∙  D j +  β 1 ∙ TRAVELTIME +  β 2 ∙ TRAVELTIME ∙  D AGE +  β 3 ∙ TRAVELTIME ∙ 
D FEMALE +  β 4 ∙ TRAVELTIME ∙ SESSCORE +  ε ij 
where TRAVELTIME was the travel time in minutes from the patient’s home (zip code) to 
the hospitals, DAGE was a dummy indicating whether the patient is older or younger than 
65, DFEMALE was a dummy for the patient’s gender and SESSCORE was a socio-economic 
status (SES) score for the patient’s zip code. We estimated a fixed-effects conditional 
logit model. Given that there were J hospitals, the dummy variables in this model would 
pick up J different sets of undefined attributes (e.g. Farrell et al. 2011; Train 2009). In our 
data we observed that 99% of the patients will not travel more than 100 minutes for a 
hip or a knee replacement or cataract surgery. We therefore restricted the choice set of 
each patient to the hospitals reachable within 100 minutes53. For cataract surgery, we 
only estimated the conditional logit model for the patient’s first cataract surgery. Out 
of all patients, 30% received more than one treatment at the same hospital. It is likely 
that a patient who received more than one cataract treatment at the same hospital was 
53 As a robustness check several alternative patient choice sets were used. Our results are robust to 
these other assumptions. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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treated for both the left and right eyes. In the estimation of the choice model (and the 
calculation of the WTP), we excluded such repeat choices by the same patient.
B. Specification of our WTP regression
For each product, we used the predicted probabilities that followed from the condi-
tional logit estimation to calculate the WTP for the inclusion of each of the hospitals 
in the network using equation (1). From the estimated conditional logit (equation (6)), 
we calculated the per-patient probability for choosing a certain hospital. Patient type i 
chooses hospital j with probability:
 ˆ  s  j( H j ,  X i ,  λ i ) =  exp [ ˆ  U  (  H j ,  X i ,  λ i ) ]  ___________  ∑ g∈G exp [ ˆ  U  (  H g ,  X i ,  λ i ) ]     
We use these probabilities and equation (1) to calculate the WTP for each hospital:
            ˆ  w  j =  
 ∑ i=1 N ln [ 1 _ 1 -  ˆ  s  j( H j ,  X i ,  λ i )  ]  _ ∑ i=1 N  ˆ  s  j( H j ,  X i ,  λ i )   . The calculations were performed in R with the package Merger-
Analysis (Halbersma 2013).
The next step was to regress the predicted WTPs on the prices negotiated between 
hospitals and insurers for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery. We estimated 
the following model54:
(7)  PRICE j = c + α ∙  WTP j +  β 1 ∙  INSURER . HHI j +  β 2 ∙  SESSCORE j +  β 3 ∙  AGE j +  β 4 ∙ 
HOUSEPRICE j +  β 5 ∙  HOSPITAL . TYPE j +  β 6 ∙  HOSPITAL . SIZE j    +  β 7 ∙  LIBERALIZED j   +  ε j 
where PRICE was the average pre-merger price (per hospital per product), WTP was the 
WTP following from equation (1) and based on the probabilities from the fixed-effects 
conditional logit model (equation (6)) (i.e. ˆ  w  j   ), INSURER.HHI is the insurer’s Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index (HHI) for each hospital (based on the insurer’s market shares of the 
total revenue of the hospital, per product). To control for potential differences in hospital 
costs, we included the average SES-score of the patients (SESSCORE) and the average 
age of the patients (AGE) as proxies for hospitals’ casemix differences, the average house 
price of the hospital’s zip code (divided by 100.000) as a proxy for location-specific costs 
(HOUSEPRICE), the hospital type (academic or general hospital55) (HOSPITAL.TYPE), and 
the hospitals’ size, measured in terms of the total number of beds (HOSPITAL.SIZE) to ac-
count for potential (dis)economies of scale. Further, we control for the per hospital frac-
54 We examined the robustness of the model by estimating the Huber M-estimator (Huber 1964) and 
the least trimmed squares (lts) regression (Rousseeuw and Van Driessen 1999). Both methods pro-
duced similar results. The results are available from the authors upon request.
55 Due to their low number, we did not distinguish Independent Treatment Centres (ITCs – see also 
footnote 24) or specialty hospitals separately in this analysis. They were treated as general hospitals.
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tion of the liberalized segment (defined by the revenue of the total liberalized segment 
divided by the total revenue of the hospital) (LIBERALIZED). We report the MacKinnon 
and White (1985) Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors.
C. Instrumental variable approach
It is possible that our predicted WTP is endogenous. There are two important sources of 
endogeneity. First, performance may feed back into structure, causing a simultaneous 
equation bias (e.g. lower prices may induce patients to go to a cheaper hospital, which 
in turn increases the (predicted) WTP of the hospital as derived from observed patient 
choices). Second, there are attributes that influence both price and patients’ choice of a 
hospital (e.g. quality of care). These are picked up by the conditional logit model’s fixed 
effects, causing an omitted variables bias (see also Evans, Froeb, and Werden 1993).
The common solution to these problems is to use an instrumental variables (IV) ap-
proach. Kessler and McClellan (2000), Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor, Morena-Serra, 
and Propper (2013) solve the endogeneity problem by using the predicted patient flows 
generated from models of patient choice. These only use observable, exogenous charac-
teristics of patients and hospitals (Kessler and McClellan 2000). In our paper, we estimate 
a WTP instrument (TRAVELTIME-WTP) which is based on the predicted probabilities of a 
conditional logit model that only includes patients’ travel times ( U ij =  β 1 ∙ TRAVELTIME + 
ε ij ) . Following Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Gaynor, Morena-Serra, and Propper 
(2013), we explicitly omit hospital-level fixed effects to prevent predicted choice being 
based on unobserved attributes of prices.
After determining the TRAVELTIME-WTP, we carried out a two-stage least square (2SLS) 
model where the instrument list consisted of TRAVELTIME-WTP (instrument for WTP), IN-
SURER.HHI, SESSCORE, AGE, HOUSEPRICE, HOSPITAL.TYPE, HOSPITAL.SIZE, and LIBERALIZED 
(see section 5 for details on these variables).
5. Data
In this paper, we analyze the price effects of a merger between a general acute care 
hospital (hospital M1) and a neighboring general acute care hospital that also provides 
tertiary hospital care (hospital M2). The merger was consummated in the Netherlands 
in year t. We used pre-merger data (t-1 data) to establish what price increases the 
Option Demand method would have predicted if an antitrust authority had used the 
model in their review after being notified of the merger. We contrast the predictions 
obtained using the OD method with the actual price effects of the merger. The latter are 
determined through a difference-in-difference technique (Roos et al. 2017). In section 
3 we explained that we focus on three products for which prices are freely negotiable: 
hip replacements, knee replacements and cataract surgery. In year t-1 these product 
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markets jointly represent 47.5 percent of the merged hospital’s turnover in the segment 
for which Dutch health insurers and hospitals were allowed to freely negotiate prices.
We use a nationwide patient-level dataset that contains all inpatient and outpatient 
visits for all hospital locations and Independent Treatment Centers (ITCs)56. For each visit, 
the patient’s zip code, age (year of birth), gender, health insurer, diagnosis and treat-
ment were observed, as well as the price negotiated for each hospital location-insurer-
product combination in year t-1. The patient-level data that we used came from the 
insurers’ claims administration and hospital registries and was provided by the Dutch 
Healthcare Authority.
For the choice model (see section 4A), we calculated each patient’s travel time (in 
minutes) to the hospitals using a travel time matrix for year t-1. Some hospitals have 
multiple treatment locations, but the data does not reflect which location the patient 
actually went to. For hospitals with more than one treatment location, we calculated 
the patient’s travel time (in minutes) to the closest hospital location57. Additionally, we 
obtained socio-economics status (SES) scores from the Netherlands Institute for Social 
Research (SCP). A higher SES score means a higher socio-economic status in the zip code 
area.
In the WTP regression (see section 4B), we included the average SES score and the 
average age. Additionally, we included the average house price for the zip code area 
of the hospital and the hospital types as proxies for location-specific costs. The data on 
house prices was obtained from Statistics Netherlands (CBS). We differentiated between 
academic and general hospitals (taking general hospitals as the reference group). ITCs 
and specialty hospitals were treated as general hospitals. The insurer’s HHI was based on 
the insurer’s market shares per product (of the total revenue of the hospital) and ranged 
from zero to one. Thus, the insurer’s HHI for hospital j and product k was calculated as: 
INSURER . HHI jk =  ∑ l=1 n  (  REV jkl  _  ∑ l=1 n  REV jkl ) 2 , where  REV jkl is the revenue of insurer l (l=1,..,n) in hospital 
j for product k. We also included the per-hospital fraction of the liberalized segment (LIB-
ERALIZED), which was defined by the revenue of the whole liberalized segment divided 
by the total revenue of a hospital (i.e. the regulated and liberalized segments together).
56 ITCs are comparable to the freestanding Ambulatory Surgery Centers (ASCs) that operate in the US 
and UK healthcare markets.
57 25 hospitals had multiple locations for hip replacements and cataract surgeries. For knee replace-
ments 27 hospitals had multiple locations. As a sensitivity check we also estimated the choice model 
using the patient’s travel time (in minutes) to the main hospital location. This did not affect our WTP 
estimations. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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6. RESULTS
A. Choice model
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the main variables that were included in the 
conditional logit model of patients’ choice of hospital for hip and knee replacement and 
cataract surgery (panels A).
Table 2 presents the results of our estimation. We estimated two models for each 
product (hip, knee and cataract). Model 2 is the conditional logit model that includes 
patients’ travel time only (see section 4C), while model 1 is the full fixed effects con-
ditional logit model that also includes other covariates (see section 4A). The results of 
model 2 clearly show that, as expected, patients dislike travel time. Model 1 also takes 
patient heterogeneity into account by adding interaction terms. The results show that 
travel time interacts with age, gender and SES score, indicating that older patients prefer 
hospitals closer to home than younger patients and that females are less willing to travel 
further than men, while the higher the SES score, the greater the patients’ willingness to 
travel. All coefficients have the expected sign and correspond with findings from other 
studies on patient choice in the Netherlands (e.g. Beukers, Kemp, and Varkevisser 2014; 
Varkevisser, Van der Geest, and Schut 2012; Varkevisser, Van der Geest, and Schut 2010). 
Furthermore, the goodness of fit measures that are also presented in table 2 show that 
our models perform well.
B. WTP regression
As discussed in section 4B, we used the estimated coefficients from the conditional logit 
models to calculate the Willingness-To-Pay for the inclusion of each of the hospitals in 
the network. We then regressed the predicted WTPs on the observed prices. Equation (7) 
is an OLS regression model that we estimated with and without instrumental variables 
(see sections 4B and 4C). Table 1 presents summary statistics on the main variables that 
were included in the OLS regressions (panels B).
The results of the estimation can be found in table 3. The first model is a simple or-
dinary least squares model with the WTP and the insurers market power vis-á-vis each 
individual hospital (measured by the HHI) regressed on price; model 2 adds control 
variables to model 1; and model 3 is a 2SLS approach with control and instrumental 
variables. As discussed in section 4C, we use TRAVELTIME-WTP as an instrument for the 
WTP. To determine the relevance of the instrument, we tested its correlation with the 
possibly endogenous regressor WTP by determining the first-stage F-statistic (Stock and 
Yogo 2005; Staiger and Stock 1997). Our first-stage F-statistic was 62.617 (p-value = 0.00) 
for hip replacement, 39.549 (p-value = 0.00) for knee replacement and 181.51 (p-value 
= 0.00) for cataract surgery. This indicates that our instrument (TRAVELTIME-WTP) is 
strongly correlated with the WTP. The Wu-Hausman statistic was 0.16 (p-value = 0.68) for 
83
Back to the Future
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum Observations
Hip replacements
Panel A. Patient characteristics
Age 69.2 10.5 16 99 N = 20846
Age Dummy (>65) 0.66 - 0 1 N = 20846
Gender (female) 0.68 - 0 1 N = 20846
SES score in the zip code area -0.002 1.000 -5.437 3.813 N = 20846
Travel time (in minutes) 12.60 13.15 0.00 99.96 N = 20846
Panel B. Hospital characteristics
Patients’ average age 69.0 2.7 55.1 0.6 n = 82
Patients’ average SES score -0.023 0.361 -0.909 0.639 n = 82
Price hip replacement (in €) 9092.00 293.29 8527.00 10408.00 n = 82
Willingness-To-Pay 1.813 0.885 1.024 7.234 n = 82
Instrument Willingness-To-Pay (TRAVELTIME-WTP) 1.666 0.676 1.056 5.177 n = 82
Academic hospital 0.09 - 0 1 n = 82
ITC 0 - 0 1 n = 82
Insurers’ HHI 0.391 0.134 0.163 0.795 n = 82
Housing price in the zip code area (€1000) 193.9 32.9 134.0 266.0 n = 82
Hospital size (number of beds) 512.7 275.0 138.0 1575.0 n = 82
The hospital’s share of the liberalized segment 
(LIBERALIZED)
0.11 0.04 0.02 0.23 n = 82
Knee replacements
Panel A. Patient characteristics
Age 69.0 9.9 20 97 N = 17558
Age Dummy (>65) 0.65 - 0 1 N = 17558
Gender (female) 0.69 - 0 1 N = 17558
SES score in the zip code area -0.002 1.001 -5.148 2.772 N = 17558
Travel time (in minutes) 13.25 14.15 0 99.71 N = 17558
Panel B. Hospital characteristics
Patients’ average age 69.0 2.0 64.1 74.6 n = 85
Patients’ average SES score 0.009 0.357 -0.869 0.791 n = 85
Price knee replacement (in €) 11493.00 390.69 9756.00 10689.00 n = 85
Willingness-To-Pay 1.712 0.795 1.019 6.628 n = 85
Instrument Willingness-To-Pay (TRAVELTIME-WTP) 1.579 0.589 1.045 4.576 n = 85
Academic hospital 0.09 - 0 1 n = 85
ITC n = 85
Insurers’ HHI 0.408 0.127 0.618 0.783 n = 85
Housing price in the zip code area (€1000) 194.1 32.2 134.0 266.0 n = 85
Hospital size (number of beds) 509.3 272.3 140.0 1575.0 n = 85
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hip replacement, 2.39 (p-value = 0.13) for knee replacement and 0.24 (p-value = 0.63) for 
cataract surgery. This indicates that the variable WTP is not endogenous.
The average price for hip replacements is €9,092 (table 1). Table 3 indicates that a 
one-unit increase in WTP will increase prices for hip replacements by €88.69 (model 
2). Following Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003), we show how to interpret the 
magnitude of this estimate by considering the hospital with the highest WTP (i.e. WTP: 
7.234 –table 1) and the hospital with the lowest WTP (i.e. WTP: 1.024 –table 1). Using the 
results of model 2, the WTP difference of 6.210 translates into a difference in the price of 
a hip replacement of €550.76.
For knee replacements and cataract surgeries, the WTP is not significantly related to 
price. Apparently, in our regression model, WTP does not explain the variation in prices 
for knee replacement and cataract surgeries. This means that in the market for knee 
Variable Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum Observations
The hospital’s share of the liberalized segment 
(LIBERALIZED)
0.11 0.03 0.02 0.23 n = 85
Cataract surgery
Panel A. Patient characteristics
Age 73.5 10.4 0.0 110.0 N = 103750
Age Dummy (>65) 0.81 - 0 1 N = 103750
Gender (female) 0.61 - 0 1 N = 103750
SES score in the zip code area 0.000 1.000 -6.171 2.809 N = 103750
Travel time (in minutes) 11.30 11.35 0.00 99.99 N = 103750
Panel B. Hospital characteristics
Patients’ average age 73.3 2.3 63.5 77.0 n = 86
Patients’ average SES score -0.031 0.385 -1.148 0.627 n = 86
Price cataract surgery (in €) 1365.00 83.80 1046.00 1547.00 n = 86
Willingness-To-Pay 1.875 0.846 1.018 5.795 n = 86
Instrument Willingness-To-Pay (TRAVELTIME-WTP) 1.782 0.805 1.056 5.766 n = 86
Academic hospital 0.08 - 0 1 n = 86
Insurers’ HHI 0.421 0.128 0.210 0.694 n = 86
Housing price in the zip code area (€1000) 192.5 33.4 134.0 284.0 n = 86
Hospital size (number of beds) 488.3 289.35 0.0 1575.0 n = 86
The hospital’s share of the liberalized segment 
(LIBERALIZED)
0.12 0.06 0.02 0.44 n = 86
Notes: Summary statistics refer to t-1, where t is the merger year. N = total number of patients that under-
went hip or knee replacements or cataract surgeries. The total number of patients that underwent cataract 
surgery only includes the patient’s first cataract surgery. n = total number of hospitals in the sample. We 
calculated the patient’s travel time (in minutes) to the closest hospital location.
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replacements and cataract surgeries using the WTP for the WTP-based merger simula-
tion is less meaningful than in the market for hip replacements.
7. USING THE WTP FOR ANTITRUST PURPOSES
In this section, we contrast the ex ante predicted price effects with the actual ex post price 
effects of a merger between a general acute care hospital (hospital M1) and a neighbor-
ing general acute care hospital that also provides some types of tertiary hospital care 
(hospital M2).
The actual price effects were determined through a difference-in-differences tech-
nique (Roos et al. 2017). For a detailed discussion of the method, data and results of 
the difference-in-differences technique, we refer to Roos et al. (2017). In sum, Roos et 
al. (2017) use data on hospital-insurer negotiated contract prices in the Netherlands 
for each of the three hospital products considered, to investigate whether the merger 
between hospitals M1 and M2 has led to price changes. They first estimate an aggre-
gated difference-in-differences model ( htmergedt
H
j
tjjht DDDDp εδλβα +⋅⋅+⋅++= +
−
=
+∑ 1
1
1
1ln ) 
Table 2. Conditional logit model of patient hospital choice for hip and knee replacements and cataract 
surgerya
Hip replacements Knee replacements Cataract surgery
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Time -0.1266***
(0.0018)
-0.1488***
(0.0010)
-0.1248***
(0.0018)
-0.1504***
(0.0011)
-0.1343***
(0.0010)
-0.1668***
(0.0005)
Time * Age -0.0590***
(0.0020)
-0.0460***
(0.0019)
-0.0551***
(0.0011)
Time * Female -0.0031
(0.0020)
-0.0025
(0.0020)
-0.0088***
(0.0010)
Time * SES-score 0.0085***
(0.0011)
0.0104***
(0.0011)
0.0072***
(0.0006)
Observations 20846 20846 17558 17558 103750 103750
McFadden’s R2 0.68 0.64 0.65 0.61 0.72 0.67
Hit-and-miss 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.66 0.70 0.68
Notes: Models estimated by conditional logit model with standard errors in parentheses under coefficients. 
Model 2 is the conditional logit model that only includes patients’ travel time (see section 4C), while model 
1 includes a full set of hospital dummies (not reported here) and other covariates (see section 4A). The con-
ditional logit models are estimated on data from t-1, where t is the merger year. We restricted the patients’ 
choice sets to the hospitals reachable within 100 minutes.
a For clarity reasons, we do not report the hospital dummies (fixed effects) here. The results are available 
from the authors upon request.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 3. Willingness-To-Pay models for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Hip replacements
(intercept) 9238.21*** (100.09) 8075.17*** (1515.84) 8027.90*** (1519.47)
WTP 76.21** (33.28) 88.69** (40.00) 94.40** (42.44)
INSURER.HHI -727.75** (294.38) -894.08*** (324.63) -909.52*** (335.73)
SESSCORE -91.61 (101.93) -95.51 (104.86)
AGE 16.81 (20.00) 17.30 (20.11)
HOUSEPRICE -0.24 (0.98) -0.18 (0.98)
HOSPITAL.TYPE 151.25 (220.69) 154.75 (220.79)
HOSPITAL.SIZE 0.09 (0.19) 0.09 (0.19)
LIBERALIZED 279.38 (2298.29) 256.06 (2295.96)
IV NO NO YES: TRAVELTIME-WTP
Observations 82 82 82
R-Squared 0.10 0.13 0.13
Adjusted R-Squared 0.08 0.04 0.04
Knee replacements
(intercept) 10857.12*** (170.90) 10805.00*** (1947.40) 10619.25*** (1917.42)
WTP 14.38 (105.15) 3.00 (125.09) 37.90 (122.47)
INSURER.HHI -473.89 (433.23) -5381.80 (450.97) -613.11 (447.91)
SESSCORE 21.99 (136.89) -3.59 (138.74)
AGE 8.25 (26.70) 9.88 (26.27)
HOUSEPRICE -2.12 (1.63) -1.76 (1.62)
HOSPITAL.TYPE 153.74 (277.65) 156.39 (282.73)
HOSPITAL.SIZE -0.06 (0.21) -0.06 (0.21)
LIBERALIZED -394.23 (2938.10) -605.29 (2903.94)
IV NO NO YES: TRAVELTIME-WTP
Observations 85 85 85
R-Squared 0.02 0.06 0.06
Adjusted R-Squared -0.00 -0.04 -0.04
Cataract surgery
(intercept) 1319.70*** (35.50) 803.25 (899.40) 295.27 (899.51)
WTP 1.26 (9.70) -2.17 (10.79) -5.94 (10.77)
INSURER.HHI 100.78 (71.39) 33.65 (89.72) 47.49 (89.22)
SESSCORE -19.57 (32.78) -17.03 (33.09)
AGE 10.12 (11.09) 10.30 (11.09)
HOUSEPRICE -0.34 (0.36) -0.36 (0.36)
HOSPITAL.TYPE 74.51 (83.95) 75.24 (83.43)
HOSPITAL.SIZE -0.07 (0.05) -0.07 (0.05)
LIBERALIZED -828.47 (331.48) -822.98** (338.05)
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and then, to show the effect of aggregating over products, locations and insurers, they 
remove the aggregations stepwise. The pre-merger price was based on data from the 
year preceding the merger (t-1) and the post-merger price was based on data from the 
year after the merger (t+1). Table 4 summarizes the estimated merger effects on prices 
of hip replacement, knee replacement and cataract surgery for hospitals M1 and M2 in 
comparison with the average price change pre- and post-merger in a control group. 
Roos et al. (2017) find evidence of heterogeneous price effects for a merger between 
neighboring hospitals across hospital products and hospital locations. Their result is 
robust for different control groups and different model specifications.
The ex ante predictions for merger-induced price increases were calculated using the 
Option Demand method as described in section 3C. Table 5 displays the predicted WTP 
increases. To see how a merger affects WTP, we looked at the change in the predicted 
WTPs. In the case of hip replacements, the WTP for hospital M1 increased by 25.7%, and 
the WTP for hospital M2 increased by 11.7%. Both of these increases were substantial. In 
general, patients are more willing to pay for the inclusion of hospital M1 than hospital 
M2. This is not surprising because the merger also had a differential impact on the struc-
ture of the market in which the hospitals were competing. Hospital M1 is located in an 
isolated geographical area and hospital M2 was the largest competitor to hospital M1 
pre-merger. Hospital M2, in contrast, is subject to notable competitive pressure from (at 
least) five other hospitals in the three submarkets studied in this paper. Note that table 
4 suggests that the price increases are higher for hospital M1 than for hospital M2, a 
finding which is only statistically significant for hip replacements.
Next, the increase in the hospital specific prices due to merger can be determined 
using equations (4) and (5). From equations (4) and (5) it follows that we were able to 
calculate the predicted increase in prices for hospital j as:
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
IV NO NO YES: TRAVELTIME-WTP
Observations 86 86 86
R-Squared 0.03 0.41 0.41
Adjusted R-Squared 0.00 0.35 0.35
Notes: Per product we report three models. The first model is a simple OLS model with the WTP and the 
insurers’ market power vis-á-vis each individual hospital regressed on price. Model 2 adds control variables 
to model 1 and model 3 is a 2SLS model that adds control and instrumental variables. We report the MacK-
innon and White (1985) Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients). 
We used data from t-1, where t is the merger year. Note that the R2 for cataract surgeries is much higher 
than the R2 for hip and knee replacements. This is due to a higher number of ITCs in the market for cataract 
surgeries.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Chapter 3
88
(8)   ˆ  α  (  w j  
post -  w j  pre )  _ ˆ ˆ PRICE  j  ,
where  ˆ ˆ PRICE  j is the fitted pre-merger price of hospital j and  ˆ  α is the estimated coefficient 
of the WTP that is obtained by equation (7). As discussed above, we only estimate the 
predicted price increases for hip replacements. Table 6 compares the results with the ex 
post estimates.
We constructed 90% and 95% confidence intervals for the predicted and estimated 
price increases using the student t distribution of  ˆ  α and treatment effect, respectively. 
Care should be taken in interpreting the results as the ex post estimates have large 
confidence intervals.
The merger simulation showed that the prices for hip replacements in hospitals M1 
and M2 were likely to increase significantly, although at a different magnitude. The con-
fidence intervals of the predicted price increases are all nested within the confidence 
intervals of the actual price increases. Given that the confidence intervals of the ex post 
estimates are quite large, however, we should be cautious in interpreting this result as 
evidence that the OD method is able to accurately predict price increases after merger. If 
we were to ignore this for a moment, because Roos et al. (2017) showed that the ex post 
estimation was robust for different control groups and different model specifications, 
table 6 suggest that OD method overestimates the price effects for hospital M2 and 
underestimates the price effects for hospital M1.
Table 4. Merger effect on prices of hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery for hospitals M1 and 
M2 in comparison to average price changes pre- and post-merger in a control group (retrospective analysis)
Merger effect on price (DiD coefficient)
Panel A. Hospital M1
Hip replacements 0.090* (0.053)
Knee replacements 0.021 (0.062)
Cataract surgery 0.027 (0.057)
Panel B. Hospital M2
Hip replacements -0.035 (0.053)
Knee replacements -0.064 (0.062)
Cataract surgery -0.049 (0.057)
Notes: Time period is t-2 and t+2, where t is the merger. Models estimated by OLS with standard errors in 
parentheses under coefficients. Null hypothesis: difference-in-difference estimator is equal to zero.
Source: Roos et al. 2017.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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8. CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper is to examine the predictive power of the option demand (OD) 
method for hospital mergers. Like other merger simulation models (MSMs), the OD 
method has clear advantages over more traditional market definition approaches be-
cause it provides antitrust agencies with direct evidence about the expected effects of 
the merger and does not require questionable assumptions to be made on the relevant 
(geographic) market. Also, studies that contrasted the predictions by the OD method 
and several traditional measures concluded that the OD model outperforms ad hoc 
measures in predicting prices (Garmon 2016; Dranove & Ody 2016).
Antitrust agencies should aim to use MSMs that are able to explain outcomes in the 
relevant market reasonable well, for example by demonstrating that the model accu-
Table 5. Hospital specific change in WTP after merger for hip and knee replacements and cataract surgery
Pre-merger price
(mean in €)
Pre-merger WTP Absolute increase 
in WTP after 
merger
Panel A. Hospital M1
Hip replacements 9135.66 4.668 1.199
Knee replacements 10693.64 4.706 0.994
Cataract surgery 1393.25 3.655 1.530
Panel B. Hospital M2
Hip replacements 9064.99 2.296 0.268
Knee replacements 10645.73 2.021 0.322
Cataract surgery 1358.92 2.500 0.157
Notes: For the pre-merger WTP, we used data from t-1, where t is the merger year (WTP estimation using the 
results from table 3, model 2). For the change in WTP after merger, we used data from t-1 and t+1, where t 
is the merger year (change in WTP using the results from table 3, model 2).
Table 6. Predicted and estimated price increases for hip replacements due to merger
Ex ante predictions (by the Option 
Demand Method)
Ex post estimates (by the difference-in-
differences estimates)
% price 
increases
95% CI 90% CI % price 
increase
95% CI 90% CI
Panel A. Hospital M1
Hip replacements 1.16 [0.12 –2.21] [0.29 – 2.04] 9.00 [-1.63 – 19.63] [0.13 – 17.87]
Panel B. Hospital M2
Hip replacements 0.26 [0.03 – 0.50] [0.07 – 0.46] -3.50 [-14.13 – 7.13] [-12.37 – 5.37]
Notes: The increases in the hospital specific prices due to merger are determined using equations 4 and 5. 
The ex post estimates are obtained using a difference-in-differences technique, which is reported in Roos 
et al. (2017).
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rately predicts the effects of mergers in the same industry (Budzinsky and Ruhmer 2009; 
Werden, Froeb, and Scheffman 2004). We have contrasted the findings of this prospective 
method of analysis with the findings of a retrospective study involving a consummated 
Dutch hospital merger (Roos et al. 2017). Our results indicate that there is a relationship 
between WTP and prices for hip replacements. We were not able to establish a relation-
ship between WTP and prices for knee replacements and cataract surgeries. We therefore 
only estimated a reduced-form merger simulation for hip replacements. The comparison 
between the reduced-form merger simulation and ex post estimates suggest that the 
OD method overestimates the price effects for hospital M2 and underestimates the price 
effects for hospital M1. Yet, the overestimation is not statistically significant.
Garmon (2016) also finds mixed results for the performance of the reduced-form 
merger simulation in the US. Hence, we conclude that although the OD method could 
be a valuable addition to the antitrust agencies’ toolkit in signaling potentially anti-
competitive merger effects, our findings also indicate that more research is necessary. 
For example, the explanatory power of our regression models is quite low. This may 
either indicate that the model needs to be reconsidered to find factors that have higher 
explanatory power or that the model does not (yet) fit the Dutch healthcare market 
well enough. With respect to the latter, we concluded in section 2B that the OD method 
is applicable to the free-pricing segment of the Dutch hospital industry. However, the 
industry is in transition and the number of health insurers offering contracts with re-
stricted provider networks has increased over the years. As the OD method depends 
upon the bargaining relationship between health insurers and hospitals, we expect 
that the relationship between WTP and price will get stronger as the threat of selective 
contracting becomes more credible.
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ABSTRACT
There is much debate about the effect of com- petition in healthcare and especially 
the effect of competition on the quality of healthcare, although empirical evidence on 
this subject is mixed. The Netherlands provides an interesting case in this debate. The 
Dutch system could be characterized as a system involving managed competition and 
mandatory healthcare insurance. Information about the quality of care provided by 
hospitals has been publicly available since 2008. In this paper, we evaluate the relation-
ship between quality scores for three diagnosis groups and the market power indicators 
of hospitals. We estimate the impact of competition on quality in an environment of 
liberalized pricing. For this research, we used unique price and production data relating 
to three diagnosis groups (cataract, adenoid and tonsils, bladder tumor) produced by 
Dutch hospitals in the period 2008–2011. We also used the quality indicators relating 
to these diagnosis groups. We reveal a negative relationship between market share and 
quality score for two of the three diagnosis groups studied, meaning that hospitals in 
competitive markets have better quality scores than those in concentrated markets. We 
therefore conclude that more competition is associated with higher quality scores.
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INTRODUCTION
Many countries are facing high healthcare costs, which are also continuing to rise 
steadily. As a response to these trends, reforms have been implemented with the aim of 
controlling healthcare costs and improving the quality of care, and it seems likely that 
further such reforms will be put in place. The Netherlands is an example of a country 
that has recently reformed its healthcare system. The reforms took place in 2006 and 
included essential competitive elements [28].
The main objectives of the reforms to the healthcare system were to reduce costs, 
increase the quality and accessibility of healthcare and, at the same time, to maintain 
an equitable healthcare system. Today, the Dutch system can be characterized as a 
system of managed competition in which health insurers compete for sub- scribers and 
healthcare providers compete for contracts with health insurers. A prospective payment 
system has been implemented to support negotiations between health insurers and 
hospitals. The prices of the hospital products, called Diagnosis Treatment Combinations, 
are in part set by the government. Prices for complex and relatively low- volume care 
are regulated (representing around 30% of hospital production in 2012). Other prices 
(mainly for elective care) have been liberalized and are set after negotiations between 
insurers and hospitals [3, 29].
Any healthcare system requires quality information regarding the care provided [33]. 
For this, an adequate system of outcome and quality measurements is necessary and 
information based on the insights provided by this system must be available to consum-
ers. In the Netherlands, quality information became publicly available in 2008 via the 
website http://www.KiesBeter.nl. Since then, consumers have been able to compare the 
quality of treatment for specific medical conditions at all Dutch hospitals [32]. Consum-
ers are obliged to take out basic health insurance covering all basic healthcare including 
hospital care.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between competition and quality indica-
tors for hospital products in a market in which prices are negotiated between health 
insurers and hospitals. We contribute to the literature in several ways. We contribute 
to our knowledge of the relationship between competition and quality. The majority 
of the existing literature on this subject focuses on the US and UK healthcare systems 
(for example [5, 6, 14, 21, 23, 24, 26]. We, however, examine a European country with 
mandatory health insurance. Secondly, we assess the impact of competition on qual-
ity in an environment of liberalized prices. For this research, we used unique price 
and production data relating to three diagnosis groups (cataract, adenoid and tonsils, 
bladder tumor) produced by Dutch hospitals and Independent Treatment Centers in the 
period 2008 to 2011. Some 928,544 claims with a total revenue of 1.3 billion euros were 
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examined. Thirdly, most other papers do not model competition. 58We use a model to 
measure market power in a framework that is rooted in economic theory [12]. Fourthly, 
we have also taken into account the Independent Treatment Centers (ITCs), which have 
entered the market in recent years, when measuring market power; many studies do not 
take the rising number of ITCs into account [7].
A total of 178 ITCs were licensed to provide health care services in the Dutch hospital 
market. Particularly in the field of ophthalmology, it is important to include ITCs in this 
research because ITCs are responsible for more than 10% of the market for cataract 
treatments [22].59 The results reveal a negative relationship between market share and 
quality scores, meaning that hospitals in competitive markets achieve higher scores 
on quality than those in concentrated markets. The paper will proceed as follows. In 
‘Institutional context’ we will give a brief introduction of the institutional context of 
the healthcare system in the Netherlands. In ‘Literature’, we will provide an overview 
of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature. We will then proceed to describe 
our estimation strategy and data in ‘Estimation strategy’, while the results are given in 
‘Estimation results’ and ‘Further examination of the empirical model’. ‘Conclusion and 
discussion’ will outline our conclusions.
1. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
In 2006, the healthcare system in the Netherlands under- went extensive reform when 
managed competition was introduced.60 The system is based on two fundamental pil-
lars: competition and solidarity. The basic concept is that insurers compete for policy 
holders and healthcare providers compete for contracts with insurers. The idea is that 
health insurers contract with individual health professionals and healthcare institutions, 
and negotiate terms relating to service delivery, price, quality, and volume of the health 
care production [27]. The selective contracting of health care providers is permitted. In 
order to support the negotiations between hospitals and insurers, a prospective pay-
ment system was put in place. Quality information for different hospital treatments was 
also made publicly available.
To guarantee both income solidarity and risk solidarity, the government introduced 
a mandatory health insurance scheme for the entire population in 2006. The Health 
Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet 2005) includes several requirements that safeguard 
equal access to healthcare for everyone. The act obliges citizens to buy a basic benefits 
58 As a proxy, many papers use the number of hospitals in a given geographic radius.
59 Unfortunately, we do not have quality information of the ITCs.
60 This paragraph is partially based on [18].
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package from a private insurance company and obliges insurers to accept clients with-
out premium differentiation. This basic benefits package is legally defined and includes 
hospital care, general practitioner care, dental care for children under 18 years, obstetri-
cian care, maternity home care, ambulance services, and curative mental healthcare. 
The premium for this basic package is roughly 50% of the expected health care cost per 
capita. The other 50% is paid to the government as an income- dependent premium. 
The government pays the sum of the income-dependent premiums into a risk adjust-
ment fund. This fund redistributes the money via risk-adjusted payments to the insurers. 
The system involves virtually no co- payments: the government currently prescribes a 
mandatory deductible of €375 and an optional deductible (between €0 and €500). In 
the period that our research relates to (2008–2011), the mandatory deductible increased 
from €150 to €170, and the optional deductible was between €0and €500.61
2. LITERATURE
Theoretical model
Economic theory on quality levels is highly equivocal and quality levels seem to be 
highly dependent on the market structures that are in place. Hospitals providing com-
parable health services may vary in the level of price-quality pro- vided. It is important 
to identify the factors that drive this relationship. In price-regulated markets, quality is 
the only dimension on which one can compete. In this setting, quality levels depend on 
whether price-cost margins are positive or negative [12]. In non-price-regulated mar-
kets, where providers are able to determine price and quality level, quality levels depend 
on elasticities of demand for price and quality. If quality information is not transparent, 
competition will focus on the price dimension [24].
For our setting, which involves managed competition, Gaynor and Town [12] provide a 
relevant theoretical model. Given that in the Netherlands hospitals and insurers bargain 
with each other, it is most useful to analyze com- petition and quality through a bar-
gaining framework. Gaynor and Town [12] (pages 566–568) present a model by which 
hospital and insurers bargain on price and hospitals are allowed to determine quality 
levels. In this framework, an insurer constructs a network of hospitals by bargaining with 
hospitals for their inclusion in that network. Insurers sell this network of hospitals to 
consumers through a health plan. The desirability of a network to a consumer depends 
61 Mandatory deductibles were €150 in 2008, €155 in 2009, €165 in 2010, and €170 in 2011. Since 
prices for most hospital treatments are higher than the deductible and insurers do not differenti-
ate deductibles on the basis of the hospital chosen, patients are not price-sensitive with respect to 
hospital treatment.
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the value that he/she attaches to the hospitals that are included in that network in the 
event that he or she needs treatment.
The bargaining model of Gaynor and Town [12] consists of four phases.
1. Each hospital determines its quality level
2. Insurers and hospitals negotiate prices (if they agree, the hospital can become part 
of the health plan network)
3. Patients choose a health plan based on their preferences
4. In the event that they need treatment, patients choose a hospital from the network
Gaynor and Town [12] find that the impact of competition on quality is generally 
ambiguous. However, in the event that hospital demand is not responsive to price—
which is actually the case in our setting, see ‘Institutional context’—then the impact of 
competition on quality is positive. Any increase in competition induces all hospitals to 
increase their quality. On balance, the effect of this increase in competition on hospitals’ 
prices depends on their relative bargaining position after their increase in quality. If their 
relative bargaining position is unchanged, then there will be no price effect. However, if 
there is a change in their relative bargaining position, due to, for example, differences in 
their marginal costs for achieving quality standards, then hospital with lower marginal 
costs for achieving quality will choose a relatively higher quality and improve their rela-
tive bargaining positions and, therefore, their prices. Using this framework as a guide 
for our empirical model, we would conjecture that in the Dutch market, we can expect a 
positive relationship between quality and competition.
Empirical literature
Various studies have examined the relationship between competition and quality in re-
lation to price negotiations between hospitals and health insurers. In their literature re-
view, Gaynor and Town [12] conclude that the impact of competition on quality remains 
ambiguous, ranging from negative to positive. Most studies undertaken originate in the 
US or UK. Lyon [19] examined the relationship between competition and quality for the 
managed care market. Lyon [19] showed that when there is greater price competition, 
price and quality are both lower than in traditional markets. Lyon’s [19] model shows that 
competition has a positive impact on quality when patients have a free choice of hospi-
tals. When patients hospital choice is restricted, competition may lead to excessively low 
or high quality. Also, Gowrisankaran and Town [14] estimate the effect of competition 
on quality by comparing Medicare patients and HMO patients. Their assumption is that 
hospitals provide the same quality for all patients and that a change in competition 
will influence changes in quality for the hospital as a whole. Hospitals cannot influence 
Medicare prices because the government sets prices. For Medicare patients, the level 
of reimbursement determines whether hospitals will adjust quality (when the price is 
lower than cost, hospitals are incentivized to reduce quality and vice versa). For two 
103
Competition and quality indicators
diagnoses, pneumonia and acute myocardial infarction, these authors use mortality 
rates as quality measure. The results show that for HMO patients, competition leads to 
lower hospital prices and higher hospital quality. For Medicare patients, their results 
show that competition leads to lower quality, indicating that Medicare margins are 
(excessively) small. Encinosa and Didem [8] estimated logit regressions to examine the 
relationship between safety outcomes and hospital profit margins and find a gradual 
negative relationship, meaning that pressure on hospital finance leads to lower quality. 
Escarce et al. [9] examine the relationship between com- petition and quality in three US 
states with different levels of HMO penetration. Their logistic regression models reveal 
a positive relationship in states with the highest average market competition measures 
and HMO penetration.
Propper et al. [24] examine the effect of price competition on quality with a difference-
in-difference model in the UK. In this model, competing hospitals are compared with 
non-competing hospitals based on geographic location. They use AMI mortality as an 
unobserved quality measure. This study finds a negative relationship between com-
petition and AMI death rate. However, the relationship between an observed quality 
measure (the waiting list for elective care procedures) and competition is positive.
An important contribution outside the hospital market is Forder and Allan [10], who 
study the impact of competition on quality and price of English care and nursing homes. 
They show that competition reduces both quality and prices in nursing homes. A major 
difference in the institutional setting, however, is that a considerable number of the 
residents in these nursing homes are ‘self-payers’, which makes consumers much more 
price-sensitive than the consumers in studies on the hospital market.
In the Netherlands, two papers have examined the competition-quality relationship 
[2, 15]. Bijlsma et al. [2] used outcome and process-quality indicators after managed 
competition was introduced in Dutch hospitals. They used the Basic Data Set of the 
Health Inspectorate from the period 2004–2008. Most of these indicators were at the 
hospital level rather than at the diagnosis level. Competition is based on fixed radius 
measures. Although the relationship between competition and some process indicators 
was positive and significant, they do not find a quality- competition relationship in the 
quality of outcomes. Heijink et al. [15] studied the relationship between price, volume, 
and quality for elective cataract surgery in the Netherlands and found little variation in 
cataract quality indicators between Dutch hospitals after the introduction of price com-
petition [15]. Other Dutch studies analyzed the relationship between patient hospital 
choice and quality with publicly available quality data. Both studies found significant 
patient sensitivity to quality data [33, 1]. Varkevisser et al. [33] examined this relation-
ship specifically in relation to angioplasty treatments, which is a treatment for which 
hospitals require government permission and which is price-regulated. Even when 
quality information is noisy (for example because quality data is not adjusted for case 
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mix), this relationship holds. Beukers et al. [2] studied this relationship with regard to hip 
replacements in the period 2008–2010. Their logit regressions indicate that although 
the relationship between quality and patient hospital choice is significant, travel time is 
a more important indicator of patients choice of hospital.
3. ESTIMATION STRATEGY
Empirical model
To determine the relation between quality and competition, we estimate a panel data 
model. We consider the following general linear model:
 y it =  x it β +  v it , (1)
where  t denotes the year and  i denotes the hospital ( i = 1, 2, …, N ). The independent 
variables for hospital  i in year  t are given by vector  x it and the dependent variable is 
given by y it . In this model  v it =  u it +  c i is the composite error, where  c i is the unobserved 
component and  u it is the idiosyncratic error (see for example [34]). For each model, we 
made assumptions on the correlation between the unobserved component  c i and  x it 
. If we allow these to be correlated, then we have a fixed-effects model where  c i is a 
parameter that we will estimate. If we assume that they are uncorrelated then we have 
a random-effects model in which we assume a structure for the variance of  v it (see [34]).
In our specific application, we estimated a model for each diagnosis. For hospital  i in 
year  t (t = 2008, …, 2011) we denoted its concentration index by  ms (see below for the 
definition) and its quality by quality . To control for possible case mix differences between 
hospitals, we included the fraction of females ( frac _ femal  e it ) and the fraction of patients 
who are 65 years old or older ( frac_  65 it ). To control for the fact that some hospitals deal 
with one dominant health insurer, while other hospitals deal with several competing 
insurers, we calculated the HHI of the insurers that a hospital faces ( HHI _ in  s it ). We calcu-
lated this for, say, hospital  i in year  t , by summing up the squared shares that each insurer 
has in the total revenue of hospital  i in year  t . Furthermore, given that teaching hospitals 
may treat more severe patients, we included a dummy variable for teaching hospitals ( 
aca  d it ) and since quality may depend on volume, we included a dummy for hospitals 
with a low volume of patients ( lowvolum  e it ). In each year, the 25% of hospitals with the 
lowest volume were considered as low-volume hospitals.
The estimated model is:
 qualit  y it =  β 1 m  s it +  β 2 frac _ femal  e it +  β 3 frac_  65 it +  β 4 HHI _ in  s it +  β 5 lowvolum  e it + 
β 6 aca  d it +  v it (2)
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To estimate the relationship between quality and competition, we needed to measure 
market power. There has been a great deal of debate about market definition and the 
measurement of market power in the literature. For an overview, see [12]. Many authors 
use a rather crude measure of competition: for example [24], measure competition as 
number of hospitals within a 30-min journey controlled for population density. How-
ever, although travel time is an important factor in hospital choice, choices can also be 
influenced by other patient and hospital characteristics.
Gaynor and Vogt [12] propose the use of the Logit Competition index (LOCI) to mea-
sure market power in the hospital market. The index is based on a weighted average of 
a hospitals market share per micro-market. The construction of the competition index 
starts by modeling the demand with a choice model. The choice model includes a utility 
function which, given characteristics of the consumer and hospital, depends on the util-
ity that a patient derives from each hospital. The utility depends on both observable and 
non-observable consumer and hospital characteristics. With the logit choice model, it is 
possible to calculate the probability that a specific consumer type will choose a specific 
hospital. Each group of patients with similar characteristics (e.g., zip-code, age, gender, 
diagnosis, etc.) forms a micro market.
Under a standard price competition model, the competition index (LOCI) of hospital  j 
for consumer type  t is given by (see [12])
 Λ j =  ∑ t w tj (1 −  s tj ) 
where the weights  w tj are the relative importance of each consumer type
 w tj =  
 N t  s tj  _  ∑ 
t
 N t  s tj 
 
and  N t is the number of consumers of the type  t .
The LOCI  Λ j is a measure of the competitiveness in the market. The index takes on 
values between 0 and 1, where  Λ = 0 means that hospital  j is monopolist and  Λ = 1 
means that the market is perfectly competitive.
We interpret the LOCI as 1 minus the weighted market share. To simplify the interpre-
tation of our results with we use the variable  ms as a shorthand for ‘‘market share’’, which 
is constructed as  (1 − Λ) .
For our purposes, we are able to use actual market share with the advantage that all 
non-observable characteristics are implicitly taken into account. Alternatively, we could 
have used estimated market share, with the advantage that all consumers are taken into 
account. In our estimations, we used actual market share. However, the use of actual 
market share could potentially lead to endogeneity: hospitals providing good quality 
may have higher market share.
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Our approach is similar to other articles about the impact of hospital competition on 
the quality of healthcare, e.g., Gowrisankaran and Town [13, 14], Kessler and McClel-
lan [16], Gaynor et al. [11], and Cooper et al. [6] all use a market share based on travel 
distance in their estimations directly or in their IV estimations, in order to avoid potential 
endogeneity problems. Our approach is different from Forder and Allan [10]: they use an 
administrative region (Medium-level Super Output Area) as a market to calculate market 
share. Since they do not use patient choice models, they cannot rely on market share 
based on travel distance as IV. They therefore use the level of competition in neighbor-
ing areas as IV.
To prevent any endogeneity problems, we also estimate our regressions with an 
estimated market share (based on travel distance only) in an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach. Our main contribution is that we define our micro markets at the level of the 
quality indicator. Our micro markets consisted of the group of DTCs that are linked to 
the quality indicators. For each quality indicator, we estimated the relationship between 
the indicator and the competition indicator, which meant that we were able to construct 
a competition indicator for each quality indicator. The micro markets are defined by a 
four-digit zip code and diagnosis. The narrower a micro market becomes, the more pre-
cise the total market share becomes. However, we should not make our micro markets 
smaller than four-digit zip codes and diagnosis, because then we would have too few 
observations per zip code. For example, age is highly skewed for each diagnosis: the 
cataract and bladder tumor diagnosis groups include mainly elderly patients, while the 
tonsil diagnosis group consists mainly of younger people. This indicates that splitting 
the micro markets across age categories will not add a great deal of information. Fur-
thermore, there is no reason to assume that choices would depend on gender.
Quality indicators
For the purposes of this research, we used the quality indicators from the ‘Dutch Health-
care Transparency Pro- gram’ (in Dutch: Zichtbare Zorg), which were developed by the 
Health Inspectorate in order to support various goals such as the provision of informa-
tion for patients and consumers to help them make their choices, purchase information 
for health insurers, control information for the Inspectorate and improvement informa-
tion for providers.
The Dutch Healthcare Transparency Program started in 2007 and in 2008 quality indi-
cators became available for ten diagnosis groups. The hospitals are required to provide 
the registered quality indicators to the government annually.62 Independent Treatment 
Centers are not obliged to provide quality indicators, and, for this reason, we have no 
62 Since 2013 the project organization for the Dutch Health Care Transparency Program has been 
integrated into the Dutch Quality Institute.
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data on the quality indicators of the Independent Treatment Centers. The quality indica-
tors can be divided into process indicators, structure indicators, and outcome indicators.
Structure indicators relate to the organization and are recorded at the hospital level; 
process indicators measure the process of activities at the patient level and outcome in-
dicators measure outcome values at the patient level. Although outcome indicators are 
the most important indicators in terms of informational value, the share of out- come 
indicators for the Dutch Healthcare Transparency Program is less than 16%. According 
to an evaluation carried out by the Court of Audit (in Dutch: Algemene Rekenkamer), 
the indicators of the Dutch Healthcare Transparency Program indicators for the hospital 
sector are stable and it is therefore possible to analyze trends over the years for which 
records have been kept [25].
We used quality indicator data from 2008–2011. Because our time period is relatively 
short, we used process and structural indicators (with a ratio scale) rather than outcome 
indicators because process and structure indicators can be influenced by hospital man-
agement and not only by medical specialists, and these types of indicators are also used 
by insurers [4]. Six selection criteria were applied to include quality indicators for the 
diagnosis groups in our research sample. (1) The diagnoses are not selected on medical 
similarity but on whether hospitals can compete for patients. We used quality indicators 
for the diagnosis groups that made up the market segment. In this segment, the prices 
for the diagnosis groups are determined by negotiations between insurers and hospi-
tals. This means that hospitals are able to compete on price and quality. This is not the 
case for all hospital treatments (such as urgent care). The Dutch Healthcare Authority 
has selected diagnoses for the market segment on criteria such as the transparency of 
the product definition, price and quality, the existence of market dynamics including 
entry and exit, the absence of undesirable effects and the absence of high transaction 
costs [17]. (2) Hospitals have been obliged to record quality indicators for the diagnosis 
groups since 2008; however, the number of diagnosis groups has grown over the years. 
We selected only the quality indicators that have been recorded since 2008. This means 
that the quality indicators that have been developed by the Health Inspectorate since 
2008 are not part of our selection. (3) The quality indicators needed to be comparable 
over the years. (4) We selected diagnosis groups that involved surgical intervention. 
(5) We selected high-volume diagnosis groups with over 10,000 treatments per year. 
(6) We excluded indicators with categorical values (yes or no answer). Our final sample 
consisted of quality indicators for three diagnosis groups: cataract (ophthalmology), 
adenoid and tonsils (otolaryngology), and bladder tumor (urology). For bladder tumor, 
quality indicator data were available for 2008 to 2010 and for cataract, and data were 
available for 2008 to 2011 for adenoid and tonsils. The three diagnoses are elective care 
treatments that include daycare surgery. It should be noted that this is also the case for 
the bladder tumor diagnosis because the quality indicator that was used in this study 
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relates to the low-risk patient group (non-muscle invasive bladder tumor). Table 1 shows 
the quality indicators that we included in our analysis.63
The indicators measure various aspects of the quality of care. For example, for cataract 
i02-02 measure the complication rate, while i02-03b measure the diagnosis process. 
We can indeed observe that (i) i02-02 have a higher average score than i02-03b and 
(ii) i02-02 have a lower standard deviation than i02-03b. This is unsurprising, since a 
one percentage-point change in i02-02 has more direct clinical relevance than a one 
percentage-point change in i02-03b. For this reason, it is more useful to compare 
changes in terms of one standard deviation. Note that i02- 02 is an outlier with respect 
to the standard deviation. The other indicators have more similar standard deviations 
and clinical relevance.
In order to compare the quality indicators over the years and with one another, we 
rescaled and aggregated the indicators as follows: for each year  t  (t = 1, 2, …, n) and 
diagnosis group  k (k = 1, 2, …, K) we calculated a combined quality indicator score per 
hospital  i  (i = 1, 2, …, N) . First, each indicator  h  (h = 1, 2, …, H) of, say, diagnosis group  k 
is rescaled to a z-score (z-score of indicators have an average value of zero and a stan-
dard deviation of 1):
 z ith =  
(  P ith −  μ th ) _s  d th 
 
Where  z ith is the value of the indicator  h of diagnosis group  k for hospital  i in year  t ,  μ th is 
the average value of indicator  h in year  t and  sd th is the standard deviation of indicator  h 
in year  t . Note that for all indicators that a high  z - score is associated with high quality of 
care and low  z - score is associated with low quality of care.
Secondly, we calculate for each hospital in each year we calculated an average  z -scores 
for diagnosis group  k , which we denote by quality itk , by averaging over  z ith :
 qualit  y itk =  
 ∑ 
h=1
 
H
 z ith 
 _H . 
We thus interpreted  qualit  y itk as the diagnosis group  k (combined) quality indicator of 
hospital  i in year t .
63 For a careful assessment of the second eye, there should be enough time between the surgery of the 
first eye and second eye.
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4. DATA
This research was based on claims data from 2008 to 2011 from all Dutch hospitals and 
Independent Treatment Centers (ITCs). The Dutch hospital market consists of 87 hospi-
tals, two specialized hospitals, and eight academic hospitals. The total number of ITCs 
rose from 189 in 2008 to 282 in 2012. Our unique dataset consists of patient-level data 
including patient characteristics such as gender, age, zip code, diagnosis and treatment, 
hospital characteristics and hospital contract prices for our three selected diagnoses. 
The total number of patients in the period 2008 and 2011 for cataract was 474,410 with 
Table 1. Quality indicators
Indicator code Description Type Average SD
Cataract
i02-02 Complications: percentage of cataract operations without a 
posterior capsular rupture (including vitrectomy)
Process 99.63 0.35
i02-03a Accurate diagnosis of the second eye: percentage of patients 
undergoing a cataract operation on both eyes with a gap of 
more than 28 days between the first and second operation. 
For a careful assessment of the second eye there should be 
enough time between the surgery of the first and second eye
Process 95.56 8.40
i02-03b Accurate diagnosis of the second eye: percentage of patients 
undergoing a cataract operation on both eyes that have (i) 
a postoperative check of the first surgery before the second 
operation and (ii) a gap of more than 14 days between the 
first operation and the last postoperative check for the first 
operation
Process 87.63 23.21
Bladder tumor
i01-02 Vesicoclysis: percentage of non-muscle invasive bladder 
cancer patients with a trans-urethral resection of the tumor 
(TURT) that have a washing out of the urinary bladder within 
24 h after the TURT
Structure 69.98 23.66
Adenoid and tonsils
i10-02 Preoperative consultation: percentage of tonsillectomy 
patients screened at an anesthesiology outpatient clinic before 
tonsillectomy
Process 90.80 23.58
i10-04a Postoperative pain measurement: percentage of inpatient 
tonsillectomy patients that have their pain intensity measured 
every 8 h
Process 84.76 21.61
i10-04b Postoperative pain measurement: percentage of measured 
inpatient patients without serious pain (i.e., Visual Analog Scale 
for Pain < 7 or Numeric Rating Scale < 7)
Process 93.32 14.51
i10-04c Postoperative pain measurement: percentage of daycare 
patients that have been telephoned after their operation to 
monitor their pain intensity
Process 75.47 38.63
This table contains for each quality indicator its average score and standard deviation pooled over the years
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a total revenue of 843 million euros. The total number of patients in the period 2008 and 
2011 for adenoid and tonsils was 223,177 with a total revenue of 219 million euros. The 
total number of patients in the period 2008 and 2011 for bladder tumor was 46,497 with 
a total revenue of 244 million euros.
The calculation of the weighted market share was based on the claims data from 
the hospitals and Independent Treatment Centers (ITCs), where we removed those 
cases with invalid zip codes (which amounted to less than 1% of our sample). Thus, 
when calculating the market share, we were able to take into account the (potential 
for) competitive pressure from ITCs. However, as discussed in ‘‘Quality indicators’’, we 
had no data on the quality indicators for the ITCs. This implies that the analysis of the 
quality indicators is restricted to hospitals and excludes the ITCs. For each diagnosis, we 
removed those hospitals where there was no data on quality indicators. Tables 2, 3, and 
4 present the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our empirical model at the 
diagnosis level. The total number of observations ranges from 191 for tonsils to 286 for 
cataract. For example, the average actual market share ms for cataract was 0.58 (SD 0.21) 
with a minimum of 0.06 and maximum of 0.97 meaning that there are large differences 
between the market share of hospitals. The other diagnoses display comparable actual 
market share. The average hospital-insurer HHI is moderately strong and ranges from 
0.39 for cataract, 0.32 for tonsils, and 0.38 for bladder tumor.
As mentioned in ‘‘Quality indicators’’, we have used standardized quality scores for 
each diagnosis. The standardized quality scores ranged between -3.05 and 0.78 for cata-
ract, between -2.17 and 0.71 for tonsils and between -2.85 and 1.42 for bladder tumor.
We included two hospital characteristics in our empirical model. Firstly, we used a 
dummy variable to control for whether a hospital is a general hospital or academic 
(university) hospital, a low-volume dummy, and insurance-hospital HHI. For each di-
agnosis, less than 10% of the hospitals included were academic hospitals. To control 
for patient characteristics, we included three variables: the fraction of female patients, 
the fraction of patients that were older than 65 years, and the co-morbidity index. The 
results differed per diagnosis due to the characteristics of the condition and the set of 
hospitals included in the analysis. The co-morbidity index, which is defined in this study 
as the average number of diagnoses, varied considerably between the diagnoses. The 
co-morbidity for tonsils had the lowest index of 1.04. The average number of additional 
diagnoses for bladder tumor (3.19) and cataracts (2.18) was higher due to the older 
population involved.
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Table 2. Cataract
Statistic N Mean SD Min Max
ms 286 0.58 0.21 0.06 0.97
Quality 286 0.00 0.63 -3.05 0.78
frac_female 286 0.59 0.03 0.51 0.68
frac_65 286 0.83 0.06 0.58 0.91
Com 286 2.18 0.30 1.60 3.17
HHI_ins 286 0.39 0.11 0.19 0.63
Lowvolume 286 0.25 0.43 0 1
Acad 286 0.09 0.28 0 1
This table shows summary statistics for each diagnosis group at the hospital-year level (2008–2011). We 
report the average, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the variables that we included in our 
regression analysis. We also show the total number of observations for each diagnosis group
Table 3. Adenoid and tonsils
Statistic N Mean SD Min Max
ms 191 0.69 0.19 0.12 0.98
Quality 191 0.00 0.59 -2.17 0.71
frac_female 191 0.51 0.03 0.42 0.60
frac_65 191 0.003 0.003 0.00 0.02
Com 191 1.04 0.30 0.53 2.18
HHI_ins 191 0.32 0.09 0.17 0.57
Lowvolume 191 0.25 0.43 0 1
Acad 191 0.07 0.26 0 1
This table shows summary statistics for each diagnosis group at the hospital-year level (2008–2011). We 
report the average, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the variables that we included in our 
regression analysis. We also show the total number of observations for each diagnosis group
Table 4. Bladder tumor
Statistic N Mean SD Min Max
ms 199 0.73 0.15 0.33 0.98
Quality 199 0.00 1.00 -2.85 1.42
frac_female 199 0.22 0.05 0.10 0.45
frac_65 199 0.72 0.06 0.52 0.86
Com 199 2.68 0.46 1.70 4.32
HHI_ins 199 0.38 0.11 0.19 0.71
Lowvolume 199 0.23 0.42 0 1
Acad 199 0.10 0.29 0 1
This table shows summary statistics for each diagnosis group at the hospital-year level (2008–2010). We 
report the average, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the variables that we included in our 
regression analysis. We also show the total number of observations for each diagnosis group
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5. ESTIMATION RESULTS
Tables 5, 6 and 7 present the estimation results for each diagnosis group using the 
pooled OLS estimator, fixed effect estimator, and random-effects estimator. For each 
estimation method, we present two models: a model with and a model without control 
variables. Because the estimated standard errors could be heteroskedastic, we used the 
Mackinnon and White [20] Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors.
We performed the Hausman test to determine whether we should select the fixed or 
random effect model: given that (i) the fixed effect model is consistent if the unobserved 
component and observable variables are correlated and (ii) the random effect model 
is inconsistent, the presence of significant differences in the estimated coefficients 
Table 5. Regression results bladder tumor
Dependent variable
Quality
Pooled Pooled Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Random effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 1.275*** 2.058 1.348*** 2.803**
(0.338) (1.347) (0.360) (1.265)
ms -1.731*** -1.764** -2.504* -3.331** -1.841*** -2.241***
(0.492) (0.705) (1.381) (1.695) (0.510) (0.674)
frac_female -1.136 0.066 -0.149
(1.483) (1.262) (1.019)
frac_65 -0.173 -1.975 -1.001
(1.686) (1.765) (1.425)
Com 0.018 -0.241 -0.106
(0.205) (0.159) (0.158)
HHI_ins -1.019 1.469 -0.134
(0.889) (1.217) (0.801)
Lowvolume -0.165 -0.004 -0.200
(0.260) (0.231) (0.188)
Acad -0.126 -0.286
(0.271) (0.300)
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199
R2 0.069 0.088 0.029 0.073 0.050 0.063
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.084 0.017 0.040 0.049 0.060
* p<0:1; ** p<0:05; *** p<0:01. We report the results from the pooled, fixed-effects, and random-effects 
model. For each model, we report two variants: (i) a simple model with the weighted market share re-
gressed on the average scaled quality indicator and (ii) a model with additional control variables. We re-
port the MacKinnon and White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors (in parentheses under coef-
ficients). We used data from 2008 to 2010
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indicates that there is correlation between the unobserved component and observable 
variables and, thus, that we should discard the random-effects model [34]. For all models, 
the Hausman test accepts the null hypotheses that there is no difference between the 
coefficient of the random and fixed-effects model (for each model, the p value is larger 
than 0.10). This indicates that the random-effects models are consistent and, therefore 
that we can use the results of the random effect models to determine the relationship 
between quality indicators and market share.
Table 5 presents the estimation results for bladder tumor using six different models. 
The adjusted R-squared of these models ranges between 0.017 for the fixed effect model 
and 0.084 for the pooled model. From all the models shown in Table 5, we can conclude 
that the weighted market share (1 minus LOCI) is significantly related with scaled quality 
Table 6. Regression results cataract
Dependent variable
Quality
Pooled Pooled Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Random effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.122 -2.552* 0.149 -2.631**
(0.145) (1.550) (0.149) (1.237)
ms -0.199 -0.584** -1.481 -1.923** -0.264 -0.772**
(0.259) (0.292) (1.023) (0.883) (0.261) (0.325)
frac_female 2.541 1.208 1.718
(1.925) (2.168) (1.830)
frac_65 1.398 1.354 1.732
(1.294) (1.703) (1.234)
Com 0.072 0.479 0.216
(0.228) (0.377) (0.235)
HHI_ins 0.196 3.568* 0.467
(0.680) (2.082) (0.691)
Lowvolume 0.069 -0.108 -0.017
(0.120) (0.154) (0.127)
Acad -0.196 -0.229
(0.313) (0.287)
Observations 286 286 286 286 286 286
R2 0.004 0.072 0.014 0.070 0.004 0.051
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.070 0.010 0.048 0.004 0.050
* p<0:1; ** p<0:05; *** p<0:01. We report the results from the pooled, fixed-effects, and random- effects 
model. For each model, we report two variants: (i) a simple model with the weighted market share re-
gressed on the average scaled quality indicator and (ii) a model with additional control variables. We re-
port the MacKinnon and White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors (in parentheses under coef-
ficients). We used data from 2008 to 2011
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score. The estimated coefficients are significant at a level of 1% for the random-effects 
models and the pooled effect model without control variables. The other models are 
significant at a level of 5% (fixed effects with control variables and pooled model with 
control variables) and the 10% level (fixed effect model without control variables). This 
indicates that hospitals in competitive markets have higher quality scores for bladder 
tumor, which supports the hypothesis that greater competition leads to higher qual-
ity scores. Models 2, 4, and 6 include six control variables which control for the patient 
characteristics of the hospital (fraction of female patients, fraction of patients older than 
65 years and co-morbidity index) and hospital character- istics7 including health insurer-
hospital HHI, the type of hospital and low-volume dummy.
Table 7. Regression results adenoid and tonsils
Dependent variable
Quality
Pooled Pooled Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Random effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.008 0.292 -0.089 -0.064
(0.236) (0.902) (0.283) (0.804)
ms 0.011 -0.068 0.723 0.382 0.099 -0.034
(0.323) (0.562) (1.537) (1.639) (0.383) (0.514)
frac_female -0.388 -0.191 -0.101
(1.452) (1.158) (1.215)
frac_65 -19.167 4.575 -17.188
(25.528) (19.921) (23.471)
Com 0.257 0.379 0.304
(0.198) (0.422) (0.201)
HHI_ins -0.579 1.394 -0.233
(0.602) (1.915) (0.608)
Lowvolume -0.185 0.036 -0.156
(0.231) (0.182) (0.178)
Acad -0.224 -0.228
(0.311) (0.314)
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191
R2 0.00001 0.066 0.002 0.015 0.002 0.038
Adjusted R2 0.00001 0.063 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.036
* p<0:1; ** p<0:05; *** p<0:01. We report the results from the pooled, fixed-effects, and random- effects 
model. For each model, we report two variants: (i) a simple model with the weighted market share re-
gressed on the average scaled quality indicator and (ii) a model with additional control variables. We re-
port the MacKinnon and White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors (in parentheses under coef-
ficients). We used data from 2008 to 2011
115
Competition and quality indicators
Tables 6 and 7 show the results for the diagnosis groups cataracts and adenoid and 
tonsils. The results of the models for cataract are comparable to the results for bladder 
tumor and reveal a negative relationship between market concentration and quality 
scores. Contrary to what we expected, the models for the diagnosis group adenoid and 
tonsils do not show any significant estimations.
For the cataract and bladder tumor diagnosis groups, we can show how to interpret 
the magnitude of the estimated relationship between quality scores and market share 
through an example. Consider the estimated difference in the quality scores for a hos-
pital with the lowest market share (i.e., a market share of 0.06 for cataract, see Table 2) 
and the hospital with the highest market share (i.e., market share 0.98 for bladder tumor, 
see Table 4). Using the results of the random-effects model for bladder tumor presented 
in Table 6, the market share difference of 0.92 translates into a shift in quality scores 
of -2.06 standard deviations from the mean (95% confidence-interval [-3.39; -0.73]). 
Similarly, using the results of the random- effects model for bladder tumor presented 
in Table 5, the market share difference of 0.92 translates into a shift in quality scores of 
-0.71 standard deviations from the mean (95% confidence-interval: [1.35; -0.069]).
Robustness check
To check the robustness of our model with aggregated quality indicators, we also 
estimated the pooled, fixed-effects, and random-effects model for each individual qual-
ity indicator separately (not relevant for bladder tumor). Table 8 shows the estimated 
market-share coefficients for each quality indicator. For the sake of clarity, we only show 
the estimated market-share coefficients. For each diagnosis, the sign of the estimated 
Table 8. Disaggregated regression results for market share (ms)
Dependent variable
Quality
Pooled (2) Fixed effects (4) Random effects (6)
Cataract: i02-02 ms 0.040 -2.812 -0.173
Cataract: i02-03a ms -1.024** -0.327 -1.038**
Cataract: i02-03b ms -0.775** -2.707* -0.906**
Adenoid and tonsil: i10-02 ms 0.361 -2.316 0.018
Adenoid and tonsil: i10-04a ms 0.901 -3.107 0.744
Adenoid and tonsil: i10-04b ms -0.369 3.018 -0.334
Adenoid and tonsil: i10-04c ms -1.150* 3.782 -0.556
* p<0:1; ** p<0:05; *** p<0:01. We report the estimated market-share coefficient from the pooled, fixed-
effects, and random-effects models, which also include the control variables. The estimated coefficient 
of the control variables are available from the authors by request. We report the MacKinnon and White 
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients). We used data from the 
period 2008–2011
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market-share coefficients are generally consistent with the aggregated model: negative 
for cataract and mixed for adenoid and tonsils.
Further examination of the empirical model
In our empirical estimations, we control for differences in patient and hospital charac-
teristics. However, there is a potential source of bias in the estimation of the relationship 
between weighted market share and quality indicators: Firstly, as discussed in, ‘‘Empirical 
model’’ hospitals with a high-quality indicators may attract more patients than hospitals 
with low-quality indicators. This means that our regression models may suffer from an 
endogeneity problem and therefore give a biased result.
A potential issue is that hospitals may change their supply in response to their own or 
their competitors quality indicators. However, there were no indications that hospitals 
significantly restructured their supply:
– no new hospitals or new hospital locations were opened during the period of our 
study.
– no hospitals or hospital locations were closed during the period of our study.
Table 9. Result: conditional logit model
Dependent variable
Hospital choice
Bladder cancer (1) Cataract (2) Adenoid and tonsil (3)
2008 traveltime -0.220*** -0.232*** -0.195***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
2009 traveltime -0.221*** -0.235*** -0.183***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
2010 traveltime -0.231*** -0.236*** -0.179***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
2011 traveltime -0.221*** -0.230*** -0.182***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of patients 2008 9436 53,449 38,621
Number of patients 2009 9854 56,412 38,211
Number of patients 2010 10,122 57,391 39,032
Number of patients 2011 10,319 53,144 40,432
* p<0:1; ** p<0:05; *** p<0:01. For each year and diagnosis group, we report the results from the conditional 
logit model with travel time as the only predictor. For cataract we take a random sample. In each year, the 
sample size is 50% of the total patient population
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– virtually no hospital increased or decreased their volume (number of patients) sig-
nificantly.64
– the presence and entry of independent treatment centers (ITC) occurred mainly in 
the cataract diagnosis group. There was no ITC in the bladder tumor diagnosis group 
and only four ITCs in the adenoid and tonsils diagnosis group.
Secondly, hospitals and insurers negotiate the prices of the products in the diagnosis 
groups that we examined in a liberalized setting. An insurer is likely to be interested in 
the quality–price ratio and not the quality or price in isolation. Furthermore, as we noted 
64 For each year, we classified all hospitals into four quartiles, based on the number of patients treated. 
For cataract and bladder tumor, there was only one hospital that increased its volume so much that 
it moved more than two quartiles.
Table 10. Result: pooled instrumental variable model
Dependent variable
Quality
Bladder tumor (1) Cataract (2) Adenoid and tonsil (3)
Constant 2.094 -2.380 0.617
(1.349) (1.560) (0.889)
ms -1.829*** -0.753** -0.603
(0.707) (0.294) (0.545)
frac_female -1.134 2.412 -0.317
(1.485) (1.922) (1.433)
frac_65 -0.159 1.432 -18.521
(1.691) (1.311) (26.590)
Com 0.016 0.046 0.193
(0.205) (0.229) (0.202)
HHI_ins -0.993 0.293 -0.285
(0.889) (0.681) (0.612)
Lowvolume -0.175 0.055 -0.235
(0.261) (0.120) (0.229)
Acad -0.137 -0.243 -0.384
(0.271) (0.325) (0.290)
Observations 199 286 191
R2 0.088 0.071 0.055
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.069 0.053
* p<0:1; ** p<0:05; *** p<0:01. For each diagnosis group, we report the results from the pooled model, 
where we use the simulated weighted market share as an instrument for the weighted market share. The 
simulated weighted market share is based on a multinomial logit model. We report the MacKinnon and 
White (1985) Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients). We used 
data from 2008 to 2011
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in ‘‘Literature’’, there may be a relationship between competition and prices through 
quality. In this section, we will examine both these issues.
Endogeneity
To test whether our (pooled) regression model suffers from the endogeneity problem, 
we used the Wu–Hausman test. In this test the result of an instrumental variable (IV) 
model is compared to the result if the non-IV model.
To estimate an IV model, we must find an instrument for market share that meets 
two requirements: (1) it should be strongly correlated to market share and (2) it should 
be uncorrelated to the error term. We took an approach that has been commonly used 
in the health economics literature to deal with the endogeneity problem, namely to 
deploy IV instruments based on predicted patient flows (see for example [6, 16], and 
[11]). We estimated a conditional logit model that was based only on the travel time 
between the patient and hospital. By excluding the fixed-effects and other hospital and 
patient characteristics, we ensured that our predicted patient flows were exogenous to 
all patient preferences other then travel time. This implies that our patient flows were 
not influenced by the potential preferences that patients may have a hospital with a 
certain level of quality indicators.
In the conditional logit model, we estimated the utility that patient  t would receive 
when he or she chose hospital j (j, …, n) , which we denote by  U tj . In our case, where we 
only use travel time as a predictor, the conditional logit model is given by:
 U tj = αtraveltim e tj +  ∈ tj , 
where the residuals  ∈ are i.i.d. extreme value (see for example [31]). We used the same 
data as in ‘‘Estimation strategy’’, with the addition of the travel times between the 
patient’s home and the hospital. The travel time was calculated as the driving time be-
tween the patient’s home and the hospital zip code. We estimated this model for each 
diagnosis group and year (see Table 9 for the estimation results). For cataract treatment, 
we took a random sample of the data for computability. In each year, the sample size 
was 50% of the total patient population. As expected, we found that patients dislike 
traveling (negative coefficient for time travel).
Given the fitted utilities  U ̂ ’s from the estimated model, we can calculate for each pa-
tient the probability  P ̂ tj that this patient ( t ) chooses hospital  j :
 P ̂ tj =  
 U ̂ tj  _ 
 ∑ 
k
 
n
U ̂ tk 
 . 
We can now calculate the simulated weighted market share for each hospital in each 
year by replacing  s tj with  P tj in ‘‘Empirical model’’ in (4.1). To determine the relevance 
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of the instruments, we determined first-stage F-statistic, see for example [30]. For each 
model we found that the first-stage F-statistic was higher than 56 (p-value <0.001). This 
indicates that our instruments were not weak. 65 Subsequently, we re- estimated the 
pooled regressions in ‘‘Estimation results’’ by employing the simulated weighted market 
share as the instrumental variable (see Table 10 for the results). Given the IV-estimated 
coefficients, we could now carry out the Wu-Hausman test, in which we tested the hy-
pothesis that there was significant difference between the coefficients from the pooled 
model and the coefficients from the IV model. For each diagnosis group we accepted the 
hypothesis that there was no difference (p-value >0.90). We performed an additional IV 
estimation of the random-effects model (which is preferred to the fixed-effects model, 
see above). For bladder tumor, the estimated market-share coefficient is -2.45 (p-val-
ue=0.062). For cataract, the estimated market-share coefficient is -0.94 (p-value=0.107). 
For adenoid and tonsils, the estimated market-share coefficient is -0.55 (p-value=0.35). 
These IV random-effects coefficient are very similar to the non-IV random-effects coef-
ficient presented in the paper. The only difference is that the standard errors are larger, 
which is no surprise, since it is much more difficult to explain the differences than the 
levels of the quality indicators with an (IV) regression model. We were therefore able to 
conclude that our regression did not suffer from endogeneity bias.
Prices
As discussed above, there may be a relationship between prices and quality indicators. 
However, a comprehensive examination of the relationship between prices and quality 
indicators is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, in this section we will provide a 
brief outline of this relationship. In ‘‘Literature’’, we discussed the bargaining model by 
Gaynor and Town [12]. From this model, it follows that the effect of an increase in com-
petition—through quality—on price depends on the effect that the increase in quality 
has on the relative bargaining position and therefore the prices charged by a hospital. 
We do not observe the factors that determine this effect such as the marginal cost of 
quality, see ‘‘Literature’’. Generally, we would expect that hospitals and insurers to be 
interested in the quality-to-price ratio and not price or quality in isolation.
To provide an indication of the relationship between quality and prices, we estimated 
the same model as our quality indicator-market share model in ‘‘Empirical model’’, where 
we included the relative prices as the independent variable rather than market share. 
We then estimated the pooled, fixed-effects, and random-effects models. In general, we 
65 Furthermore, a simple correlation analysis shows that the simulated market share used in the IV are 
correlated with the original market share. In each year, the correlation coefficient is between 0.67 
and 0.71 for bladder tumor, between 0.72 and 0.90 for adenoid and tonsils, and between 0.69 and 
0.77 for cataract.
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found no significant results for the price variable.66 Our results indicate that, for the hos-
pital products examined, having a relatively higher (or lower) quality indicators was not 
related to higher (or lower) prices during the period that we studied. We can therefore 
conclude that hospitals with better quality indicators are not compensated by higher 
prices.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this study, we have examined the impact of competition on the quality of healthcare 
for the Dutch hospital market. The Dutch government reformed the health care system 
in 2006 introducing managed competition in a context where income and risk solidarity 
are guaranteed. With this sys- tem, the government aims to reduce costs and increase 
quality of care. Health insurers compete for policy holders and healthcare providers 
compete for contracts with health insurers. We used a unique data set including indi-
vidual patient-level claim data and information on quality indicators for three diagnosis 
groups—cataracts, adenoid, and tonsils and bladder tumor—produced by Dutch hospi-
tals and Independent Treatment Centers.
For cataract and bladder tumor, the relationship between market share and qual-
ity scores was found to be significant. The robustness checks confirmed these results. 
The regression estimators for adenoid and tonsils were not significant. One possible 
explanation is that the patient group for adenoid and tonsils is less complex. It is mainly 
children younger than 11 years who are treated for adenoid and tonsils. This type of 
patient is less complicated and has fewer additional diagnoses compared to patients 
with, for example, bladder tumor (the fraction of patients older than 65 years is 0.72 for 
bladder tumor, 0.83 for cataract, and 0.01 for adenoid and tonsils, respectively).
Because of endogeneity, we could not include price as independent variable in our 
quality indicator models. To give an indication of this relationship, we replaced the 
market-share variable with the relative prices as the independent variable. We conclude 
from these models that there is no relationship between price and quality scores, which 
means that hospitals with higher-quality scores do not have higher prices.
Overall, we conclude that more competition leads to better published quality scores. 
This research does have some limitations however. For this research, we used observed 
quality information that did not include mortality rates (an outcome indicator). For our 
research period data, no data on mortality rates was available. However, since 2014 hos-
pitals are obliged to publish standardized mortality ratios on their websites. For future 
66 Only in the random-effects model for bladder tumor we find a significant (positive) result. The results 
are available from the authors on request.
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research, it would be interesting to examine the relationship between mortality rates 
and competition within the Dutch hospital market.
Chapter 4
122
REFERENCES
 1. Beukers, P.D., Kemp, R.G., Varkevisser, M.: Patient hospital choice for hip replacement: empirical 
evidence from the Netherlands. Eur. J. Health Econ. 15(9), 927–936 (2014)
 2. Bijlsma, M.J., Koning, P.W., Shestalova, V.: The effect of competition on process and outcome qual-
ity of hospital care in the Netherlands. De Economist 161(2), 121–155 (2013)
 3. Boonen, L.H., Schut, F.T., et al.: Preferred providers and thecredible commitment problem in 
health insurance: first experi- ences with the implementation of managed competition in the 
Dutch health care system. Health Econ. Policy Law 6(2), 219 (2010)
 4. Botje, D., Klazinga, N.S., Wagner, C.: To what degree is the governance of Dutch hospitals orien-
tated towards quality in care? Does this really affect performance? Health Policy 113(1), 134–141 
(2013)
 5. Brekke, K.R., Siciliani, L., Straume, O.R.: Hospital competition and quality with regulated prices. 
Scand. J. Econ. 113(2), 444–469 (2011)
 6. Cooper, Z., Gibbons, S., Jones, S., McGuire, A.: Does hospital competition save lives? Evidence 
from the English NHS patient choice reforms. Econ. J. 121(554), F228–F260 (2011)
 7. Courtemanche, C., Plotzke, M.: Does competition from ambulatory surgical centers affect hospital 
surgical output? J. Health Econ. 29(5), 765–773 (2010)
 8. Encinosa, W.E., Bernard, D.M.: Hospital finances and patient safety outcomes. INQUIRY J. Health 
Care Organ. Provis. Financ. 42(1), 60–72 (2005)
 9. Escarce, J.J., Jain, A.K., Rogowski, J.: Hospital competition, managed care, and mortality after hos-
pitalization for medical conditions: evidence from three states. Med. Care Res. Rev. 63(6 suppl), 
112S–140S (2006)
 10. Forder, J., Allan, S.: The impact of competition on quality and prices in the English care homes 
market. J. Health Econ. 34, 73–83 (2014)
 11. Gaynor, M., Moreno-Serra, R., Propper, C.: Death by market power: reform, competition, and 
patient outcomes in the National Health Service. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Policy 5(4), 134–166 (2013)
 12. Gaynor, M., Town, R.J. Competition in health care markets. In: Pauly, M.V., McGuire, T.G., Barros, P.P. 
(eds.). Handbook of Health Economics, Volume 2 of Handbook of Health Economics, Chapter 9, 
pp. 499–637. Elsevier, Amsterdam (2011)
 13. Gowrisankaran, G., Town, R.J.: Estimating the quality of care in hospitals using instrumental 
variables. J. Health Econ 18(6), 747–767 (1999)
 14. Gowrisankaran, G., Town, R.J. Competition, payers, and hospital quality. Health Serv. Res. 38(6p1), 
1403–1422 (2003)
 15. Heijink, R., Mosca, I., Westert, G.: Effects of regulated competition on key outcomes of care: cata-
ract surgeries in the Nether- lands. Health Policy 113(1), 142–150 (2013)
 16. Kessler, D.P., McClellan, M.B.: Is hospital competition socially wasteful? Q. J. Econ. 115(2), 577–615 
(2000)
 17. Krabbe-Alkemade, Y., Groot, T., and Lindeboom, M.: Competition in the Dutch hospital sector: an 
analysis of health care volume and cost. Eur. J. Health Econ. 1–15 (2016)
 18. Krabbe-Alkemade, Y.J.F.M.: The Impact of Market Competition and Patient Classification on Dutch 
Hospital Behavior. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (2014)
 19. Lyon, T.P.: Quality competition, insurance, and consumer choice in health care markets. J. Econ. 
Manag. Str. 8(4), 546–580 (1999)
 20. MacKinnon, J.G., White, H.: Some heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimators with 
improved finite sample properties. J. Econom. 29(3), 305–325 (1985)
123
Competition and quality indicators
 21. Noether, M.: Competition among hospitals. J. Health Econ. 7(3), 259–284 (1988)
 22. NZa: Monitor zelfstandige behandelcentra. NZa publicaties (2012)
 23. Propper, C., Burgess, S., Gossage, D.: Competition and quality: evidence from the NHS internal 
market 1991–9. Econ. J. 118(525), 138–170 (2008)

Chapter 5
Evidence of selection in a mandatory 
health insurance market with risk 
adjustment
With Katalin Katona, Misja Mikkers and Victoria Shestalova
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
his paper reflects the personal views of the authors, which are not necessarily those 
of their employers. We would like to thank Erik Schut and Marco Varkevisser (Erasmus 
University) and Cédric Argenton (TILEC, Tilburg University) for their valuable comments.
Chapter 5
126
ABSTRACT
This paper aims to identify selection separately from moral hazard in a mandatory 
health insurance market where enrollees can freely choose their deductible scheme. The 
empirical analysis uses a unique dataset for the period 2010-2013 covering the whole 
population of the Netherlands at enrollee level, allowing us to use prior health expenses 
of the enrollees to demonstrate the selection effect separately from the potential 
moral hazard effect. Our estimates show that the enrollees who opt for deductibles are 
both healthier and have a higher risk-adjusted result (i.e. the difference between the 
compensation from the risk-adjustment fund and the actual health care cost) under the 
prevailing risk-adjustment system. Compared to enrollees who have chosen the lowest 
available deductible level, enrollees who have chosen the highest deductible level have 
an average risk-adjusted result that is approximately €450 higher per enrollee. An option 
that the Dutch government could consider to fully eliminate the risk-adjustment gain of 
the deductibles is to include the choice of a voluntary deductible in the risk-adjustment 
system as one of the characteristics of the consumer. Our detection of substantial selec-
tion effect of deductibles suggests the need of further research to understand in greater 
detail the relationship between premium discounts and the expected gains on the risk-
adjustment for enrollees with a voluntary deductible.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In order to mitigate market failures and increase affordability in health insurance mar-
kets, regulators in several countries, including the Netherlands, set rules for consumers 
and insurers. Most importantly, these rules oblige insurance companies to accept all 
applicants (open enrollment) and to offer health insurance policies at the same price to 
all persons (community rating). An other important rule is to oblige all citizens to enroll 
in health insurance67.
Generally, a risk-adjustment system is in place to provide a level playing field for the 
insurers. A perfect risk-adjustment system eliminates the predictable profits (losses) on 
low-risk profile (high-risk profile) enrollees emanating from community rating. In that 
case, insurers have no incentives to select low-risk enrollees or to offer products that are 
attractive to low-risk enrollees68.
The Dutch risk-adjustment system began simply and has gradually been improved. 
However, even a state-of-the-art system cannot remove incentives for exploiting the 
mechanism of selection fully (van Kleef, McGuire, van Vliet, & van de Ven, 2017). There 
are still incentives for the insurers to sort low-risk and high-risk enrollees into differ-
ent health plans by designing different health plans for different risk profiles. Because 
health plans may be priced independently, this would result in premium differentiation 
according to risk profiles and risk-based sorting across plans. Such selection decreases 
solidarity and induces social welfare losses (Cutler, Zeckhauser, et al., 1997). In the lit-
erature on selection, there is a focus on ( i ) the relationship between risk-type and the 
demand for contracts with generous reimbursement (i.e. adverse selection) and ( ii ) the 
incentives for health insurers to select low-risk individuals by tailoring insurance options 
to attract them (Newhouse, Price, Hsu, McWilliams, & McGuire, 2015; Newhouse, Price, 
Huang, McWilliams, & Hsu, 2012; Einav & Finkelstein, 2011; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976).
Empirical identification of selection is challenging because of the interaction of selec-
tion with moral hazard (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010). Using a unique dataset on the Dutch 
health insurance market, this paper contributes to the existing literature by showing 
empirically that the possibility for consumers to opt for voluntary deductible can results 
in selection, even in a health insurance market with a risk-adjustment system in place. 
By taking account of the past health costs and focusing on whether consumers opt for 
deductibles, we are able to identify the selection effect separately from moral hazard 
67 For a description of this general idea see e.g. van de Ven and Ellis (2000).
68 However, a recent theoretical insight from Bijlsma, Boone, and Zwart (2014) suggests that selection 
could exists even in a market with optimal risk-adjustment. When the health insurance market is 
imperfectly competitive and healthy consumers have a higher price elasticity than the high-risk 
consumers, enrollees can still be ‘sorted’ into health plans with different prices and coverage .
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effect. Further, we examine the selection effect separately in terms of adverse selection 
and in terms of the incentives for health insurance to select low-risk enrollees.
With our study, we improve the understanding of selection in managed competition 
settings. Our result is therefore also relevant for other health care systems with managed 
competition, such as Medicare Advantage and Part D in the United States.
In the remainder of this paper we will discuss the previous literature in section 2 ex-
plain the organization of the Dutch health insurance sector in section 3. This is followed 
by the exposition of our empirical approach in section  4, after which we describe the 
data and our empirical findings in sections  5 and 6. Section  7 ends with concluding 
remarks.
2. LITERATURE
In this section we focus on the previous literature on voluntary deductible and the 
empirical identification of selection in health insurance markets.
Voluntary deductibles
In the Netherlands there is the possibility to choose from five different levels of voluntary 
deductible in exchange for a premium discount on the basic benefit package. Although 
less than 11% of the Dutch insured chose voluntary deductibles in 2014, the group of 
enrollees with voluntary deductibles is growing every year (NZa, 2014; Vektis, 2017).
Looking at the potential effects of voluntary deductibles from the perspective of the 
economic literature, the following opposite effects can be highlighted. On the one hand, 
deductibles reduce the effect of moral hazard. Individuals incur lower health care cost if 
they are enrolled in a health plan with a higher deductible (Newhouse, 2004; Aron-Dine, 
Einav, & Finkelstein, 2013). Most studies attribute this cost reduction to lower health care 
utilization (Keeler, 1992; Gern & Schellhorn, 2006; Wharam et al., 2007), rather than to 
choosing cheaper hospitals. Lower health care utilization is desirable when it applies to 
care valued below its cost69.
On the other hand, deductibles are an instrument of selection. Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976) shows that due to the private information available to consumers, selection 
results in the underinsurance of low-risk enrollees. Moreover, since deductibles are only 
attractive for enrollees with lower expected costs, they allow for selection by insurers 
(van Kleef, Beck, van de Ven, & van Vliet, 2008; Tollen, Ross, & Poor, 2004).
69 Note that enrollees who have to pay deductibles (or a co-insurance rate) may reduce or postpone 
necessary health care treatment (Brot-Goldberg, Chandra, Handel, & Kolstad, 2015; Fronstin & Col-
lins, 2008; Lohr et al., 1986; Davis, Doty, & Ho, 2005; Galbraith et al., 2011).
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More specific to our context, van Winssen, van Kleef, and van de Ven (2016) argue 
that in the Netherlands voluntary deductibles mitigate moral hazard, but it also involves 
an (adverse) selection component. The Dutch Healthcare Authority has found that 
enrollees who choose a voluntary deductible have a higher risk-adjusted result than 
enrollees who choose no voluntary deductible (NZa, 2016). However, the mere fact that 
enrollees who choose a voluntary deductible have a higher risk-adjusted result does 
not, in itself, prove selection. It also may be due to the fact that these enrollees consume 
less health care because they wish to avoid paying the higher deductible (moral hazard). 
Therefore, the finding suggests that a more elaborated analysis is still needed in order to 
disentangle the two effects.
Identification of selection
There is a growing body of empirical literature on identifying selection in health insur-
ance markets. For example, Panthöfer (2016) finds adverse selection in the German 
public health insurance market. Olivella and Vera-Hernández (2013) test for asymmetric 
information in the UK private health insurance market and find evidence for adverse 
selection. Dardanoni and Donni (2012) find significant adverse and advantageous se-
lection in the US Medigap insurance market. Bolhaar, Lindeboom, and van der Klaauw 
(2012) find that information asymmetry is present in the supplementary health insurance 
in the Netherlands. For an extensive review of the empirical literature on the relationship 
between coverage and risk see Cohen and Siegelman (2010) and Aarbu (2017).
We conduct a version of the positive correlation test, which is described in Chiappori 
and Salanie (2000), to determine the extent of selection on the market. A positive cor-
relation test assesses, conditional on observables, if there is a correlation between the 
choice for a contract and the occurrence or severity of an accident, which is in our case 
health care expenditure.
We take broadly a similar approach to Abbring, Heckman, Chiappori, and Pinquet 
(2003), who suggest testing for selection by studying the relationship between behav-
ior under a contract and subsequent amendments to that contract. In this paper, we 
focus on an amendment to a contract in the light of past behavior. To disentangle moral 
hazard and selection in our paper, we will look at the history of health care consump-
tion by enrollees  prior to their decision to choose a voluntary deductible. At that point, 
enrollees’ behavior with respect to health care expenditure is not influenced by the 
subsequent uptake of deductible, which can be seen as a contract amendment in the 
context of Abbring et al. (2003).
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3.  INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND RISK-ADJUSTMENT MODEL IN THE 
NETHERLANDS
In the Netherlands, health insurance is provided by private insurers that compete mainly 
on premiums. Since 2006, all citizens have been legally required to take out insurance in 
the form of a standardized basic benefits package, which is defined by the government. 
Insurers are obliged to offer this basic package in any health plan they offer. Community 
ratings are applied, meaning that insurers may not differentiate premiums among enroll-
ees of the same health plan70. Insurers can offer a voluntary deductible to its enrollees. 
Deductible options of €100, €200, €300, €400 and €500 are permitted. Here, too, insurers 
are not allowed to differentiate the price discounts associated with voluntary deductible 
options between enrollees of the same health plans. Note also, that the deductible op-
tion is added on top of the mandatory deductible (€350 in 2013), which was introduced 
to cope with moral hazard in health care consumption and to reduce public expenditure 
on health care. We analyze only the effect of optional voluntary deductible taking the 
mandatory deductible as given.
The insurance system is funded as follows. Approximately 50% of the total insurance 
revenue is raised from the premiums paid directly to the insurers and the out-of-pocket 
expenses falling under the deductibles. The other 50% is raised through an income-
dependent premium determined by the government and collected by the tax office. The 
system of income-dependent premiums is meant to guarantee income solidarity and to 
keep insurance affordable. The core of this system is the risk-adjustment model: the tax 
office transfers the income-dependent premiums into the risk-adjustment fund, which 
in turn distributes these in the form of risk-adjusted capitation payments to the insurers.
Risk adjustment
The risk-adjustment model works at the level of individuals. The payments from the 
risk-adjustment fund to an insurer are based on a number of characteristics of the in-
surer’s enrollees in order to compensate for differences in expected health costs of the 
enrollees. The used characteristics define risk classes related to the health status and 
other characteristics of an enrollee. These risk classes group individuals into health cost 
categories that are deemed predictive of their health care costs in the subsequent year.
The past health status of individuals is captured by diagnosis-cost classes for both 
physical and mental care, pharmacy-cost classes, and multi-year high-cost classes, 
70 Insurers may offer a discount on group contracts up to a maximum of 10%. In 2015, these discounts 
were on average 4.4%. Insurers with less than 850000 enrollees may also offer regional policies ac-
cessible only to inhabitants of a particular region.
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based on the past health care consumption of the individual.71.The additional individual 
characteristics are captured by age-gender classes, income-source risk classes (benefit-
receivers, self-employed and a rest category), socio-economic status risk classes (group-
ing individuals into three income levels and a separate category for enrollees who 
reside at an address with more than 15 others, for example a nursing home), region risk 
classes (grouping individuals into geographic clusters), and a risk class for one-person 
households.
The risk-adjustment model works as follows. Each year, the normative marginal 
cost values for each risk-adjustment class are determined by means of a regression of 
health care costs on the individual characteristics listed above. This estimation is done 
at the individual level. As a result, the expected health care cost of each enrollee can 
be estimated. The risk-adjustment fund is distributed among the insurers based on the 
predicted cost of their population minus an administrative premium that is set by the 
government.
The difference between the estimated costs as determined by the risk-adjustment 
fund and the actual health care cost of each individual equates to ‘the risk-adjusted 
result’ of the enrollee. The risk-adjusted result in the whole population is normalized 
to zero. Since the risk-adjustment model includes adjustment for mandatory deduct-
ible payments which the insurer receives directly from the enrollees, the variable ‘risk-
adjusted result’ is adjusted for the profits and losses due to the mandatory deductible72.
Ideally, predictable health-related cost differences between enrollees should be fully 
eliminated by this system, leaving the insurers no incentive for selection. Significant ef-
fort is therefore devoted to improving the risk-adjustment model. Yet, not all predictable 
cost differences can be eliminated due to some private information, which leaves scope 
for selection.
Until 2012, the system also included significant ex-post additional compensations 
that applied when the predicted and realized health care costs diverged substantially. 
However, these ex-post adjustments have been phased out in recent years. Due to this 
decrease in risk-sharing, the incentive for selection has increased if the improvements in 
the risk-adjustment system are not sufficient to counteract it.
71 Consumption in the previous year except the multi-year high-cost classes where the consumption of 
the previous three years is considered.
72 In particular, a separate model within the risk-adjustment system predicts the amount of out-of-
pocket payment related to the mandatory deductible that each enrollee would pay in the current 
year. This amount is subtracted from the predicted health care cost of the enrollee. However, the 
predicted out-of-pocket payment may diverge from the realized payment (just like there may be a 
difference between the predicted and realized health care costs) which means that the insurer may 
have a profit or a loss in this part of the system as well.
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Health plans
In 2013, 10 insurers offered 67 different health plans. These health plans cover the same 
basic insurance package, but differ in some details with respect to both their coverage 
and pricing. While traditional health plans have only minor differences with respect to 
the choice of health care providers for enrollees, since 2008 there have also been health 
plans with a restricted network of health care providers (these plans require out-of-
pocket payment for visiting non-contracted providers). The market share of these health 
plans was about 8% in 2015 (NZa, 2015).
Each health plan offers discounts for voluntary deductibles. Enrollees who opt for 
a contract with a voluntary deductible benefit from premium discounts, depending 
on the size of the deductible chosen. A higher deductible is associated with a greater 
discount. In 2013, the average annual premium was €1269. The maximum voluntary 
deductible of €500 corresponded to an average discount of €230, which is  18% of the 
average premium. The situation was similar in the preceding years73. Figure 1 illustrates 
the discrepancies in the deductible discount schedules over the different health plans, 
showing that there are quite large differences between health plans in terms of the 
premium discounts available for each deductible level.
Insurers can offer for each deductible level a discount on the health plan’s premium. 
Insurers may not differentiate the discount among enrollees of the same health plan. 
In this graph, for each deductible level the average discount is calculated by taking the 
average of the health plans’ discounts.
About 9% of enrollees over the age of 18 (the age at which the deductibles may be 
applied) chose a contract with a voluntary deductible in 2013, and the majority of them 
chose the maximum level of €500. The distribution of the share of enrollees who chose 
the maximum level of €500 in their health plans in 2013 is shown in Figure 2. We can 
observe large variation in the share of enrollees who chose the maximum deductible 
level of €500. Some health plans have a share that is lower than  5% , while one health 
plan has a share that is around  60% .
For each health plan, we calculated the share of enrollees that have chosen the 
maximum deductible level in 2013. We excluded health plans that have less than 1000 
enrollees.
73 For the other voluntary deductible levels, the average discounts were €45 (€100 deductible), €88 
(€200 deductible), €131 (€300 deductible) and €175 (€400 deductible).
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Figure 1. Boxplot of discounts offered at different deductible levels in 2013
Insurers can offer for each deductible level a discount on the health plan’s premium. Insurers may not dif-
ferentiate the discount among enrollees of the same health plan. In this graph, for each deductible level the 
average discount is calculated by taking the average of the health plans’ discounts.
Figure 2. Share of enrollees with deductible level €500 in 2013
For each health plan, we calculated the share of enrollees that have chosen the maximum deductible level 
in 2013.We excluded health plans that have less than 1000 enrollees.
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4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In this paper, we are interested to determine ( i ) how strong the relationship is between 
risk-type and the choice for deductibles (i.e. the degree of adverse selection) and ( ii ) the 
incentives for insurers to attract enrollees into healthplans with a voluntary deductible 
in terms of the risk-adjusted result. Note that the most important channel for a health 
insurer to attract enrollees into healthplans with a voluntary deductible is by offering 
substantial (community-rated) premium discounts.
To determine both the degree of adverse selection and the incentives for insurers, we 
perform the conditional correlation test that was proposed by Chiappori and Salanie 
(2000) and further developed by Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, and Salanie (2006) and Fin-
kelstein and McGarry (2006). Our analysis follows the application of this test by Aarbu 
(2017), who examined the presence of asymmetric information in the home insurance 
market.
In short, to determine the degree of adverse selection we estimate an OLS model 
on the individual enrollee level to determine if enrollees with a high deductible level 
have low health care costs. To determine the incentives for insurers to offer deductibles 
to enrollees, we also estimate an OLS model on enrollee level. However, in this model 
we determine if enrollees with a voluntary deductible have high risk-adjusted results 
compared to enrollees with no voluntary deductible.
A challenge with the conditional correlation test is to disentangle the moral hazard ef-
fect from the adverse selection effect. Finding that there is a relation between deductible 
level and health care costs can be explained by both adverse selection (the relationship 
between risk-type and the demand for deductible) and moral hazard (the hypothesis 
that enrollees who have chosen a deductible consume less health care because they 
face out-of-pocket payments). The same holds for the relation between deductible level 
and risk-adjusted results.
To disentangle moral hazard and adverse selection in our paper, we will look at the his-
tory of health care consumption by enrollees  prior to their decision to choose a voluntary 
deductible. At that point, enrollees’ behavior with respect to health care expenditure is 
not influenced by the subsequent uptake of deductible.
What follows is a more formal exposition of the conditional correlation test for the 
examination of adverse selection and the incentives for insurers.
The health care cost of enrollee  i ,  cos  t i depends on the health status and other char-
acteristics of the enrollee,  X i . The deductible chosen by enrollee  i ,  deductibl  e i , is also a 
function of characteristics of the enrollee. Therefore, we obtain a system of equations of 
the form
 cos  t i = g (  X i ,  μ i ) (1)
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 deductibl  e i = h (  X i ,  ν i ) (2)
where  μ i and  ν i are the error terms from the cost equation and the deductible choice 
equation.
If there is no asymmetric information, and vector  X contains all the relevant character-
istics used by the insurer, then the error terms  μ and  ν will be uncorrelated. However, if 
there is a variable with a positive impact on health care costs that is not included in the 
list of characteristics  X , then the error term  μ will pick up the effect that this variable has 
on health care costs,  cost . According to the literature, see section 2, high-risk enrollees 
will self-select in a contract with more generous coverage. Hence, a higher value of  μ will 
be observed together with a lower value of the deductible, and thus, with a lower value 
of  ν . A significant negative correlation between the error terms  μ and  ν will, therefore, 
demonstrate the presence of asymmetric information.
Under a conditional independence assumption, this test can be conducted by using 
reduced-form OLS equation in which  cost is the dependent variable and  deductible is the 
independent variable:
 cos  t i = α deductibl  e i + β  X i ‘ + γ  Z i ‘ +  ∈ i (3)
where  cost denotes the health care costs,  deductible is the choice of deductible,  X is 
a vector of consumer characteristics,  Z contains all other health plan related relevant 
variables, and  ∈ is the error term. The letters  α ,  β and  γ are parameter vectors. We expect 
a negative relationship between the cost and the deductible. However, it is important to 
control for enrollees’ risk aversion, since there may be a bias in the single-equation OLS 
model if ( i ) the choice of deductible is related to risk aversion and ( ii ) risk aversion is re-
lated to enrollee cost type (Finkelstein & McGarry, 2006; Aarbu, 2017). In our application 
we will include proxies for risk aversion based on several characteristics of the enrollees.
Since the current costs in each year contains both selection and moral hazard effects, 
one more step needs to be done in order to separate the selection effect from the moral 
hazard effect. To remove the moral hazard effect from the equation, we focus on the 
enrollees who had contracts without voluntary deductibles during three years before 
the year for which we conducted the estimation, year  t . Additionally we replaced the 
health care costs incurred in that year with the health care costs of the previous year. 
This replacement results in the following specification for the reduced model, in which 
the dependent variable does not depend on the choice of a contract in year  t :
 cos  t i,t-1 = α deductibl e it + β  X it ‘ + γ  Z it ‘ +  ∈ it (4)
Chapter 5
136
In the presence of risk-adjustment, the same reasoning also holds for the risk-adjusted 
result variable,  result . Therefore, this selection effect could also be demonstrated by us-
ing an alternative model specification with the past  result as the dependent variable and 
deductible as the independent variable, in which a higher risk-adjusted result would be 
associated with a higher deductible level chosen.
However, this approach could introduce selection bias in our estimate of selection. 
By focusing on enrollees who had contracts without deductibles in  t - 1 ,  t - 2 and  t - 3 , 
we have a subsample of the population with different characteristics compared to the 
whole population. If these characteristics affect costs or risk-adjusted results, then we 
have potential bias in our estimation. We are not able to quantify this bias, however, 
we can try to give a direction of the bias. van Winssen, van Kleef, and van de Ven (2015) 
showed that in the Netherlands for a large share of enrollees who has not chosen any 
voluntary deductible would have been better of if they would have chosen a voluntary 
deductible. This means that our subsample may include an over-representation of en-
rollees that are less interested and/or less shrewd when choosing their deductible. If this 
is the case, then we may underestimate the adverse selection effect.
5. DATA DESCRIPTION
Data and defining the relevant subset for the empirical analysis
The data came from two sources: risk-adjustment data and health plan choice data. Both 
datasets are panel datasets, covering the entire population of the Netherlands, which 
exceeds 16 million enrollees per year, over the period 2010-2013.
Both datasets were provided by the Dutch Healthcare Authority. The risk-adjustment 
dataset comprises the characteristics of the enrollees included in the risk-adjustment 
system and the actual costs incurred by the enrollees. The individual characteristics and 
the cost types included were described in detail in section 2, where we also defined the 
concept of ‘risk-adjusted result’. The health plan choice dataset is a complementary data-
set that includes the insurance enrollment. These records provide the health plan details 
on each enrollee, including the deductible level chosen. As explained, enrollees can opt 
for or zero voluntary deductible or a voluntary deductibles of €100, €200, €300,€400 or 
€500. To conduct the analysis, both dataset were merged at the enrollee level.
Table 1 provides an overview of our dataset coverage (in insured years) and the 
amounts of costs included in the dataset in billions of euros. Since physical and mental 
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health care costs are the major costs of health care74, the cost variable that we use in our 
analysis are defined as the sum of these two cost components75.
The table excludes observations with missing values and the observations relating to 
individuals who reside abroad (approximately 1% of all observations). In the analysis that 
follows, we also excluded enrollees younger than 18 years, since this group of enrollees 
does not have to pay any deductible (this implies excluding  20% of the population). 
Furthermore, we only selected enrollees that appeared in our dataset every year, so that 
we could follow each enrollee over the whole period (this implied excluding  11% of the 
population).
In order to conduct the test described in section 4 for the year 2013, we selected en-
rollees who did not choose a voluntary deductible in the previous years (2010 till 2012) 
in order to estimate the equations for the health care costs and risk-adjusted results for 
the year before the enrollees chose a voluntary deductible (i.e. 2012). By looking at the 
outcomes for health, costs and risk-adjusted results for 2012, before the enrollee chose 
a deductible, we were able to exclude the possibility that the voluntary deductible had 
affected the health, costs and risk adjusted results that we were examining. Next section 
provides some descriptive analysis of the selected subset of enrollees.
Descriptive analysis of the selected subset
For the selected subset of enrollees, we consider the relationship between their deduct-
ible choice in 2013 and some variables of interest, such as the health status, costs, risk-
adjusted result, and expected out-of pocket expenses.
Table 2 shows the number of enrollees for each deductible choice in 2013, together 
with the share of healthy individuals in each subgroup. Here we classified an enrollee 
as ‘healthy’ if he or she was not included in any diagnosis-cost class, pharmacy-cost 
class or multi-year high cost class in 2012. These enrollees are considered as having no 
substantial health care costs in the period 2010-2012, which is deemed predictive of 
74 Some fixed cost components are not included in risk-adjustment.
75 Note the difference between the risk-adjusted result and the cost variable: the cost variable that we 
use represents the incurred cost; this variable is neither adjusted nor normalized.
Table 1. Size of the dataset
year Insured Years mln total physical health care costs bln 
euro
total mental health care cost bln 
euro
2010 16.3 25.958 3.010
2011 16.4 26.508 3.299
2012 16.5 27.837 2.982
2013 16.5 29.736 3.071
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2013 health care costs according to the risk-adjustment model. The share of healthy 
enrollees among enrollees who did not choose any deductible in 2010-2012 and 2013 
was 57%. The share of healthy enrollees was much higher among enrollees who did not 
choose a voluntary deductible in 2010- 2012 but who did choose a voluntary deductible 
of €500 in 2013: 83%. This descriptive analysis suggests that enrollees who choose a 
higher deductible level are more likely to be healthy.
Table 3 compares the mean values of health care costs, risk-adjusted results and 
counterfactual €500-deductible out-of-pocket expenses for 2012 (before choosing 
a deductible) and 2013 (after choosing a deductible) for each deductible category in 
2013. We will explain below how we calculated the counterfactual deductible out-of-
pocket expenses. The columns on costs provide insight in the health care use by the 
individuals; the columns on risk-adjusted results show profitability of each subgroup in 
risk-adjustment; and the counterfactual expenses characterize the attractiveness of a 
higher deductible option from the enrollees’ perspective.
First, looking at the columns headed ‘mean cost’ and ‘mean result’ in this table, we 
observe that the mean 2012 health costs (mean 2012 result) for enrollees who did not 
choose a voluntary deductible in either 2010-2012 or 2013 are higher (lower) than the 
mean 2012 health costs (mean 2012 result) for the enrollees who did not choose a vol-
untary deductible in 2010-2012 but did choose a voluntary deductible of €500 in 2013: 
€2,261.68 vs. €600.29 (€-26.05 vs. €399.578)76. From this comparison, we can conclude 
that insurers have lower costs for enrollees who have chosen a voluntary deductible 
(higher risk-adjusted results). This applies to the year before they chose the voluntary 
deductible (2012) and it remains true for the year after they chose the voluntary deduct-
ible (2013). Although the costs in 2013 reflect not only the selection but also the moral 
76 The risk-adjusted result was normalized such that its mean is equal to zero. However, the mean 
results presented in the table differs from zero because we use a subset of the population in our 
analysis.
Table 2. For each deductible category the number of enrollees and the share of healthy in 2012. Only 
enrollees that have not chosen any voluntary deductible in the period 2010-2012 are taken into the cal-
culation.
deductible 2013 enrollees share enrollees classified as ‘healthy’
000 10828669 0.57
100 25386 0.82
200 41442 0.83
300 23242 0.82
400 7925 0.82
500 265489 0.83
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hazard effect, the lower costs and positive risk-adjusted results in 2012 are a strong 
indication for the presence of selection and also indicates that the selection effect is 
much larger than the moral hazard effect.
The last two columns of Table 3 headed ‘mean expenses’ show the mean counterfac-
tual values of out-of-pocket expenses that would have been paid by the enrollees under 
the €500 deductible option. Since there is also a mandatory deductible, which was €350 
in 2013, we simulated the counter-factual situation in which each enrollee had chosen a 
voluntary deductible of €500 on top of the mandatory deductible of €350. In this case, 
each enrollee would have to pay any costs incurred up to €850. In the Netherlands, the 
deductible applies to almost all health care costs, but there are some exceptions; for 
example, payments for general practitioners (GP) are not included. In our dataset, for 
each enrollee we knew the exact costs that were taken into account for the deductible. 
Using these ‘deductible costs’ and limiting them to €850 euro, we were able to calculate 
the total counterfactual out-of-pocket expenses that each enrollee would have had to 
pay if he or she had chosen the maximum voluntary deductible of €500 euro in 2013. We 
calculated these out-of-pocket expenses based on the 2012 ‘deductible costs’ (that is, 
before the choice of any voluntary deductible for 2013) and the 2013 ‘deductible costs’ 
(after the choice of a voluntary deductible for 2013).
Focusing on the column headed ‘mean expenses 2012’ in Table 3, which shows these 
counterfactual values for the year 2012, we can see that the mean counterfactual out-
of-pocket expenses in 2012 for enrollees who did not choose a voluntary deductible in 
either 2010-2012 or 2013 are higher than the same figure for those enrollees who opted 
for a voluntary deductible of €500 in 2013: €466.53 vs. €227.21. This holds for the year 
Table 3. For each deductible category the mean costs, mean risk-adjusted results and mean counterfactu-
al voluntary deductible 500 out-of-pocket expenses in 2012 and 2013. Only enrollees who have not chosen 
any voluntary deductible in the period 2010-2012 are taken into the calculation.
deductible 2013
mean cost mean result mean expenses
2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013
000 2262 2487 -26 -27 467 452
100 772 906 286 257 254 243
200 643 810 384 314 231 228
300 653 796 405 349 232 227
400 627 826 445 362 232 230
500 600 703 420 400 227 203
Combining the findings from Tables 2 and 3, we can therefore conclude that enrollees who chose a volun-
tary deductible in 2013 are: healthier and have lower counterfactual out-of-pocket expenses than enrollees 
who did not choose a voluntary deductible in 2013. At the same time, insurers incur lower costs and have 
higher risk-adjusted results for enrollees who chose a voluntary deductible in 2013.
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before they chose the voluntary deductible (2012), and a similar result holds for the year 
after they chose the voluntary deductible (2013).
Table 4 shows the summary statistics of the variables discussed above in Table 3. In 
addition, Table 5 provides insight on how the risk-adjusted result varies in relation to 
the choice of a deductible in 2013 by the subset of enrollees who did not choose a 
voluntary deductible in 2010-2012, which we use in our empirical analysis. The table 
shows both the mean and the distribution of the risk-adjusted result over percentile 
groups for each deductible category. For example, we can see that 2.05% of the enroll-
ees that did not choose a deductible in 2013 are in the  [ 0th, 2th ] percentile group, while 
only 0.46% of the enrollees who chose a deductible of €500 in 2013 are in the  [ 0th, 2th 
] percentile group. Table 5 also includes the 2012 mean risk-adjusted result for each 
deductible category. The mean risk-adjusted result in the  [ 0th, 2th ] percentile group is 
€-27925.10, while the mean risk adjusted result in the  ( 10th, 100th ] percentile group is 
€1081.41. Thus, compared to the other deductible categories, a relatively large share of 
the enrollees who did not have any voluntary deductibles in 2013 fall into the lowest 
result percentile group  [ 0th, 2th ] . This last observation suggests that enrollees without a 
voluntary deductible are more likely to be loss-making in risk-adjustment.
6. ESTIMATION
In this section we estimate the relationship between ( i ) costs in the previous year and 
the choice of a deductible for the subsequent year and ( ii ) between the risk-adjusted 
result in the previous year and choice of a deductible for the subsequent year. These 
are the test of our two hypotheses derived from section 4. We have tried to control as 
much as possible for enrollee heterogeneity and health plan heterogeneity. Enrollee 
heterogeneity entails differences in enrollee characteristics, in particular those that 
are relevant to risk-preferences. Health plan heterogeneity includes differences at the 
level of the insurer’s health plan, for example the possibility that a particular health plan 
Table 4. Summary statistics for cost, counterfactual (cf ) out-of-pocket expenses and risk-adjusted result in 
2012 and 2013. Only enrollees who have not chosen any voluntary deductible in the period 2010-2012 are 
taken into the calculation.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
cost 2012 11192153 2208 5589 0 645275
cost 2013 11192153 2431 6664 0 806561
result 2012 11192153 -12 4761 -627524 81361
result 2013 11192153 -14 5769 -780855 88989
cf expenses 2012 11192153 459 367 0 850
cf expenses 2013 11192153 444 367 0 850
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may have a more cost-effective way of purchasing health care (lower costs) than the 
average health plan. We estimated the following equations separately for the costs and 
risk-adjusted result:
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In model (5)  cos  t i is the cost of enrollee  i in 2012 and in model (6)  resul  t i is the risk-
adjusted result for enrollee  i in 2012. In both models,  deductibl  e ki is a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 if enrollee  i has chosen deductible category  k in 2013 (leaving out 
category ‘000’).
To control for possible heterogeneity in risk preference (i.e. risk aversion proxies), we 
included age dummy variables  ag  e ki (7 categories), gender dummy variables  gende  r ki (2 
categories), income source dummy variables  income _ sr  c ki (3 income source categories: 
benefit-receivers, self-employed and a rest category), average household income vari-
ables  incom  e ki (4 categories) , one-person household dummy variables  oneperson _ h  h ki 
(2 categories). These variables are taken from the risk classes from the risk-adjustment 
system. See section 3 for a description of these variables. From the literature we know 
that there is a potential relation between gender, age, family status, income and occu-
pation/education characteristics of individuals and their risk aversion (). However, note 
that the risk aversion proxies may also pick up other effects, such as health behavior 
or ability to pay. We have to keep this in mind when interpreting the effect of the risk 
aversion proxies on the estimations.
Table 5. For each deductible category the distribution of population percentiles. Only enrollees that have 
not chosen any voluntary deductible in the period 2010-2012 are taken into the calculation.
percentile result mean result SD share of deductible in 2013
000 100 200 300 400 500
[0th,2th] -27925 23382 0.021 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(2th,4th] -9138 1486 0.021 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.005
(4th,6th] -5722 665 0.020 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.007
(6th,8th] -3878 423 0.020 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.009
(8th,10th] -2685 283 0.020 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010
(10th,100th] 1081 1787 0.898 0.950 0.957 0.958 0.958 0.965
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In both models dummy variable  healthpla  n ki is equal to 1 if enrollee  i has chosen 
healthplan  k in 2013, which we added to control for potential unobserved factors that 
affect the risk-adjusted result and are related to the specific health plan that an enrollee 
has chosen in 2013. Lastly,  α and  ~ α are the constants, and  ∈ i and  ˜  ∈ i are the error terms.
In our estimation, we did not include all riskclasses that is used in the risk-adjustment 
system. Our goal is not to predict as well as possible the health care costs of each en-
rolee. However, we do want to control for enrollees’ risk aversion, since, as discussed in 
section 4, there may be a bias in the OLS model if ( i ) the choice of deductible is related 
to risk aversion and ( ii ) risk aversion is related to enrollee cost type. It should also be 
noted that the risk-adjusted result is the residual of the risk-adjusted payment and costs. 
Therefore the risk-adjusted result has already been ‘adjusted’ for the effect of the observ-
able consumer characteristics that are included in the risk-adjustment.
We estimated models (5) and (6) with the ordinary least squares (OLS). Table 6 shows 
the results of the OLS estimation of the cost model (5) and Table 7 shows the results of 
the OLS estimation of the risk-adjusted result model 6. For both models, we estimated 
the model in steps: ( i ) only the deductible dummy variables, ( ii ) adding health plan fixed 
effects and ( iii ) adding the risk aversion proxies. As with our descriptive analysis in sec-
tion 5.2, we estimated the model using the dataset of enrollees who chose no voluntary 
deductible in the period 2010-2012.
Table  6 econometrically confirms our conclusions from the descriptive analysis in 
section 5.2: enrollees who chose a voluntary deductible in 2013 had significantly lower 
costs in 2012 than enrollees who did not choose a voluntary deductible in 2013. For 
example, in the model with only voluntary deductible dummy variables, enrollees who 
chose a voluntary deductible of €500 in 2013 had, on average, costs that were €1,661.50 
lower in 2012 than enrollees who did not choose a voluntary deductible in 2013. We 
found similar effects for the other deductible categories (€100, €200, €300 and €400). 
Adding fixed effects only slightly reduced the estimated decreases related to the choice 
of a voluntary deductible in 2013. When the risk aversion proxies were added to the 
model, we found that the decrease in costs associated with a voluntary deductible is 
lower and that there is a increase in the  R 2 . However, the reduction in costs associated 
with having a voluntary deductible remains substantial. For example, enrollees who 
chose a voluntary deductible of €500 in 2013 had, on average, costs of €891.70 lower in 
2012 compared to enrollees who did not choose a voluntary deductible in 2013.
Similarly, Table 7 confirms our conclusions from the descriptive analysis in section 5.2: 
enrollees who chose a voluntary deductible in 2013, had a significantly higher risk-ad-
justed result in 2012 than enrollees who did not choose a voluntary deductible in 2013. 
For example, in the model with only voluntary deductible dummy variables, enrollees 
who chose a voluntary deductible of €500 in 2013 had, on average, a risk-adjusted 
result in 2012 of €445.86 higher compared to enrollees who did not choose a voluntary 
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Table 6. OLS estimation of cost 2012 on deductibles 2013.
Dependent variable: cost2012
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 2,261.756*** 3,578.001*** 3,391.542***
(1.696) (13.733) (20.448)
deductible_2013 100 -1,490.718*** -1,270.968*** -669.262***
(35.081) (35.103) (34.263)
deductible_2013 200 -1,618.965*** -1,482.874*** -852.448***
(27.475) (27.486) (26.834)
deductible_2013 300 -1,608.693*** -1,491.396*** -871.760***
(36.662) (36.646) (35.768)
deductible_2013 400 -1,634.726*** -1,514.096*** -957.012***
(62.731) (62.673) (61.157)
deductible_2013 500 -1,661.473*** -1,412.512*** -891.700***
(10.969) (11.371) (11.120)
age[30,40) 277.571***
(6.258)
age[40,50) 134.474***
(5.953)
age[50,60) 551.633***
(6.079)
age[60,70) 1,365.584***
(6.200)
age[70,70+) 2,834.631***
(6.341)
male -200.765***
(3.277)
oneperson_hh 218.082***
(4.455)
incomegroup1 -1,717.903***
(15.044)
incomegroup2 -1,804.444***
(14.865)
incomegroup3 -2,018.974***
(15.066)
income_src benefitsreceiver 2,430.191***
(5.772)
income_src selfemployed -387.520***
(7.473)
plan fixed effects no yes yes
Observations 11,189,716 11,189,716 11,189,716
R2 0.003 0.006 0.054
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.006 0.054
Residual Std. Error 5,582.036
(df = 11189710)
5,572.685
(df = 11189652)
5,437.474
(df = 11189640)
F Statistic 6,078.346***
(df = 5; 11189710)
1,081.476***
(df = 63; 11189652)
8,466.543***
(df = 75; 11189640)
Note: * p<0:1; ** p<0:05; *** p<0:01.
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Table 7. OLS estimation of risk adjusted result 2012 on deductibles 2013.
Dependent variable: result 2012
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -26.029*** -105.554*** -582.410***
(1.447) (11.730) (17.893)
deductible_2013 100 312.270*** 300.549*** 345.379***
(29.916) (29.984) (29.982)
deductible_2013 200 409.890*** 403.887*** 445.349***
(23.429) (23.478) (23.481)
deductible_2013 300 431.057*** 430.744*** 469.269***
(31.264) (31.302) (31.298)
deductible_2013 400 471.235*** 471.247*** 501.459***
(53.494) (53.534) (53.516)
deductible_2013 500 445.857*** 446.350*** 475.240***
(9.354) (9.713) (9.730)
age[30,40) -15.396***
(5.476)
age[40,50) 66.972***
(5.209)
age[50,60) 104.224***
(5.320)
age[60,70) 149.685***
(5.425)
age[70,70+) 343.263***
(5.549)
male 56.165***
(2.867)
oneperson_hh 71.606***
(3.899)
incomegroup1 391.714***
(13.164)
incomegroup2 349.325***
(13.008)
incomegroup3 309.668***
(13.184)
income_src 
benefitsreceiver
-132.834***
(5.050)
income_src selfemployed 55.798***
(6.539)
plan fixed effects no yes yes
Observations 11,189,716 11,189,716 11,189,716
R2 0.0003 0.0003 0.001
Adjusted R2 0.0003 0.0003 0.001
Residual Std. Error 4,760.164
(df = 11189710)
4,760.030
(df = 11189652)
4,758.072
(df = 11189640)
F Statistic 583.033***
(df = 5; 11189710)
57.188***
(df = 63; 11189652)
171.068***
(df = 75; 11189640)
Note: * p<0:1; ** p<0:05; *** p<0:01.
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deductible in 2013. Again, we found similar effects for the other deductible categories 
(€100, €200, €300 and €400). Adding health plan fixed effects and risk aversion proxies 
only affect the results slightly.
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our empirical results point to the presence of selection under mandatory health 
insurance with open enrollment in a managed care setting. The uniquely rich dataset 
covering the entire population of the Netherlands over a period of several years allowed 
us to demonstrate the presence of the selection effect of deductibles separately from 
the potential moral hazard effect that arises simultaneously. From our analysis it follows 
that offering contracts with voluntary deductibles results in self-selection by healthier 
enrollees, who are overcompensated by the risk-adjustment system.
We observe the selection effect even after controlling for a large set of control vari-
ables for risk aversion, healthplan fixed-effects and possible other confounding effects. 
The expected gains on the risk-adjustment per enrollee with a voluntary deductible of 
€500 are estimated at around €450 on average. On top of this, the enrollee pays a larger 
share out-of-pocket, resulting in lower costs for the insurer to be reimbursed. In return, 
the insurer offers the enrollee a premium discount for taking a voluntary deductible.
It should also be noted that the literature on effects of voluntary deductibles shows 
that ( i ) enrollees are not always able to choose the optimal deductible options; ( ii ) en-
rollees are not always able to make the optimal choices in relation to these deductibles; 
( iii ) there is little insight into the size of the reduction of the moral hazard effect on costs 
(because it is difficult to distinguish delayed costs from avoided costs and the reduction 
in excessive costs).
Thus, our paper provides convincing evidence that individuals have substantial pri-
vate information that are not captured by the risk-adjustment system. When insurers 
have the possibility or obligation to diversify their health plans in terms of generos-
ity, individuals can self-select into health plans. For health plan generosity in terms of 
deductibles, we show that this self-selection results in substantial differences in costs 
which are only partly compensated by the risk-adjustment system.
Given the substantial expected gains on the risk-adjustment for enrollees with a 
voluntary deductible, it is important to study in greater detail how the these gains are 
related to the premium discount for voluntary deductible that insurers set. For example, 
it would be interesting to determine if insurers are able to attract enrollees with large 
gains from risk-adjustment by offering large premium discounts. However, it may also be 
the case that by offering higher discounts the insurers may attract on the margin enroll-
ees that are relatively high-risk. If we find that not all gains are translated into premium 
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discounts, it would be interesting to examine if this is due to the current regulation that 
stipulate that insurers are not allowed to differentiate the price discounts associated 
with voluntary deductible options between enrollees of the same health plans.
An option that the Dutch government could consider to fully eliminate the risk-adjust-
ment gain of the deductibles is to include the choice of a voluntary deductible in the risk-
adjustment system as one of the characteristics of the consumer. In this way, consumers 
with a voluntary deductible are not profitable any more in the risk-adjustment system, 
which decreases the incentive for selection. This may lead to a lower number of enroll-
ees opting for a voluntary deductible. Consequently, the potential moral hazard effect 
would be lower too. Because this potentially results in a trade-off between improving 
solidarity (due to better risk adjustment) and cost reduction (due to moral hazard), more 
research in this area is definitely needed to understand the potential welfare effects.
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether consumer inertia can effectively reduce adverse selection 
in health insurance markets. To this end, we investigate consumer choice of deductible 
in the Dutch health insurance market, using panel data on all insured individuals in the 
Netherlands over period 2010-2013. The Dutch health insurance market offers a unique 
setting to study adverse selection, because during annual open enrollment periods all 
adults are free to choose an extra deductible up to 500 euros per year. By focusing on 
deductible choices of those who do not switch health plans, we are able to examine 
the ‘pure’ adverse selection effect (i.e. not distorted by other health plan attributes). 
We estimate a logit model to determine how previous and future costs are related to 
individuals’ deductible choice. We find that almost 70% of the individuals with the high-
est deductible level are likely to stick with this choice even after incurring very high 
costs during the previous year. Furthermore, only 3.5% of those having no deductible 
and very low costs are likely to choose a 500 euro deductible next year. These findings 
suggest that consumer inertia can act as a powerful brake on adverse selection.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The presence of adverse selection is a well-known impediment to an efficient health 
insurance market (Einav and Finkelstein 2011). Adverse selection occurs when enrollees 
choose health plans with more coverage because they have private information about 
being likely to incur high costs. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that adverse selec-
tion can result in the under-insurance of low-risk enrollees or even a market with no 
equilibrium. As shown by Handel (2013) and Handel et al. (2015), however, adverse 
selection may in practice be counteracted by individuals’ suboptimal decision making. 
There is ample empirical evidence that optimal consumer choice in health insurance 
markets is hampered by “frictions” like inertia, search and switching cost, and a lack of 
knowledge (˜health insurance literacy”); see for example Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
(1988), Abaluck and Gruber (2011), Bhargava et al. (2015), Handel (2013), Handel and 
Kolstad (2015), Handel et al. (2015), Heiss et al. (2016), Ho et al. (2015), and Marzilli 
Ericson (2014).
Beforehand, it is not clear whether adverse selection or friction is more important to 
market outcomes and how these two factors interact which each other. As Pauly (1984) 
noticed already more than three decades ago: “One of the things that theory does say 
here is that only a little bit of adverse election may cause market equilibrium to unravel. 
But then only a little bit of consumer inertia is needed to reinstate it.”
The interaction of adverse selection and consumer inertia has recently been studied in 
the context of US markets for health insurance (Handel 2013, Handel and Kolstad 2015, 
Handel et al. 2015, Polyakova 2016). Handel and Kolstad (2015) measure inertia as the 
implied monetary costs of switching plans when a default option is present. They identify 
inertia by comparing health plan choice of the same consumers over time in both clearly 
active and clearly passive choice environments. In the context of an employment-based 
insurance setting of a large US firm, they show that both adverse selection and inertia 
are important. Furthermore, they show that reducing frictions is welfare decreasing 
(increasing) when the mean and variance of surplus from risk protection compared to 
its costs are relatively low (high).
In this paper, we aim to determine to what extent adverse selection is mitigated by 
consumer inertia. In our setting – the Dutch market for mandatory basic health insur-
ance – the choice environment is stable, since we focus on individuals staying with the 
same health plan during the study period. These individuals, however, can freely adapt 
their choice of deductible (i.e. coverage level) resulting in a lower or higher premium. 
Hence, no health plan attributes other than the deductible level and its correspond-
ing premium difference play a role in the consumer choices examined here. Given 
that only monetary trade-offs are involved in this choice setting, we are able to truly 
identify inertia as defined by Handel (2013); i.e. the implied monetary costs of choice 
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persistence. Using detailed data for the total Dutch adult insured population who were 
enrolled in the same health plan during the entire study period 2010-2013 (about 9.5 
million individuals), we first constructed 16 possible deductible choice paths to examine 
the relationship between health care costs and deductible choice. In a second step we 
used the same dataset for estimating a logit model. The model estimates reveal to what 
extent individuals’ choice of deductible in 2013 can be explained by their previous 
and future health care cost. Although we find clear evidence of adverse selection, we 
also find that the extent of adverse selection is strongly mitigated by the presence of 
substantial consumer inertia.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly de-
scribe the context of the Dutch health insurance market in which people annually have 
free choice of deductible. Section 3 informs about the data and descriptive statistics. 
In section 4, deductible choice paths are defined and analyzed. The empirical model is 
formulated in section 5, after which the estimation results are presented in section 6. 
Section 7 concludes.
2. CONTEXT
In the Netherlands, universal mandatory health insurance is offered by competing 
private health insurers.77 During our study period (2010-2013), the number of insur-
ers decreased from 11 to 9 due to two mergers, whereas the number of basic health 
plans (or health insurance policies) offered by these insurers increased from 57 to 67. 
All Dutch citizens are required to buy a basic health plan and health insurers have to 
accept all individuals applying for enrollment in such a plan. The basic benefit package 
is comprehensive and standardized by law. Hence, each basic health plan covers the 
same benefits. In addition, health plan premiums have to be community-rated. That 
is, all people enrolling in the same health plan face the same premium (except that in 
case of a group contract insurers are allowed to offer a premium discount up to 10%).78 
For all adult enrollees (18 years and older) there is a mandatory deductible. Its level is 
77 For a more detailed description of the Dutch health insurance market and the system of regulated 
(or managed) competition, see Van de Ven and Schut (2008), and Douven et al. (2017).
78 For each enrollee insurers receive a risk-adjusted premium subsidy from a risk-equalization fund 
that is filled with income-related contributions. This risk-adjusted premium subsidy is equal to the 
enrollee’s predicted costs minus a fixed amount that is annually determined by the government 
(about 1,000 euro per year). Hence, to break even health insurers must at least charge a community-
rated premium equal to this fixed amount (McGuire and Van Kleef, 2018).
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annually set by the government.79 On top of this mandatory deductible, adults can opt 
for a (voluntary) deductible in return for a premium discount. The deductible levels are 
restricted by the government to 0, 100, 200, 300, 400 or 500 euro per year. For each 
deductible level, health insurers are free to determine a community-rated premium 
discount. During our study period the cost of maternity care and family care (provided 
by GPs) were exempted from the deductible.
Each year, individuals can switch health plans during the annual open enrollment 
period (December/January). Health plans differ from each other in terms of premium, 
(preferred) provider networks and premium discounts for the various deductible levels. 
Enrollees can adjust the deductible level every year by notifying their health insurer 
during the open enrollment period. This typically requires only one phone call or tick-
ing another box at the insurer’s website. Changing deductible levels does not require 
changing health plans. Hence, after having increased the deductible level people can 
easily lower it again during the next open enrollment season if they have acquired a 
chronic disease or otherwise expect higher medical costs in the year(s) to come.
As mentioned in Section 1, depending on the fundamentals of the market, having 
substantial consumer inertia in the health insurance market could be welfare increasing 
or decreasing (Handel et al. 2015). In the Netherlands, there is a sophisticated system of 
risk equalization, which reduces the potential negative welfare effects of adverse selec-
tion (Van Kleef et al. 2017). Further, as described above, the premium discount in return 
for a deductible is community rated, thereby reducing the opportunities for insurers 
to attract favorable risks (relative to the risk adjusted capitation payments) by higher 
discounts. Nevertheless, even after sophisitcated risk equalization those opting for the 
highest deductible level appear to be profitable to insurers at the prevailing discount 
levels (Croes et al. 2017). Increasing the uptake of voluntary deductibles by reducing 
consumer inertia may reduce profitability for insurers if people with a higher risk profile 
opt for it, or if it results in higher premium discounts because of enhanced competition. 
However, the welfare implications of stimulating the uptake of voluntary deductibles 
require further empirical research.
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVES
We use individual level panel data on the total Dutch population over the period 
2010-2013 obtained from the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa). The dataset includes 
information on (i) individual health care expenses – including out-of-pocket costs – for 
79 During our study period the mandatory deductible was gradually raised from 165 euro in 2010 to 
170 euro in 2011, 220 euro in 2012, and 350 euro in 2013.
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benefits covered by mandatory health insurance, (ii) individuals’ choice of health plan 
and deductible level, and (iii) a number of individual characteristics. In our analysis, we 
included age (5 classes), gender and household income (3 classes) as potentially relevant 
individual characteristics. In addition, we obtained data from the Dutch Healthcare Au-
thority (NZa) about the community-rated premium discount offered by each health plan 
in return for a higher deductible. Throughout the study period, the average discount 
was 222 euro for a 500 euro deductible with a standard deviation of about 40 euro. We 
linked the information in the dataset about each individual’s health plan to the health 
plan specific discount.
The full dataset includes about 16.6 million individual records in 2010. After excluding 
individuals that were not in the dataset for all four years, the number of observations 
reduced to 15.9 million. We also excluded a small number of people with more than 
one health plan per year (for example because they enrolled in another group contract 
after changing jobs), and people with incomplete information on household income 
(both groups comprise less than 1% of the total population). Furthermore, we excluded 
all individuals younger than 18 years in 2010, since these individuals did not face any 
deductible during part or the entire study period. The remaining dataset includes about 
11.8 million individual records with data for each of the four years.
For this balanced panel, Table 1 shows the distribution of individuals over the various 
deductible levels. The proportion of enrollees that opted for a deductible other than 
zero increased from 5% to 9% from 2010 to 2013. This change is almost entirely due to 
the increasing share of individuals choosing the deductible of 500 euro (from 2% to 5%).
As explained above, from the perspective of adverse selection we are primarily inter-
ested in the question to what extent enrollees’ choice of deductible is related to their 
past, current and expected future health costs. Enrollees who switch health plans, are 
Table 1. Distribution of enrollees over deductible levels, 2010-2013 (N x 1000).
Deductible level
2010 2011 2012 2013
N share N share N share N share
000 11226 0.95 11172 0.94 11097 0.94 10816 0.91
100 174 0.01 167 0.01 166 0.01 170 0.01
200 102 0.01 101 0.01 107 0.01 136 0.01
300 77 0.01 86 0.01 92 0.01 80 0.01
400 16 0.00 17 0.00 17 0.00 24 0.00
500 227 0.02 279 0.02 344 0.03 596 0.05
Total 11822 11822 11822 11822
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probably also reconsidering their deductible choice during this switching process.80 In 
our dataset, 46% of all enrollees who changed their deductible, also switched health 
plans. The decision to switch health plans depends on multiple factors (Boonen et al. 
2016). Because these factors may be correlated with the choice of deductible, we re-
stricted our analysis to those enrollees that did not switch health plans during the study 
period. For this subsample, it is most likely that the change of deductible level is driven 
by past or anticipated health care expenses. Furthermore, to keep the analysis concise 
we also excluded the small minority of people who chose intermediary deductible levels 
(100-400 euro).81 As a result the final sample consist of about 9.4 million individuals who 
in the period 2010-2013 (i) did not switch health plans and (ii) each year have either 
a zero or a 500 euro deductible. Given the two deductible choice options (0 and 500) 
and 4 years (2010-2013) we can distinguished 16 possible deductible choice paths. Each 
individual can be assigned to one of these paths. Table 2 exhibits the distribution of 
individuals over the 16 possible choice paths.
As shown in Table 2 the vast majority (96%) of all enrollees included in the dataset 
sticks with the default option of a zero deductible during the entire period. The second 
largest subgroup (1%) includes the enrollees who stick with a once chosen 500 euro 
deductible. The remaining 3% changed their deductible at least once during the study 
period.
When calculating each individual’s health care costs, we excluded the costs of GP and 
maternity care because these health care services are exempted from the deductible. 
The average costs per individual increased from 2,085 euro in 2010 to 2,508 euro in 2013 
during the study period. As typically is the case, the distribution of individual health 
care costs is highly skewed. For instance, in 2013 25% of all enrollees had costs below 
45 euro while 50% and 87.5% had costs below 477 euro and 4464 euro, respectively. 
Therefore, we transformed the cost data by taking the natural logarithm of one plus 
cost, i.e. log(1+cost). Figure 1 shows that the resulting log transformed cost distribution 
has the familiar bimodal shape, with local maxima at 0-0.5 (about zero euro) and 6.5-7 
(about 900 euro). The log transformed cost distribution is convenient for our application, 
since we want to categorize enrollees into cost classes.
For the empirical analysis, we distinguished 6 different log transformed costs catego-
ries. Table 3 displays the proportion of people with either a zero or 500 euro deductible 
in 2013 for each of the 6 cost categories in 2012. As expected, the share of people opting 
80 See Boonen et al. (2016) for a study of the factors that impact the propensity to switch health insur-
ers in the Dutch health insurance market.
81 Note that – in contrast to intermediairy deductible levels – the share of enrollees who have chosen 
the highest (500 euro) deductible level has grown significantly from 2010 to 2013. Furthermore, this 
growth continued after 2013 (Vektis 2017).
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Table 2. Distribution of individual enrollees in the final sample over the possible deductible choice paths 
(2010-2013)
Path Nr. Deductible level 2010-2011-2012-2013 N share
1 500_500_500_500 134977 0.01
2 500_500_500_000 5471 0.00
3 500_500_000_500 1279 0.00
4 500_500_000_000 5969 0.00
5 500_000_500_500 1325 0.00
6 500_000_500_000 220 0.00
7 500_000_000_500 4524 0.00
8 500_000_000_000 8359 0.00
9 000_500_500_500 20838 0.00
10 000_500_500_000 1546 0.00
11 000_500_000_500 589 0.00
12 000_500_000_000 2130 0.00
13 000_000_500_500 26329 0.00
14 000_000_500_000 2245 0.00
15 000_000_000_500 121941 0.01
16 000_000_000_000 9025461 0.96
Total sample 9363203 1.00
Figure 1. Distribution of log transformed individual health care expenses in 2012
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for the highest deductible in 2013 is negatively related to their health care expenses in 
the previous year. In the lowest cost category 7.8% of the individuals opted for a 500 
euro deductible, whereas this holds for only 0.3% of the individuals in the highest cost 
category. However, note that even among those in the lowest cost category more than 
90% of the individuals preferred not to have an extra deductible.
The high percentage of people with low costs choosing a zero deductible indicates 
that many people may not make a (financially) optimal deductible choice. Indeed, as 
shown by Van Winssen et al. (2015) an uptake of a 500 euro deductible would have been 
retrospectively financially profitable for 48% of the Dutch insured population in 2014, 
whereas only about 11% actually acted in this way.82 We calculated the share of people 
that with hindsight made the most profitable deductible choice. We find that, given 
their actual health care expenses, about 50% of the people with a zero deductible made 
the best choice during the study period (varying between 47 and 54%).83 By contrast, 
82 to 85% of the people with a 500 euro deductible with hindsight made the financially 
optimal decision. These findings are similar to those of an earlier study by Douven and 
Remmerswaal (2016). Of course, an ex-post non-profitable deductible choice does not 
necessarily mean this choice is also non-profitable ex-ante, since the ex-ante profitability 
depends on the distribution of risk as well as the existing risk preferences.84 Therefore 
the key question is: do people, from a financial perspective, make the optimal deduct-
82 Handel et al. (2015) find similar differences in a US employment-based insurance context, where, 
based on ex post spending 60% of employees are better off financially in a high deductible health 
plan, though only 15% of employees actually choose that plan.
83 Individuals with a zero deductibles who retrospectively made a suboptimal choice, could have 
gained on average about 200 euros if they had opted for a 500 euro deductible.
84 Note that the rationale of insurance is that ex-post the majority of the insured make a loss because 
their premiums are used to pay the claims of an unlucky minority.
Table 3. Number and percentage of individuals with a zero and a 500 euro deductible in 2013 for each 
2012 log transformed cost class
log(1+cost2012)
Number of individuals Percentage individuals
deductible 000 deductible 500 with deductible 500
[0,2] 1200177 101563 7.8%
(2,4] 1033134 70097 6.4%
(4,6] 1921228 79647 4.0%
(6,8] 3174945 49024 1.5%
(8,10] 1575631 11017 0.7%
(10,15] 146286 454 0.3%
Total 9051401 311802 3.3%
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ible choice given their expected health care expenses? Before exploring this question 
in-depth, we first examine enrollees’ annual deductible choices in relation to their previ-
ous and future health care expenses.
4. DEDUCTIBLE CHOICE PATHS
To examine the relation between enrollees’ deductible choices and their health care 
costs, we have distinguished all possible deductible choice paths over the period 2010-
2013. For each of these paths, the aggregate annual median cost are then calculated. 
The resulting median cost patterns for each of the 16 deductible choice paths are pre-
sented in a heatmap (Figure 2). The first eight paths include all enrollees with a 500 euro 
deductible in 2010, while the last eight paths include all enrollees with a zero deductible 
in 2010. The heatmap confirms our initial expectation. Enrollees in path 1 () consistently 
have the lowest annual median costs. In contrast, enrollees in path 16 () in each year 
have among the highest median costs compared to the other deductible paths. These 
median cost patterns are consistent with the presence of adverse selection: high (low) 
risks sorting themselves into the low (high) deductible plans.
Of particular interest are the choice paths of enrollees who experience a substantial 
increase in health care expenses over the years. In Figure 2, this involves the paths with 
a profound change of color. As the heatmap shows, for all the choice paths in which 
enrollees experience a strong increase in costs – i.e. choice paths 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, and 14 
– we observe that the cost jump is followed by a change in deductible from 500 to zero 
in the next year. This is also consistent with the presence of an adverse selection effect. 
Enrollees following choice paths 3, 5 and 11 exchanged a zero for a 500 euro deductible 
in the only year they had higher health care cost (and changed back in the subsequent 
year). This is both consistent with adverse selection (choosing a zero deductible in 
anticipation of health care expenses) and moral hazard (a zero deductible resulting in 
higher health care expenses). Choice paths 7, 9, 13, and 15 show that enrollees with a 
zero deductible who are experiencing low health costs over the entire period eventually 
opt for a 500 euro deductible. This demonstrates that adverse selection may not take 
place immediately because consumers may learn more over time about their health 
risk – as well as the corresponding health care expenses – and the available deductible 
choice options.
In sum, all the possible choice paths seem to have cost patterns that are consistent 
with the presence of adverse selection. The patterns also suggest that (i) adverse selec-
tion may take time to arise and (ii) some healthy people are able to effectively anticipate 
an increase in next year’s health care costs.
161
Is adverse selection effectively mitigated by consumer inertia?
5. EMPIRICAL MODEL
We estimate a logit model to examine the determinants of individual choice of deduct-
ible (0 or 500) for the year 2013 based on individual level data over the period 2010-2013. 
The logit model specifies the probability that individual i chooses a 500 euro deductible 
in 2013 as:
 π i =  
exp ( μ i )  _ 1 + exp ( μ i )  
where  μ i denotes the set of relevant characteristics for individual i, which can be speci-
fied as follows:
Figure 2. Heatmap of annual median cost (in euros) per deductible choice pattern over the period 2010-
2013
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 μ i = c + β  deductible2012 i +    ∑ k=1 5  ρ k  cost2012 ki +    ∑ k=1 5  σ k  cost2013 ki +      ∑ k=1 5  ω k  cost2012 ki    
deductible2012 i    +    ∑ k=1 5  φ k  cost2013 ki     deductible2012 i +   δ  stablelowcost i +      ∑ k=1 2  γ k 
income ki +   ∑ k=1 4  θ k  age ki +  ϑ  gender i +   τ  discount i     
The main variables of interest are deductible2012, cost2012, cost2013 and stablelowcost 
because these four variables may provide evidence of adverse selection. The dummy 
variable deductible2012 is equal to one if the individual had a 500 euro deductible in 2012. 
If there is choice persistence, we expect that having a 500 euro deductible in 2012 has an 
positive impact on the probability of choosing a 500 euro deductible in 2013. Cost2012 
and cost2013 represent an individual’s health care cost in 2012 and 2013, categorized in 
6 categories (k=1,..6), which are included as dummy variables in the regression (exclud-
ing the lowest cost class as reference dummy). If adverse selection is present, we expect 
to find a negative relationship between the uptake of a 500 euro deductible in 2013 and 
the individual health care expenses in 2012. Since people may not only base their ex-
pectations on last year’s health care costs but also on expected future expenses, we also 
included cost2013 as an indicator of adverse selection. It should be noted, however, that 
this cost2013 variable may be endogenous, since these costs may depend on the choice 
of deductible because of moral hazard. Hence, the effect of cost2013 on the choice of 
deductible may be overestimated. For this reason, we estimated the model with and 
without the cost2013 variable. We also interacted both cost variables with the dummy 
variable deductible2012. This is because we expect that among individuals having a 500 
euro deductible in 2012 those who experience (or expect) high costs are less likely to 
opt again for a 500 euro deductible in 2013. Hence, if these interaction effects are nega-
tive for higher cost categories, this will provide further evidence of adverse selection. For 
individuals who have chosen zero deductible in 2010, 2011 and 2012, we included the 
variable stablelowcost to investigate the possibility of a delayed adverse selection effect 
due to learning. We have defined stablelowcost as a dummy variable taking the value of 
1 if (i) the individual’s health care expenses did not exceed the mandatory deductible for 
three consecutive years (165 euro in 2010, 170 euro in 2011 and 220 euro in 2012) and (ii) 
if the individual has chosen zero deducible in 2010, 2011 and 2012. If there is a delayed 
adverse selection effect because for some individuals learning takes time, we expect 
to find a positive coefficient for this variable. Note that this variable also provides an 
indication of consumer inertia, as a positive coefficient implies that people are incurring 
monetary costs of choice persistence.
To control for risk preferences, we include for each individual his/her household in-
come (income) (three categories, with the lowest income category as reference dummy), 
age (5 dummies, with the youngest age category as reference dummy), and gender 
(male=1). Furthermore, to control for health plan specific differences in the monetary 
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value of a 500 euro deductible, for each enrollee we include his specific health plan’s 
community rated premium discount for a 500 euro deductible in 2013.
6. ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table 4 presents the estimation results for two models, one excluding and one including 
2013 cost variables.85 First, the results provide evidence of a high degree of choice per-
sistence. Individuals already having a 500 euro deductible in 2012 are very likely to opt 
for the same deductible in 2013. The weighted average probability of choosing a 500 
euro deductible in 2013 is 85 percentage points higher for individuals already having 
a 500 euro deductible in 2012 than for individuals having a zero deductible in 2012.86
Next, there is a significant negative relation between the propensity of choosing a 
deductible in 2013 and the costs in the previous and current year. This result provides 
evidence of adverse selection.87 Moreover, the interaction effects between cost and 
deductible choice show that this relationship is particularly strong for people with a 500 
euro deductible in 2012.88 Below, we provide a detailed discussion and illustration of the 
marginal effects of prior and current year’s health care cost on deductible choice.
In model 1, having stable low costs during the 2010-2012 period is positively related 
to the propensity of having a 500 euro deductible in 2013. However, the marginal effect 
of stablelowcost in this model is close to zero. Furthermore, in model 2 where we include 
the cost of the current year, this effect disappears. This suggest that the learning effect 
that is measured by the stablelowcost variable is captured by the cost2012 and cost2013 
85 We determined the accuracy rate of both models based on a down-sampled dataset, including all 
people choosing a 500 euro deductible and an equally sized randomly selected subsample of people 
choosing a zero deductible. Assigning a 500 euro deductible to individuals when the predicted 
probability of choosing this deductible exceeds 0.5, both models predict 29 percentage point better 
than a 50/50 random prediction (79% vs. 50%).
86 For each possible combination of covariates, we calculated the difference in probability of choosing 
a 500 euro deductible in 2013 with and without having a 500 euro deductible in 2012. The weighted 
average of these differences in probability is then calculated by weighing each covariate combina-
tion with the number of individuals. The marginal effects of the other variables are calculated in the 
same way.
87 As discussed earlier, the effect of people’s health care cost in 2013 on deductible choice may be over-
estimated, because these costs are likely to be influenced to some extent by the choice of deductible 
as a result of moral hazard. Given the broad cost categories we distinguished, however, the moral 
hazard effect is most likely not large enough to have a substantial impact on the classification of 
individuals into the various cost classes. Therefore the potiential endogeneity problem seems small.
88 Notice that the interaction effects for the highest cost category are not signficant (2012) or only at 10% 
level (2013), which is probably due to the very small subgroup (only 454 individuals, see Table 3).
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Table 4. Regression results
Dependent variable:
500 euro deductible in 2013 (Y/N)
(1) (2)
deductible2012 7.460 (0.028) 7.638 (0.033)
cost2012(2,4] -0.004 (0.008) 0.051 (0.009)
cost2012(4,6] -0.217 (0.009) -0.060 (0.009)
cost2012(6,8] -1.074 (0.010) -0.655 (0.010)
cost2012(8,10] -1.851 (0.016) -1.150 (0.017)
cost2012(10,15] -3.339 (0.097) -2.312 (0.098)
income2 0.190 (0.008) 0.191 (0.008)
income3 0.525 (0.008) 0.519 (0.008)
age[30,40) 0.085 (0.010) 0.095 (0.010)
age[40,50) 0.090 (0.009) 0.126 (0.009)
age[50,60) 0.069 (0.009) 0.152 (0.009)
age[60,60+) -0.467 (0.010) -0.283 (0.010)
gender 0.092 (0.006) 0.071 (0.006)
discount 0.008 (0.0001) 0.008 (0.0001)
stablelowcost 0.079 (0.008) -0.004 (0.008)
cost2013(2,4] -0.048 (0.008)
cost2013(4,6] -0.259 (0.008)
cost2013(6,8] -0.882 (0.010)
cost2013(8,10] -1.444 (0.018)
cost2013(10,15] -1.579 (0.055)
deductible2012:cost2012(2,4] -0.215 (0.041) -0.119 (0.043)
deductible2012:cost2012(4,6] -0.531 (0.037) -0.363 (0.039)
deductible2012:cost2012(6,8] -0.725 (0.034) -0.637 (0.037)
deductible2012:cost2012(8,10] -0.598 (0.043) -0.600 (0.046)
deductible2012:cost2012(10,15] -0.028 (0.133) 0.019 (0.137)
deductible2012:cost2013(2,4] -0.160 (0.043)
deductible2012:cost2013(4,6] -0.375 (0.039)
deductible2012:cost2013(6,8] -0.488 (0.038)
deductible2012:cost2013(8,10] -0.261 (0.049)
deductible2012:cost2013(10,15] -0.114 (0.111)
constant -5.770 (0.019) -5.637 (0.020)
Observations 9,363,203 9,363,203
Log Likelihood −667,808.6 -659,057.7
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,335,659.0 1,318,177.0
Note: * = p<0.01, standard errors in brackets
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variable, which is plausible since for most of the individuals having low costs in 2010 
and 2011 the cost in 2012 and 2013 are expected to be low as well. All other explanatory 
variables are significant and have the expected signs (e.g. Borghans et al. 2009). The 
propensity of choosing a 500 euro deductible is positively related to income and gender 
(being male). For income, however, the weighted average marginal effect of a change in 
income category is only 1 percentage point for individuals with zero deductible in 2012, 
and 3 percentage points for individuals with 500 euro deductible in 2012. For gender, 
the weighted average marginal effects are less than 1 percentage point.
The propensity of choosing a 500 euro deductible is also positively related to being 
enrolled in a health plan offering a higher premium discount in return for a 500 euro 
deductible. When comparing the probability of choosing a 500 euro deductible in 
2013 between having the maximum (311) and minimum (150) discount in our sample, 
the weighted average marginal effect is 2 percentage points for individuals with zero 
deductible in 2012 and 6 percentage points for individuals with 500 euro deductible in 
2012. Furthermore, the propensity of choosing a 500 euro deductible increases with age 
up to an age of 40-50, and then decreases, particularly among those older than 60. When 
comparing the probability of choosing a 500 euro deductible in 2013 between age 40-
50 and age older than 60, the weighted average marginal effect is -1 percentage point 
for individuals with zero deductible in 2012 and -3 percentage points for individuals 
with 500 euro deductible in 2012.
We illustrate the marginal effects of changes in 2012 cost classes on deductible choice 
in model 1 by Figures 3 and 4. Both figures refer to a ‘median individual’, i.e. the median 
of each covariate of a 500 euro deductible chooser (as specified below the figures).89 
Figure 3 shows for each 2012 cost category the probability that people with a 500 euro 
deductible in 2012 choose the same deductible in 2013.
As illustrated, individuals within the lowest cost category in 2012 have a 98% prob-
ability of continuing their 500 euro deductible choice in 2013, whereas this probability 
drops to 68% for individuals in the highest cost category. The 30 percentage point reduc-
tion in probability provides evidence of a substantial adverse selection effect. Despite 
extremely high costs (exceeding 20,000 euro) in 2012, 68% of the individuals do not 
lower their 500 euro deductible in 2013. This provides evidence of substantial consumer 
inertia, because it is unlikely that these costs were just incidental for most individuals. 
For the whole population, the weighted average reduction in the probability of choosing 
a 500 euro deductible for people moving from the lowest to the highest cost category 
is 37 percentage points.
Figure 4 shows for each 2012 cost class the probability that people with a zero deduct-
ible in 2012 choose a 500 euro deductible in 2013. Clearly, the probability that people 
89 Using alternative values for income, stablelowcost age, gender and discount show similar patterns.
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switch from a zero to a 500 euro deductible is very small. Even for people having the 
lowest costs in 2012, the chance of taking up a 500 euro deductible in 2013 is only 3.5%. 
As expected, this percentage drops to close to zero percent for people experiencing very 
high health care expenses in 2012. The small share of low-cost individuals likely to take 
up a 500 euro deductible indicates a high degree of choice persistence with substantial 
implied monetary costs. For the whole population, the weighted average reduction in 
the probability of choosing a 500 euro deductible for people moving from the lowest to 
the highest cost category is 2 percentage points.
For each individual, we can retrospectively determine whether they made the most 
financially optimal deductible choice in 2013. Individuals who chose a zero deductible 
Figure 3. Probability of choosing a 500 euro deductible in 2013, for individuals with a 500 euro deductible 
in 2012 in six different 2012 cost classes
Based on model 1 for individuals with the following characteristics: income=category 3, stablelowcost=0, 
age=[40-50], gender=male, discount=222 euro.
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in 2013 did not make an optimal choice if their costs are lower than the mandatory 
deductible (350 euro) plus the premium discount offered by their health plan for a 500 
euro deductible. Similarly, individuals who chose 500 euro deductible in 2013 and have 
costs on top of the mandatory deductible (350 euro) that are higher than the discount, 
did not make an optimal choice. In 2013, 53% of the individuals who have chosen zero 
deductible would be financially better off with a 500 euro deductible. And for individu-
als who have chosen a 500 euro deductible, 14% would be better off with a zero euro 
deductible. We approximated the implied monetary costs by determining the gain that 
those individuals would attain if they would have chosen optimally in retrospect. The 
Figure 4. Probability of choosing a 500 euro deductible in 2013, for individuals with a zero euro deductible 
in 2012 in six different 2012 cost classes
Based on model 1 for individuals with the following characteristics: income=category 3, stablelowcost=0, 
age=[40-50], gender=male, discount=222 euro.
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average implied monetary costs is 229 euro for individuals who have chosen a subop-
timal zero deductible, and 187 euro for individuals who have chosen a suboptimal 500 
euro deductible.
As discussed above, previous cost experience does not necessarily mean that people 
can predict future health expenses. To get an indication of the extent to which people 
foresee future health expenses and act upon it, we used the estimation results of model 
2 to examine for each 2012 cost category the relationship between people’s choice of 
deductible and their (at that time future) health care cost in 2013. Figure 5 illustrates this 
relationship.
For each 2012 cost category, Figure 5 shows that the probability of people keeping 
a 500 euro deductible decreases if their health care expenses in 2013 increase. For 
instance, for people within the lowest cost category in 2012 the probability of keeping 
a 500 euro deductible in 2013 reduces from 99 to 94% if they shift to the highest cost 
category in 2013. Hence, only a small minority of about 5% of people having low cost in 
2012 and high cost in 2013 seem to have anticipated a substantial cost increase in 2013 
by reducing their deductible to zero. Much more pronounced is the anticipatory behav-
ior of those who experienced high cost in 2012 followed by – on hindsight – low cost in 
2013. As shown in Figure 5, for people having the highest cost in 2012 the propensity 
of keeping a 500 euro deductible is 62% if they have high costs in 2013, whereas this 
propensity increases to 90% if they have low costs in 2013. Hence, a substantial share 
of high cost individuals effectively anticipates future expected health care cost by (not) 
adjusting their choice of deductible. However, the fact that 62% of people within the 
highest cost groups in both years nevertheless keeps their 500 euro deductible further 
supports the evidence of high consumer inertia.
For individuals who had a zero deductible in 2012, Figure 6 shows a similar pattern as 
Figure 5. Although the probability that people switch from a zero to a 500 euro deduct-
ible is very small, we again find that at least some people effectively anticipate a change 
in future health care costs. For instance, the probability that people within the lowest 
cost class in 2012 will uptake a 500 euro deductible in 2013 reduces from 4% to less than 
1% if they move from the lowest to the highest cost class in 2013. Still, the fact that 96% 
of those in the lowest cost class in both years sticks with a zero deductible indicates also 
here that consumer inertia and choice persistence are high.
7. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In the context of the Dutch health insurance market where people can annually choose 
a deductible level, varying from 0 to 500 euro, we find evidence of both adverse se-
lection and consumer inertia. Using data for about 9.5 million individuals who do not 
169
Is adverse selection effectively mitigated by consumer inertia?
switch health plans during a four years study period (2010-2013), we first constructed 
16 possible choice paths for people choosing a zero or 500 euro deductible. We find that 
all possible choice paths have cost patterns that are consistent with the presence of ad-
verse selection. The patterns also suggest that adverse selection may take time to arise 
since it can take several years before people with low health care cost substitute a 500 
euro for a zero deductible. In addition, the choice paths show that on average healthy 
people are able to anticipate effectively next year’s health care costs. Next, using the 
same dataset over the period 2010-2013 (including about 37.5 million observations) we 
estimated a logit model to examine to what extent the individual choice of deductible 
Figure 5. Relationship between the probability of sticking with a 500 euro deductible in 2013 and people’s 
health care cost class in 2013, for individuals with a 500 euro deductible in 2012 in six different 2012 cost 
classes
Based on model 1 for individuals with the following characteristics: income=category 3, stablelowcost=0, 
age=[40-50], gender=male, discount=222 euro.
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in 2013 can be explained by previous and future health care cost. We find clear evidence 
of adverse selection, as people with higher previous and future health care cost are sub-
stantially less likely to take up or keep a 500 euro deductible. Furthermore, our results 
also indicate that people do anticipate future health care cost as these cost can explain 
part of the variation in deductible choice given their cost in the previous year.
However, we also find clear evidence of high consumer inertia as the propensity of 
taking up a 500 euro deductible among low-cost individuals is only 3.5%, while the 
propensity of keeping a 500 euro deductible among high-cost individuals is 68%. For 
both low-cost individuals sticking with a zero deductible and high-cost individuals 
Figure 6. Relationship between the probability of changing from a zero to a 500 euro deductible in 2013 
and people’s health care cost class in 2013 , for individuals with a 500 euro deductible in 2012 in six differ-
ent 2012 cost classes
Based on model 1 for individuals with the following characteristics: income=category 3, stablelowcost=0, 
age=[40-50], gender=male, discount=222 euro.
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sticking with a 500 euro deductible, the implied monetary costs of choice persistence 
are approximately 200 euros per year. The substantial degree of consumer inertia is 
remarkable, given the very low transaction costs for enrollees involved in adjusting their 
deductible level.
By counteracting adverse selection, a certain degree of consumer inertia may be 
welfare increasing (Handel 2013, Handel and Kolstad 2015). Within the context of the 
Dutch health insurance market with regulated (or managed) competition, however, the 
presence of substantial consumer inertia may well be welfare decreasing. This is because 
the potential negative welfare effects of adverse selection are possibly substantially 
mitigated by a sophisticated system of risk equalization. Despite the presence of risk 
equalization, however, those opting for the highest deductible level appear to be profit-
able to insurers at the prevailing premium discount levels (Croes et al. 2017). Hence, an 
active policy to reduce consumer inertia may enhance adverse selection and increase 
insurers’ profits. Nevertheless, the associated negative welfare effects are likely to be 
much smaller than the positive welfare effects of enhancing active consumer choice 
because of the large share of the population currently incurring a substantial implied 
monetary loss (about 200 euro per person). This suggests that within the Dutch context, 
activities aimed at reducing consumer inertia with regard to deductible choice are likely 
to be welfare improving.
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In this thesis, we analyzed aspects of some important market failures that may hamper 
an appropriate functioning of the Dutch health care system: market power in the pro-
vider market, and selection and consumer inertia in the insurance market.
Chapter 2 tackled the issue of market power in the Dutch hospital market. Since merg-
ers are the most important source of increased market concentration, and many mergers 
took place in the Dutch hospital market, it is essential to improve our understanding of 
how hospital mergers may affect market performance. My first research question was: 
For a merger between two neighboring hospitals in the Netherlands, do the prices in-
crease after a merger and do we observe differential price changes between different 
hospital locations, different products and different insurers? We examined the price 
effect of a hospital merger for three products: hip replacement, knee replacement and 
cataract surgery. We found evidence of heterogeneous price effects across health insur-
ers, hospital products and hospital locations. After disaggregating the price effect per 
product and location, significant price increases related to the merger were found. These 
price increases, however, occurred at one of the locations of the merged hospitals and 
for one of the three products (i.e. hip replacement). Furthermore, the price effects varied 
considerably among insurers. These findings therefore suggest that when analyzing 
the effects of a hospital merger on market performance, it is important to take a more 
disaggregate approach to get a more complete picture of the relevant merger effects.
In most developed countries, a merger is submitted for approval to a competition au-
thority, which reviews the merger and decides whether it is allowed to be consummated. 
The findings in Chapter 2 show that for competition authorities it may be worthwhile to 
investigate ex ante whether a proposed hospital merger may result in price increases in 
specific sub-markets or locations. This would allow competition authorities to reveal and 
address in greater detail the potential detrimental effects of a hospital merger.
Unfortunately, predicting the effect of a hospital merger is not an easy task. Econo-
mists have developed new methods to review mergers in hospital markets, such as the 
Option Demand Method. The OD-method has clear advantages over more traditional 
market definition approaches, because it provides antitrust agencies with direct evi-
dence about the expected effects of the merger. Additionally, it does not require ques-
tionable assumptions associated with delineation of the relevant (geographic) market. 
There is, however, a lack of empirical evidence that approaches like the OD-method are 
able to give reliable predictions. My second research question therefore was: What is 
the predictive power of the Option Demand Method for mergers in the Dutch hospital 
market? In Chapter 3, we examined this question by comparing the ex-ante prediction 
of the simulation model with the ex-post observed price effects for a consummated 
hospital merger in the Netherlands.
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Our results indicated a relationship between our measure of market power and prices 
for hip replacements. We were not able to establish a relationship between market power 
and prices for knee replacements and cataract surgeries. Therefore, only a reduced-form 
merger simulation for hip replacements was estimated. The comparison between the 
reduced-form merger simulation and ex post estimates are not conclusive. Our findings 
suggest that the OD-method could be a valuable addition to the antitrust agencies 
toolkit, but that more research remains necessary.
Although prices are of course an important market outcome, for patients the quality 
of hospital care may be even more important. However, in the Dutch hospital market 
– where most prices are not regulated by the government – the potential impact of 
competition on quality is ambiguous. That is, depending on the specific market condi-
tions competition may result in lower or higher quality of care. Hence, my third research 
question was: What is the relationship between competition and quality indicators 
in the Dutch non-price-regulated hospital market? In Chapter 4, we investigated this 
question by combining patient-level claims data with information on quality indica-
tors. We examined three diagnosis groups (cataract, adenoid and tonsils, and bladder 
tumor) delivered by Dutch hospitals in the period 2008-2011. For this study period, we 
evaluated the relationship between hospitals’ quality scores and indicators of hospital 
market power. For cataract and bladder tumor, the relationship between market share 
and quality scores was found to be negative. For adenoid and tonsils, however, this re-
lationship was not statistically significant. One possible explanation for this difference is 
that the patient group for adenoid and tonsils is less complex. Mainly children younger 
than 11 years are treated for adenoid and tonsils, and these patients have relatively few 
additional diagnoses. It could be the case that patients are less sensitive to quality when 
their treatment has a lower risk of complications. Thus, for two of the three diagnosis 
groups studied, hospitals in (more) competitive markets had better quality scores than 
those in concentrated markets.
In several developed (OECD) countries, markets also play an important in the financing 
of health care. This is also the case in the Netherlands. Such health care markets consist 
of a complex interaction between consumers, insurers and providers. Generally, on the 
health insurance market consumers buy health plans from competing health insurers. 
These health plans give consumers access to a network of providers when they seek 
treatment. An insurer and a provider negotiate over the inclusion of the provider into 
the insurer’s network.
The functioning of health insurance markets can by hampered by selection problems 
and information frictions. The interaction of both phenomena, however, may reduce 
welfare problems because the latter (partly) counteracts the former. Empirical identifica-
tion of the exact extent of the selection problem is in general challenging because of 
the interaction of selection and moral hazard. The mere fact that people who choose a 
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voluntary deductible have lower health expenses does not, by itself, prove the presence 
of adverse selection. This may also be due to more cost conscious behavior induced by 
the deductible (i.e. less moral hazard). In Chapter 5, we tried to control for the moral 
hazard effect to answer my fourth research question: How large is the selection effect 
for individuals who chose voluntary deductibles in a health insurance market with 
risk-adjustment? By examining people’s deductible choice, while taking account of 
their prior health care expenses, we were able to identify the selection effect separately 
from moral hazard effect. Our analysis showed that offering contracts with voluntary 
deductibles results in self-selection by healthier individuals, who are overcompensated 
by the risk-adjustment system. The expected gains on the risk-adjustment per individual 
with a voluntary deductible of 500 euro were estimated to be around 450 euro on av-
erage. On top of this, the corresponding individuals pay a larger share out-of-pocket, 
resulting in lower costs for the insurer to be reimbursed. In return, the insurer offers the 
individual a premium discount for taking a voluntary deductible, but this discount is 
typically (much) lower than the cost savings due to self-selection.
The interaction between adverse selection and consumer inertia is the subject of my 
fifth research question: Is adverse selection effectively mitigated by consumer inertia 
in the Dutch health insurance market? In Chapter 6, using panel data on all insured 
individuals in the Netherlands over period 2010-2013, we examined this question by 
constructing all possible choice paths for people choosing a zero or 500 euro voluntary 
deductible. For each individual, his choice path is based on the possible deductible 
choices that the individual can make in each year. For each individual we can distinguish 
16 possible deductible choice paths. We found that all possible choice paths have cost 
patterns that are consistent with the presence of adverse selection. The patterns also 
suggested that on average healthy people are able to anticipate effectively next year’s 
health care costs. Estimating a logit model, we found clear evidence of adverse selection. 
That is, people with higher previous and future health care cost are substantially less 
likely to take up or keep a 500 euro deductible. However, we also found clear evidence 
of high consumer inertia as the propensity of taking up a 500 euro voluntary deductible 
among low-cost individuals is only 3.5% while such a deductible would probably be 
(very) profitable for them.
To a certain extent consumer inertia may be welfare increasing, because it counter-
acts adverse selection. Within the context of the Dutch health insurance market with 
regulated (or managed) competition, however, the presence of substantial consumer 
inertia may well be welfare decreasing. This is because the potential negative welfare 
effects of adverse selection are possibly substantially mitigated by a sophisticated 
system of risk equalization. Despite the presence of risk equalization, however, we find 
that individuals opting for the highest deductible level appear to be overcompensated 
by the risk-adjustment system. Apart from this, reducing consumer inertia on the health 
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insurance market may lead to more adverse selection. This may have a negative effect 
on consumer welfare, despite the fact that moral hazard decreases when more people 
choose voluntary deductibles. Nevertheless, the associated negative welfare effects are 
likely to be much smaller than the positive welfare effects of enhancing active consumer 
choice because of the large share of the population currently incurring a substantial im-
plied monetary loss (about 200 euro per person). This suggests that, within the current 
Dutch market for basic health insurance, activities aimed at reducing consumer inertia 
with regard to deductible choice are likely to be welfare improving. These potential 
welfare gains might even be higher if the reduction of consumer inertia is combined 
with an improvement in risk-adjustment system that reduces the expected gains on the 
risk-adjusted payments for people choosing a voluntary deductible.
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In dit proefschrift zijn twee belangrijke vormen van marktfalen geanalyseerd die een 
goede werking van het Nederlandse zorgstelsel kunnen belemmeren, te weten (i) markt-
macht in de zorgverleningsmarkt en (ii) selectie en inertie in de zorgverzekeringsmarkt.
Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt het probleem van marktmacht in de Nederlandse zieken-
huismarkt. De belangrijkste oorzaak van de stijging van de marktconcentratie in de 
Nederlandse ziekenhuismarkt is het groot aantal fusies tussen ziekenhuizen. Daarom is 
het van belang om goed te begrijpen hoe fusies tussen ziekenhuizen de werking van de 
ziekenhuismarkt beïnvloeden. De eerste onderzoeksvraag was: Stijgen de prijzen van 
ziekenhuiszorg na een fusie tussen twee naburige ziekenhuizen in Nederland? En zien 
we variatie in de prijsveranderingen tussen verschillende ziekenhuislocaties, verschil-
lende producten en verschillende zorgverzekeraars? We hebben het prijseffect van een 
ziekenhuisfusie geanalyseerd voor drie producten: heupvervanging, knievervanging en 
staaroperatie. Onze resultaten toonden aan dat er heterogene prijseffecten zijn tussen 
ziekenhuislocaties, producten en zorgverzekeraars. Wanneer we het prijseffect splitsen 
naar locatie en product, vonden we significantie prijsstijgingen die gerelateerd zijn aan 
de fusie. Deze prijsstijgingen vonden plaats bij één van de twee locaties en alleen bij 
één van de drie producten (heupvervanging). Daarnaast varieerde het prijseffect sterk 
tussen de verschillende zorgverzekeraars. Deze bevindingen geven aan dat, wanneer 
we het effect van een fusie op de ziekenhuismarkt analyseren, het belangrijk is om op 
de effecten op verschillende niveaus te onderzoeken om een completer beeld te krijgen 
van de prijseffecten van de fusie.
In de meeste ontwikkelde landen melden ziekenhuizen een nieuwe fusie eerst bij een 
mededingingsautoriteit. De mededingingsautoriteit onderzoekt de fusie en beslist of de 
fusie mag doorgaan. De resultaten in Hoofdstuk 2 geven aan dat het de moeite waard 
kan zijn voor een mededingingsautoriteit om vooraf (ex ante) te onderzoeken of de 
fusie mogelijke prijsstijgingen kan veroorzaken in specifieke sub-markten of locaties. Dit 
geeft de mededingingsautoriteit de mogelijkheid om uitvoerig de mogelijke negatieve 
effecten van de fusie in kaart te brengen en te adresseren.
Helaas is het voorspellen van de effecten van een ziekenhuisfusie niet eenvoudig. 
Economen hebben nieuwe methoden ontwikkeld om fusies te beoordelen, zoals de Op-
tion Demand Methode (OD-Methode). De OD-methode heeft duidelijke voordelen ten 
opzichte van de meer traditionele marktafbakening methoden, omdat de OD-methode 
een directe schatting doet van de effecten van een fusie. Ook vereist het geen aanvecht-
bare aannames, zoals die wel gebruikt worden bij methoden voor marktafbakening. Er 
is echter een gebrek aan empirisch bewijs dat benaderingen zoals de OD-methode in 
staat zijn betrouwbare voorspellingen te doen. Vandaar de tweede onderzoeksvraag: 
Wat is de voorspellende kracht van de Option Demand Methode voor fusies in de 
Nederlandse ziekenhuismarkt? In Hoofdstuk 3 hebben we deze vraag onderzocht door 
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de ex-ante voorspelling van een simulatiemodel te vergelijken met de ex-post waarge-
nomen prijseffecten voor een voltooide ziekenhuisfusie in Nederland.
Onze resultaten toonden aan dat er een verband bestaat tussen onze marktmacht 
indicator en de prijzen voor heupvervanging. Onze bevindingen suggereren dat de 
OD-methode een waardevolle aanvulling zou kunnen zijn voor de mededingingsautori-
teiten, maar dat er meer onderzoek nodig blijft.
Hoewel prijzen natuurlijk een belangrijk marktresultaat zijn, kan de kwaliteit van de 
ziekenhuiszorg voor patiënten nog belangrijker zijn. Op de Nederlandse ziekenhuis-
markt - waar de meeste prijzen niet door de overheid worden gereguleerd maar vrij 
onderhandelbaar zijn - is de potentiële impact van concurrentie op de kwaliteit op voor-
hand onduidelijk. Dat wil zeggen, afhankelijk van de specifieke marktomstandigheden 
kan concurrentie resulteren in een lagere of hogere kwaliteit van zorg. Vandaar de derde 
onderzoeksvraag: Wat is de relatie tussen concurrentie en kwaliteitsindicatoren in de 
Nederlandse ziekenhuismarkt waar prijzen vrij onderhandelbaar zijn?
In hoofdstuk 4 hebben we deze vraag onderzocht door DBC-data op patiëntniveau te 
combineren met informatie over kwaliteitsindicatoren. We onderzochten drie diagnose-
groepen (staar, keel- en neusamandelen, en blaastumor) uitgevoerd door Nederlandse 
ziekenhuizen in de periode 2008-2011. Voor deze onderzoeksperiode evalueerden we 
de relatie tussen de kwaliteitsscores en de marktmacht indicatoren van de ziekenhuizen. 
Voor staar (cataract) en blaastumor vonden we een negatieve relatie tussen marktaan-
deel en kwaliteitsscores. Voor keel- en neusamandelen was deze relatie echter niet sta-
tistisch significant. Een mogelijke verklaring voor dit verschil is dat de patiëntengroep 
voor keel- en neusamandelen minder complex is. Voornamelijk kinderen jonger dan 11 
jaar worden behandeld voor keel- en neusamandelen. Deze patiënten hebben relatief 
weinig aanvullende diagnoses. Het kan zijn dat patiënten minder gevoelig zijn voor 
kwaliteit bij behandelingen met een lager risico op complicaties. Voor twee van de drie 
onderzochte diagnosegroepen hadden ziekenhuizen in (meer) concurrerende markten 
betere kwaliteitsscores dan ziekenhuizen in geconcentreerde markten.
In verschillende ontwikkelde (OESO) landen spelen markten ook een belangrijke rol 
bij de financiering van de gezondheidszorg. Dit is ook het geval in Nederland. Dergelijke 
zorgmarkten bestaan uit een complexe interactie tussen consumenten, verzekeraars 
en aanbieders. Over het algemeen kopen consumenten polissen van concurrerende 
zorgverzekeraars. Deze polissen geven consumenten toegang tot een netwerk van 
gecontracteerde aanbieders wanneer zij medische behandeling nodig hebben. Een ver-
zekeraar en een aanbieder onderhandelen over de contractvoorwaarden (prijs, volume 
en kwaliteit van zorg).
Het functioneren van de zorgverzekeringsmarkt kan worden belemmerd door selec-
tie- en informatieproblemen. Informatieproblemen kunnen selectieproblemen echter 
verminderen wanneer consumenten minder of trager (dat wil zeggen inert) reageren 
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op premieverschillen. Dit betekent dat het beter informeren van consumenten op de 
zorgverzekeringsmarkt vanuit maatschappelijk perspectief per saldo ongunstig kan 
uitpakken. Empirische identificatie van de exacte omvang van het selectieprobleem is 
over het algemeen een uitdaging vanwege de interactie tussen selectie en moreel risico. 
Het enkele feit dat mensen die kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico lagere gezond-
heidskosten hebben, bewijst op zichzelf niet dat er sprake is van adverse selectie. Dit 
kan ook te wijten zijn aan meer kostenbewust gedrag veroorzaakt door het vrijwillig 
eigen risico (dat wil zeggen, minder moreel risico).
In Hoofdstuk 5 probeerden we voor het moreel risico-effect te controleren om de 
vierde onderzoeksvraag te kunnen beantwoorden: Hoe groot is het selectie-effect 
voor individuen die vrijwillig eigen risico kiezen in een zorgverzekeringsmarkt met 
risicoverevening? We hebben op het niveau van individuele verzekerden geanalyseerd 
welke keuzes zij hebben gemaakt voor het vrijwillig eigen risico. Hierbij hebben we re-
kening gehouden met hun eerdere zorgkosten. Hierdoor konden we het selectie-effect 
onderscheiden van het moreel risico-effect. Uit onze analyse blijkt dat het aanbieden 
van contracten met een vrijwillig eigen risico resulteert in zelfselectie door gezondere 
personen. Bovendien blijken deze personen overgecompenseerd te worden door het 
risicovereveningsysteem. De verwachte winst op het risicovereveningsysteem per 
individu met een vrijwillig eigen risico van 500 euro wordt geschat op ongeveer 450 
euro (gemiddeld). Dit voordeel komt voor de verzekeraars bovenop het voordeel van 
lagere kosten doordat verzekerden met een vrijwillig eigen risico een groter deel van 
de zorgkosten uit eigen zak betalen. In ruil voor deze voordelen biedt de verzekeraar 
een premiekorting aan voor het nemen van een vrijwillig eigen risico, maar deze korting 
is meestal (veel) lager dan de kostenbesparingen als gevolg van zelfselectie en hogere 
eigen betalingen door de consument.
De interactie tussen adverse selectie en inert consumentengedrag leidt tot de 
vijfde onderzoeksvraag: Wordt adverse selectie effectief verzacht door inertie van 
consumenten in de Nederlandse zorgverzekeringsmarkt? In hoofdstuk 6 hebben we 
deze vraag onderzocht met behulp van paneldata over alle verzekerden in Nederland 
gedurende de periode 2010-2013. Hiervoor hebben we alle mogelijke keuzepaden 
geconstrueerd voor individuen die een vrijwillig eigen risico van nul of 500 euro hebben 
gekozen. Voor elk individu is zijn keuzepad gebaseerd op de mogelijke vrijwillig eigen 
risico keuzes die het individu elk jaar kan maken. Voor elk individu kunnen we op die 
manier 16 mogelijke vrijwillig eigen risico keuzepaden onderscheiden. We hebben 
vastgesteld dat alle mogelijke keuzepaden kostenpatronen hebben die consistent zijn 
met de aanwezigheid van adverse selectie. De patronen suggereren ook dat gezonde 
mensen, gemiddeld gezien, in staat zijn om effectief te anticiperen op hun toekomstige 
zorgkosten. We hebben op basis van de data ook een logit-model geschat van de indivi-
duele keuze voor een vrijwillig eigen risico. We vonden duidelijk bewijs van adverse se-
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lectie. Dat wil zeggen dat mensen met hoge voorgaande en toekomstige kosten voor de 
gezondheidszorg aanzienlijk minder geneigd zijn om een vrijwillig eigen risico bedrag 
van 500 euro te nemen of te houden. We vonden echter ook duidelijk bewijs van een 
substantiële consumenteninertie: de kans om een vrijwillig eigen risico van 500 euro te 
nemen bij personen met lage kosten is slechts 3,5% terwijl een dergelijk vrijwillig eigen 
risico voor de meeste van hen waarschijnlijk (zeer) winstgevend zou zijn.
Tot op zekere hoogte kan de consumenteninertie welvaartsverhogend zijn, omdat het 
adverse selectie tegengaat. In het kader van de Nederlandse zorgverzekeringsmarkt met 
gereguleerde concurrentie kan de aanwezigheid van substantiële consumenteninertie 
echter negatief uitpakken voor de consumentenwelvaart. Dit komt omdat de potentiële 
negatieve welvaartseffecten van adverse selectie mogelijk aanzienlijk worden beperkt 
door een uitgebreid systeem van risicoverevening. Ondanks de aanwezigheid van risico-
verevening, vinden we dat individuen die kiezen voor het hoogste vrijwillig eigen risico 
overgecompenseerd worden door het risicovereveningsysteem. Los hiervan kan het 
verminderen van de consumenteninertie op de zorgverzekeringsmarkt mogelijk leiden 
tot meer adverse selectie. Dit kan, afgezien van het feit dat wanneer meer mensen een 
vrijwillig eigen risico kiezen de moral hazard afneemt, een negatieve effect hebben op 
de consumentenwelvaart. Niettemin zullen de bijbehorende negatieve welvaartseffec-
ten waarschijnlijk veel kleiner zijn dan de positieve welvaartseffecten van het verbete-
ren van de actieve consumentenkeuze vanwege het grote aandeel van de bevolking 
dat momenteel een aanzienlijk hogere premie betaalt dan noodzakelijk (ongeveer 200 
euro per persoon). Dit suggereert dat, binnen de huidige Nederlandse zorgverzeke-
ringsmarkt, activiteiten die gericht zijn op het verminderen van de consumentinertie 
met betrekking tot vrijwillig eigen risico waarschijnlijk een positief effect hebben op de 
consumentenwelvaart. Deze potentiële welvaartswinsten kunnen zelfs hoger zijn als de 
vermindering consumenteninertie wordt gecombineerd met een verbetering van het 
risicovereveningssysteem om de overcompensatie voor mensen die een vrijwillig eigen 
risico kiezen te verminderen.

